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PREFACE

The lives of 6,000,000 persons in New York
City and its suburbs were snuffed out yester
day afternoon at 2:50 o'clock when an air
fleet of six hundred Coalition bombing planes
laid a blanket of diphenyl chloroarsine and
cacodyl isocyanide gas over Manhattan Island
and the metropolitan area, killing every man,
woman, child, beast, plant, and other living
things in New York City's five boroughs and
their immediate environs. . . . Over 36,000,000
persons are reported to have been killed by gas
throughout the world in the past twelve hours.
New York, London, Paris, Calais, Brussels, Ber
lin, and Vienna are unpopulated cities today,
for air raids took the lives of all their inhabi
tants yesterday afternoon and last evening.

This graphic 1931 account^- of Armageddon was not the product of
a science fiction writer nor was it written for one of the flourishing
pulp magazines.

Rather, it was an ominous warning written by a sober

American journalist for a respectable magazine.

He was indisputably

concerned with the destructive power of the strategic bomber.

More

over, the article illustrated an anxiety prevalent throughout the west
ern world.

Even a brief survey of newspapers, magazines, and books in

all significant western nations reveals how intensely fear of the
bomber gripped the imagination of informed people between the two world
wars.
The source of this fear can be traced to the summer of 1917 when
the Germans revolutionized warfare by initiating the first prolonged

^Paul D. Gesner, "The Morning After," Forum, LXXXVI (October 1931),
p. 240.
iv
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independent strategic bombing operations.

Almost all of the German

bombing raids were directed against England.

In response to these

attacks the British developed a surprisingly intricate air defense
system.

Neverthaless, the bombers continued to reach London and its

environs until the spring of 1918.

By then, too, other bombing for

mations swept across western Germany, France, Austria, and Italy.
In the years following the Armistice, the bomber loomed ever
larger in the minds of political leaders, far-sighted military of
ficers, and air oriented observers.

They were confronted with the

world’s first ultimate weapon; a weapon unstoppable once unleashed
and capable of destroying entire cities— even civilization itself.
Permeated with the horrors of World War I the concerned statesmen
adopted two policies to counter the bomber menace:

the threat of

instantaneous reprisal and desperate attempts to limit or abolish the
bomber.

However, this bomber menace is conspicuously missing in

post-World War II historical literature.

Therefore, this study will

attempt to partially fill this gap.
With the abundant information available and the advantage of the
perspective acquired after more than forty years, it is feasible to
investigate how military and political thought was influenced by the
strategic bomber and how this, in turn, permeated the population at
large.

This investigation will only attempt to examine the situation

as it existed between 1917 to 1933.

Furthermore, it does not concern

itself with the details of national and international policy during

v
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this period.

Numerous renowned historians have already examined

these questions from every viewpoint.

It is hoped that this in

vestigation will contribute to a better understanding of the inter
war period.

Nor is this study without contemporary relevance.

Al

though today's version of the ultimate weapon has been refined to a
frightful level of destructiveness, a comparison of the human re
sponse in the two periods is indeed interesting.

Finally, the result

of this investigation is submitted, with all due modesty, in the
spirit in which the Byzantine Emperor Maurice offered his treatise
on the art of war in the sixth century:
If, then, anything of value be found in this work,
thanks be to Almighty God, who has given us the
skill to express it. And if any commander, through
his own experience and diligence, shall find a bet
ter guide, thanks be again to God, the Giver of all
good things; but may our work be judged leniently,
by reason of our zealous endeavor.
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CHAPTER I

THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW ERA

Perhaps the spectacle was prophetic of the war of
the future, when invading aircraft, equipped as
these were with bombs, will fly so tightly packed
and so well drilled in aerial tactics that they
will be to all intents and purposes flying for
tresses, strong against assault.
L. E. 0. Charlton on 13 June
1917 Gotha Raid on London

Aeronautical advancement remained predominantly in civilian hands
during the half decade following the Wright brothers first successful
flight.

Only small groups of intrepid officers risked their lives and

careers to advance aviation in their respective nations.

In the United

States Lieutenants Benjamin D. Foulois, Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, and
Thomas DeW. Milling labored to raise the Aviation Section of the Signal
Corps (founded 1907) to European standards.

Yet despite their efforts

and Congressional appropriations for the establishment of a military
flying school at College Park, Maryland, American aviation made little
headway.

Conservative officers flatly refused to have anything to do

with airplanes.

They argued that aircraft flew too fast to permit ac

curate military observation, and even worse, they unnecessarily com
plicated the problems of modern warfare.
In France aviation advanced at a more rapid pace in spite of an
airship oriented military leadership.

When general antipathy towards

airplanes and their "somewhat crazy" pilots began to evaporate in the
summer of 1909, not even the airship proponents could prevent the

1
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formation of a military aviation "Phalanx" in February 1910 or their
participation in the autumn maneuvers.

A year later French pilots

pioneered aerial artillery observation, and in February 1912, they
were organized into the Aviation Bureau of the Engineers.

Under this

reorganization the embryonic air service received its own aviation
parks and repair shops for twenty-seven field squadrons, but suddenly
atrophied to a mere twenty-two pilots in 1913.^

Public indignation,

aroused by the disclosure of this situation, created a minor govern
mental crisis.

Consequently, the Minister of War separated aircraft

and airship units of 21 February 1914 and placed each under its own
command structure.

This timely decision undoubtedly enabled the French

to mobilize the second largest air service in August 1914.
Imperial Germany, the home of Graf von Zeppelin, also remained
airship oriented until 1909 when the General Staff displayed its first
cautious interest in aircraft.

Although the General Staff established

a flying school at DSberitz and placed all air personnel under the
command of transport troops, the rudimentary air arm began the year
1910 without aircraft.

In fact, German airmen were anything but happy

when their first aircraft turned out to be mere copies of Wright "box
kites."

Another two years passed, however, before the German aircraft

industry received the needed support which enabled the Germans to mo
bilize the largest air contingent at the start of World War I.

"\john R. Cuneo, Winged Mars, 2 vols. (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Mili
tary Service Publishing Company, 1942), vol. 1: The German Air Weapon,
1870-1914, pp. 151-59; C. G. Grey, ed., Janes All the World’s Aircraft,
1919 (London: Sampson Low Marston, 1919; reprint ed., New York: Aero
Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 213-14.
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British aviators fared little better than their American cousins
until Louis Bldriot flew across the English Channel on 25 July 1909.
His feat excited the imagination and patriotism of Captains J. D. B.
Fuller, Bertram Dickson, and a handful of others who likewise recog
nized this new threat to British security.

Their unflagging efforts

were instrumental in the establishment of the Air Battalion of the
Royal Engineers on 1 April 1911 and the creation of the Royal Flying
Corps (RFC) one year later.

Spurred by the Zeppelin scares of 1912

and 1913, the RFC counterbalanced inadequate equipment and insufficient
strength with esprit * de corps and personal initiative.

This quickly

became the trademark of the Upavon Central Flying School under the
direction of Major Hugh M. Trenchard; but the older services took
little interest in aeronautical acrobatics.

In fact, Sir Douglas Haig,

future Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the British Expeditionary Force
in France, remarked in 1911 that flying would never benefit the army,
and as late as 1914, urged his officers not to be so foolish as to
think that aircraft could be usefully employed for reconnaissance
purposes.'*'

In the view of most ranking officers in 1914 aircraft

were nothing more than a nuisance and a poor substitute for cavalry.

Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing: A Study of the
Development of British Air Strategic Thought and Practice up to 1918
(London: William Kimber and Co., Ltd., 1973), pp. 48-49.
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The Bitter Fruit of Trench Warfare

As far as those in authority were concerned the First World War
began generally as envisioned.
issued.

Ultimatums and declarations of war were

The armed forces were mobilized.

into a storm of patriotism.
rallied to the colors.

Pride and passion exploded

Socialists, monarchists, and republicans

Men marched to war amidst a crescendo of mar

tial music and through crowds of cheering people who deluged them with
flowers and encouragements.

Women kissed their loved ones farewell

knowing that they would only be gone six weeks, certainly no more than
three months.

But it must be kept in mind that the Europeans who

cheered the war in 1914 were imbued with frenzied enthusiasm nourished
by nearly half a century of peace.

Psychologically they were still

rooted in the nineteenth century.
The Campaigns in August did little to alter pre-war conclusions.
The Germans unleashed one and one-half million men through the gap be
tween the Dutch border and the Ardennes.

The Fortress of Liege was

systematically reduced by 420-mm. field guns and capitulated on 16 Au
gust.

Brussels fell on 20 August.

Meanwhile, the Battles of the

Frontier in Alsace-Lorraine presaged the new character of this war.
Completely dedicated to L'attaque *a eutranee, a doctrine advocating
a series of unhesitating glorious charges, the French attacked en
masse all along the frontier.

Attired in red trousers and blue over

coats, encumbered with heavy field packs and led by white-gloved of
ficers, the French frequently charged over as much as half a mile
before grappling with their Feldgrau foe.

Consequently, the seemingly

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

5

ubiquitous machine guns exacted a heavy toll and by 25 August the
French were thrown back to Nancy and Verdun.
After sweeping through most of Belgium, the Germans enjoyed simi
lar success against Field Marshal Sir John French’s British Expedi
tionary Force (BEF) at Mons.

After a brief, but fierce, engagement,

the heavily outnumbered British retreated before General Alexander
von Kluck's First Army.

Then, on 31 August, General Helmuth von

Moltke made the first of the many grave errors so characteristic of
this war; he abandoned the planned sweep west of Paris and turned east
of it in expectation of rolling up the Fifth French Army.

The maneu

ver exposed von Kluck's own flank, and a timely French counter-attack
brought about the strategic victory on the Marne.

Because of this

setback General Erich von Falkenhayn replaced von Moltke on 14 Septem
ber and immediately moved his headquarters from Luxembourg to Charleville on the Meuse.
The six weeks following the Battle of the Marne are marked by a
series of attempts by each side to turn the opponents’ western flank.
This final period of mobility has often been called "The Race to the
Sea."

S. L. A. Marshal'*' more trenchantly called it "a succession of

lurches."

He also attributes General J. C. Joffre’s (French C-in-C)

slow reaction in covering this open flank to a shell shortage.

B. H.

2
Liddell Hart,

on the other hand, ascribed it to Joffre's limited

^S. L. A. Marshal, World War I (New York:
Press, 1971), p. 126.

American Heritage

2
B. H. Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914-1918 (London:
Faber, Ltd., 1930), p. 116.
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imagination which never quite grasped the situation.

When he finally

awoke to the idea of moving fresh troops laterally by rail to outflank
the Germans, it was always "an army corps too few and twenty-four
hours too late."
The First Battle of Ypres (20 October— 24 November) concluded the
lateral movement towards the Channel and nearly wiped out the BEF.
The Germans incessantly attacked the salient around the Belgian village
of Ypres for ten days and nearly broke through.

Then the British

counter-attacked; but each successive attack only strengthened the
embryonic trench system.

When the battle finally ebbed, very little

of the original BEF survived.

As a result of the Ypres stalemate there

existed a continuous trench system from Switzerland to the Channel.
This anomalous development cost each side nearly a million casualties.
Only Falkenhayn recognized the inevitability of a long war.

Conse

quently, he ordered that field fortifications be refined and the rail
road expanded laterally behind the front to assure continuous movement
of reserves and supplies.^"
The year 1915 is notable for two distinct traits:

increased

lethal firepower concentrated in a refined trench system and extreme
Allied optimism.

As Liddell Hart

2

pointed out, the wisest course of

action would have been to postpone action until munitions were stock
piled and the armies reinforced.

But the French desire to regain lost

territory, combined with a total lack of imagination and ill-founded

Hoc. cit., p. 131.

2
loc. cit., p. 146.
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optimism, spurred Joffre to launch a series of premature offensives.
This, more than anything else, explains the costly battles of Artois,
Champagne, and Neuve Chapelle which spanned the first four months of
1915.

These attacks gained little, if any, ground and only managed

to sink the trenches more firmly into the ground.

Having learned

absolutely nothing, the Allies continued to launch a series of dif
fused and unconnected attacks throughout the spring and summer.

Among

these, the Second Battle of Ypres clearly illustrated the hideous con
sequences of inept leadership.
None of the battles of 1915 approached Allied expectations.

Each

one began with a thunderous roar of cannon only to degenerate into
unconnected and miserable local exercises of meaningless slaughter.
Yet the Allies believed that only bad weather and inadequate supplies
prevented these "brilliant" tactical victories from developing into
total victory.'*'

By the end of the year the Germans lost over 600,000

men and the Allies nearly 1,500,000 plus their first C-in-C— Haig re
placed French in November.
The year 1916 marked the watershed of the war.

Before the battles

of Verdun and the Somme, Allied commanders frequently voiced optimistic
forecasts on the rapid and successful conclusion of the war.

They were

not concerned with troop morale even after one and one-half years of
appalling casualties.

All this changed in the two immense battles of

1916.

^Marshal, World War I, op. cit., pp. 234-36.
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In December 1915 Falkenhayn arrived at the dubious conclusion
that Germany's one chance of victory rested on his ability to bleed
the French Army white.

He also realized that the French would not

accommodate him unless he chose a sentimental target.
citadel of Verdun met all criteria.

The ancient

The French could never willingly

surrender the town where Charlemagne's heirs divided Europe and where
Vauban had so diligently labored to give the word "France" that certain
ring of arrogance.

Moreover, the main German railroad line came close

enough to facilitate rapid reinforcement and supply.
With an amazing degree of secrecy the Germans assembled 1,220
artillery pieces of all calibre and began the longest battle in history
(21 February— 15 December) with an unprecedented bombardment.

Over

two million shells— at a rate of 100,000 an hour— drenched the fortstudded six-mile front.^

The world disintegrated around the French

soldiers who now saw war plunge to new depths of depravity.

In the

following months entire forests vanished and infantrymen perished by
the thousands.

Often firing 1,500-2,000 rounds an hour, the artillery

dominated everything for nearly a year.

A bullet wound was a godsend

since most casualties resulted from shell-fire.

Altogether both sides

fired 40 million shells or two hundred for each casualty— enough to
fight eight wars the size of Korea.
horror beyond belief.

2

It was slaughter without limits;

After ten months the Verdun "Mincing Machine"

claimed half a million Frenchmen and nearly 400,000 Germans.

1ibid.

2
loc. cit., p. 246.
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The successful defense of Verdun was both a symbolic and Pyrrhic
victory.
house.

Three-fourths of the French Army went through that charnel
Some units returned two or three times.

Although the Battle

of the Somme saved Verdun, it could not save French morale.

Only a few

months later General Robert Nivelle discovered how vapid French morale
had become.

Henceforth the burden of attack rested on the British.

Even though Haig advanced the date of the Somme Offensive from
August to 23 June, he refused to dispense with the week-long artillery
preparations; he believed that this would allow his men to simply walk
over to the German line.

It never occurred to him that this process

of flattening the trenches would create thousands of equally protective
shell holes.

In any event, the Germans were well prepared and not at

all surprised on 1 July 1916.
Describing the first day o.i the Somme, Marshall^ rhetorically
wrote that the British jumped into the "exploding unknown" at 7:28
o

A.M.

But Liddell Hart,

who was there, wrote that "the whole mass

of assaulting infantry was formed up in a series of close-packed
lines, which were to advance simultaneously."

And so eight waves, not

more than 100 yards apart, advanced shoulder to shoulder at a slow pace
toward the German lines along a fifteen-mile front.

This attack, remin

iscent of the eighteenth century, marked the nadir of modern infantry

^loc. cit., p. 251.
^B. H. Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart, vol. I
(London: Cassel, 1956), pp. 20-23; Liddell Hart, The Real War, op. cit.,
pp. 222-53. The experience of his battalion was quite typical on the
Somme. In three days it shrank from 800 to 74 men.
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attacks.

Struck down like human bowling pins, the British lost nearly

60,000 men that day.

In World War II it took the first twenty days of

the Normandy invasion before the combined Anglo-American casualties
reached this level.
After the first day Haig should have quit.

But he stubbornly

adopted Falkenhayn's tactic of attrition and the Somme deteriorated
into a blood bath rivaling Verdun.

The assiduous attacks and mutual

slaughter continued into November when winter rains finally suspended
operations.

Altogether the battle cost the British 420,000 casualties,

the French 195,000, and the Germans 650,000.
The shock-waves of the Verdun-Somme disaster reached the highest
governmental echelons.

On the German side the Hindenburg-Ludendorff

team replaced Falkenhayn.

In France Joffre was "kicked upstairs" and

the minister of war vanished in the governmental shake-up.
Prime Minister Asquith gave way to David Lloyd George.
vived the general shake-up.
a long shadow.

In Britain

Only Haig sur

The Battle of the Somme undeniably cast

Few men have more poignantly described the bitter fruit

sown by this offensive than former Air Marshal Sholto Douglas:^
In the minds ofthe men of my generation the year
1916 stands for only one thing:
the battles that were
waged on the Somme during the summer and autumn. In
those battles there died the last shreds of the blithe
spirit with which we had
set off to the war nearly two
years before, and inits place came the beginning of the
disillusionment that was to enter into the hearts and minds
of so many of my generation. . . . It was in that year of
1916 that the world which we had been brought up to be
lieve in finally seemed to fly to pieces. . . .

^Sholto Douglas [Lord Douglas of Kirtleside], Combat and Command:
The Story of an Airman in Two World Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1966), p. 102.
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The year 1916 closed in an atmosphere of disappointment and
frustration.

Offensives on all fronts had misfired.

The Somme had

failed to produce any visible results in any way proportionate to the
drain of British manpower.

The British were also disappointed with

the negative results of the great naval battle off Jutland.
the submarine threatened to sever Britain's lifeline.

Meanwhile,

Among the Allies

there developed a growing sense of depression and the first suggestions
of a possible peace settlement.

Furthermore, Russian strength was

visibly at its nadir and Joffre warned that the French Army could fight
only one more big battle.^The Germans were not in much better shape.

The demoralizing ef

fects of Verdun and the losses on the Somme negated success in the East.
On the home front German civilians began to feel the full impact of the
blockade.

Bread was rationed, butter was scarce, and the "Turnip Win

ter" left deep scars.

Not surprisingly the Germans increasingly con

sidered Britain the strongest foe.

Victory, they concluded, hinged on

their ability to "knock out" Britain.
Both sides desperately searched for some means to resurrect move
ment in the face of heavy defensive fire.

This became increasingly

urgent to the British after the abortive Gallipoli venture which pre
vented them from circumventing the trench system by sweeping through
the Balkans and into Austria.

Moreover, such minor innovations as the

light machine gun, the mortar, and the flame thrower failed to dent
the trench barrier.

A few key people finally recognized the importance

^Liddell Hart, The Real War, op. cit., p. 320.
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of Colonel Swinton's tank which was invulnerable to machine-gun fire
and capable of crossing trenches.

But the unimaginative Haig, in his

desperate attempt to break through on the Somme, prematurely committed
a handful of tanks to battle and thereby lost the efficacy of a massed
surprise attack.
A few imaginative Germans likewise sought some way to break the
deadlock directly or indirectly.

Their first venture failed miserably

when the obdurate General Staff hesitantly discharged gas during the
Second Battle of Ypres without proper reserves.

They next resorted to

submarine warfare, but indecisiveness once again frustrated high expec
tations.

Meanwhile, few observers realized that the reorganization of

the German Air Force in 1916 and the mandate for General Erich von
Hoeppner to organize a strategic bomber force unleashed a new lethal
idea.
It is inconceivable that the airplane would have evolved from its
negligible role at the outset of the war into such an important means
of attack were it not for the long trench stalemate.

Nothing else

could have spurred aeronautical engineering and aerial tactics as
quickly as the necessities of war.

Likewise, the necessity of finding

an alternative to trench warfare spurred the imagination and some
visionaries quickly foresaw the possibilities of long-range bombing.
Lord Northcliff^ aptly pointed this out in a post-war oration:
We thought that the very small piece of sea we had
around us would be our safeguard. But one Sunday morning

^"Our Future in the Air," Times (London), 8 May 1920, p. 17.
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M. Bleriot arrived at Dover, and a few thinking people
began to realize at once that our position was entirely
changed. Unfortunately for us most of these thinking
people lived in Germany. . . .
Indeed, Major Wilhelm Siegert first suggested bombing England in the
fall of 1914 and even received permission from the German Army High
Command (OHL) to do so.

Only the lack of adequate aircraft thwarted

this ambitious plan.^
In 1916 the High Command clearly recognized the growing impor
tance of airpower by creating a separate air service on 8 October and
placing it under Hoeppner's command.

Combining enthusiasm for airpower

with administrative ability, and relying frequently on the sound advice
of his chief of staff, Lt. Col. Hermann von der Lieth-Thomsen, Hoeppner
revived Siegert*s old plan since a recently developed bomber made it
feasible.

He pointed out to OHL that airship raids on London were no

longer practical and that thirty of the new bombers could be operative
by February 1917.

Eighteen of them, he added, could carry a payload

equal to three airships and "so far three airships have never reached
London simultaneously."

He finally received authorization to create

an independent "England Squadron" and based it at Ghistelles, Belgium,
under the code name TUrkenkreuz.

Within a few weeks, though, two

flights were sent to both Gontrode and St. Denis-Westrem— each about
170 miles from London.

^Raymond H. Fredette, The Sky on Fire; The First Battle of
Britain 1917-1918 and the Birth of the Royal Air Force (New York;
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 34-35.
o
H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, vol. V (London:
versity Press, 1935), p. 20.

Oxford Uni
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General Hoeppner anticipated that the bombing of British towns
would cause enough panic among civilians to compel the withdrawal of
English units from France and thereby weaken the Western Front.

The

audacious general hoped to accomplish this with the Gothaer Wagonfabrik
A.G. G.IV twin-engined Gotha.

To most pilots of that day the Gotha

was the largest and most awesome biplane in existence.

Displaying

an impressive 77-foot wing span and. a sleek 40-foot fuselage, the Gotha
could carry a 2,722 pound bomb load up to 500 miles.

Although limited

to a 21,000-foot ceiling, it easily carried a three-man crew at 12,000
feet at nearly 80 mph:

nor was the Gotha defenseless.

With one ma

chine-gun mounted forward, one aft, and one aimed downward to the rear,
British pilots soon learned to respect it.^
Much to Hoeppner’s annoyance, though, the promised aircraft failed
to arrive in February 1917.

The "England Squadron" did not receive its

full complement of bombers or trained personnel until March.

Because

of the squadron's unique mission and the complete lack of training man
uals or experience, the spirited crews chafed at the bit as they endured
several more weeks of simulated bomb runs and practice flights over
water.

In the last week of May the crews finally received the long-

awaited order to embark upon an independent strategic bombing campaign.
Hoeppner did not confine himself to a single weapon system; he
anxiously awaited the Riesenfleugzeug (giant airplane).

Even before

■^Grey, Janes All the World's Aircraft, 1919, op. cit., p. 299;
John W. R. Taylor, ed., Combat Aircraft of the World (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1969), p. 160. One of the many myths coming out of the
war had it that the Gotha was but a mere copy of the British Handley
Page which fell into German hands.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission

15

the war the Zeppelin works at Stuttgart considered building such air
craft, but dropped the idea when the General Staff expressed no in
terest in them.

Therefore, credit for the first four-engined giant

aircraft flight goes to Igor Sikorsky of Imperial Russia.
Mourumetz" first flew in 1914.

His "Ilia

Between February 1915 and October 1917

formations of ten or more "Ilias" flew 422 sorties and dropped 2,300
bombs on German positions and marshalling yards.^

Their continued

success revived German interest in four-engined bombers.
The German Giants were the first true strategic bombers to be
used in the West.

Original specifications called for a multi-engined

bomber with long-range, heavy payload capacity, and an enclosed wire
less equipped cabin.

However, the crews unique ability to repair

faulty engines in flight set this 9-ton Giant apart from all other aircraft.

2

Moreover, the R-bomber was a giant by any standards.

Its 138-

foot wing span was 35 feet longer than the World War II B-17 Flying
Fortress, and one foot longer than the ultramodern American B-l strate
gic bomber.

Air power came of age with the Giant.

Manned by a crew

of seven, armed with six machine-guns, and able to cruise up to ten
hours at 80 mph with a one and one-half ton payload,

3

the Giant anti

quated the Gotha and clearly presaged intercontinental warfare.

G. W. Haddow and Peter M. Grosz, The German Giants: The Story
of the R-planes, 1914-1919, 2nd ed. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969),
pp. 70-71. The "Ilia" had an enclosed cockpit, a 102-foot wing span,
and a 66-foot fuselage.
o
loc. cit., pp. 4-6.
^Taylor, Combat Aircraft of tke World, op. cit., pp. 194-95.
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Target:

"Fortress London"

In August 1914 the British eagerly prepared for war.
by the thousands flocked to the colors.

Volunteers

Not even the retreat from Mons

could shake confidence back home.

At the same time, however, the name

of Zeppelin was a household word.

Yet the dreaded Zeppelin failed to

appear.

Britain's sky remained inviolable for five months.

The first

airship raid struck Norfolk on 19 January 1915 and London was spared
until 31 May.

Since Mr. Robinson and Mr. Poolman^ have satisfactorily

dealt with the Zeppelin raids, it is sufficient to note here that the
Zeppelin raids were sporadic, unreliable, susceptible to the weather,
and with the introduction of incendiary bullets, thoroughl}’ defeated.
Until the spring of 1918 the airships certainly caused alarm, a Zep
pelin psychosis, and nights of terror when sudden death came from the
sky; but it was simply a transitional weapon.
The age of strategic bombing burst suddenly into existence and
caught the attention of the entire world in the summer of 1917.

Liv

ing today in a nuclear age, where civilization could be struck a crip
pling blow within thirty minutes, we take it for granted that civilian
centers will be bombarded and, if possible, totally destroyed.

Prior

to the summer of 1917 hardly anyone entertained such an idea.

There

fore, to fully understand the inter-war period it is essential to
grasp what happened to London in the First World War.

^Douglas H. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat, 3rd ed. (Sun Valley,
Calif.: John W. Caler Publications, 1971); Kenneth Poolman, Zeppelins
Against London (New York: John Day Co., 1961)
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Before the Germans attacked "Fortress London" they were compelled
by bad weather to launch a preliminary raid on Folkestone in the early
evening of 25 May 1917.

Friday evening was the most popular shopping

period for the poorer people of Folkestone.

Housewives, loaded down

with purchases for the Whitsun weekend, bustled from shop to shop down
the crowded Totine Street.

Children played in the street and elderly

men stood about pondering the great questions of the day.

Some people

looked up into the cloudless blue sky when they heard the drone of air
craft engines around 6:20 P.M.; but none were alarmed since aircraft
often passed over the town.
osity and amazement.

Airplanes still aroused a tingle of curi

Suddenly earsplitting explosions erupted one

after another for nearly ten minutes.
street in shambles.

This nightmare ended with the

Flames licked out of gutted buildings, and men,

women, and children lay dead in the glass strewn street or beneath
demolished shops.^
It was the first mass bomber raid on Britain and deadlier than
any previous Zeppelin attack.

The twenty-two Gothas remained unde

tected until they struck Folkestone and the nearby Shorncliff Camp.
Even though seventy-four RFC fighters rose in pursuit, all but one
Gotha returned to Belgium.

Altogether the four and one-half tons
2

of bombs killed ninety-five people and injured 195.

The coroner's

inquest on 29 May labeled the attack as nothing more than "scientific

Sixty Bombs:
28 May 1917, p. 7.

Slaughter of Women and Children," Times (London),

o
Jones, The War in the Air, vol. V., op. cit.
Table B.

See Appendix I,
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barbarism."

One man confessed that the appalling sight of Totine

Street would haunt him to his dying day.^
In spite of the deadly effectiveness of this raid and those that
followed in the summer, one British student of strategic bombing in
sisted as late as 1969 that the Germans never intended to use bombing
as a terror weapon.

In fact, he

2

confessed his inability to understand

why the Germans bombed England at all unless they simply hoped to re
lieve pressure from the Front.
von Billow's

He obviously overlooked Major Freiherr

postwar disclosure that the bombers were not restricted

to military targets:
The main purpose of the bombing attack was the intimi
dation of the morale of the English people, the crippling
of their will to fight and the preparation of a basis for
peace. The secondary purpose of the raids was to disrupt
the British war industry, disorganize the communication
between coastal ports and London, attack supply dumps of
coastal ports and hinder transport of war material.
All previous concepts of war vanished under this rain of bombs.
They erased the clear delineation between the fighting front and the
civilian rear.

The limited range of artillery in past wars usually

compelled attacking forces to concentrate on the walls of heavily
defended fortresses.

Undefended towns were rarely bombarded by an

invader since he preferred to conserve precious ammunition.

But in an

age of "total war" the civilians— who produce guns, ammunition, optics,

^■"No Warning of Air Raid," Times (London), 30 May 1917, p. 3.
2
Anthony Verrier, The Bomber Offensive (New York:
1969), p. 34.

Macmillan Co.,

3
Haddow and Grosz, The German Giants, op. cit., p. 26.
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uniforms, and other essential items— are as important as the fighting
men.

The airplane simply extended the army's bombardment range to

areas it could not possibly occupy.
The Folkestone raid understandably triggered a wave of alarm
throughout eastern England.

People demanded adequate warning, reliable

air defense measures, and retaliation raids; but the Government ignored
this outburst.

Its reaction was not unlike that of RFC pilots after

the solo German "tip-and-run" escapade over London in November 1916.
The "sheer cheek of it" tickled their fancy, and after the exclamation,
"Well I'm damned!" there followed a roar of laughter.

As the editor1

of the Aeroplane pointed out, no bombs fell near the residence of "any
body who matters."

Accordingly, the people in London were totally

unprepared for the arrival of eighteen Gothas.
Shortly after 11 A.M. on 13 June 1917 the Gothas crossed the
Essex coastline and made their way to London.

As the Germans approached

the unsuspecting city at 12,000 feet, they were awed by the breath
taking expanse of London which swelled out in all directions like a
vast sea of buildings.

They could see the sharp outlines of the Tower

Bridge, St. Paul's Dome, Liverpool Station, and the toy-like ships in
the Thames.

2

To anyone who looked up into the near cloudless sky the Gothas ap
peared as small glittering specks of silver.

Thousands of people were

^C. G. Grey, "On the Latest Invasion," Aeroplane, XI (December,
1916), pp. 1081, 1079.
2
"German Airman's Thrilling Story of London Raid," New York Times,
2 July 1917, p. 1.
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in the streets when the bombs fell.

Some quickly sought shelter but

many more dashed into the streets or onto roof tops to witness the
spectacle.

A trail of wrecked buildings and a shocking total of 162

dead and 432 injured Londoners marked the Gotha’s path.
bombs wrought havoc near the Royal Albert Docks.
Southwark and Dalston.

Clusters of

Others descended on

Seventy-two bombs exploded within a mile radius

of Liverpool Station and killed seventeen people near an incoming train.
One bomb in particular aroused all of London when it became known that
ten youngsters were killed and fifty others injured in a demolished
schoolhouse. ■*"
The fact that the Gothas seemed to loiter over London with im
punity and that the ninety-four interceptors were unable to bring down
one single bomber further disheartened the people.

After the attack

a public outcry for air raid warnings developed into a hot Parliamen
tary debate because businessmen opposed warnings on the ground that
they disrupted daily transactions.

Policemen likewise opposed warnings

since they brought curious people into the streets rather than encour
age them to seek shelter.

On the other hand, hospitals needed timely

warnings in order to prepare beds, assemble staffs, and alert ambu
lances .^
The popular and political reaction to the raid was extremely rapid

^"Air Raid on London,” Times (London), 14 June 1917, pp. 6-7;
Jones, The War in the Air, V, op. cit., p. 27.
^"Lesson’s From the Raid," Times (London), 15 June 1917, p. 9.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

21

and intense.

Some writers^- compared it to the penetration of Dutch

ships into the Medway in Charles' II reign.

Prime Minister Lloyd George

immediately sent for Major General Hugh Trenchard, C-in-C of RFC in
France.

The War Cabinet informed Trenchard that the Germans needed "one

or two sharp lessons" and this required the release of two fighter
squadrons from France.

Unable to dissuade the politician he reluctant

ly complied with the order.

The combat weary pilots packed their kits

and enjoyed two glorious weeks of dancing and drinking with the patri
otically cooperative women from nearby towns until Trenchard secured
their return on 6 July.
On the following day twenty-two Gothas again struck London from
a clear blue sky.

Swooping in from the northeast the bombers once

again surprised the people of London.

While riding on a streetcar, one

woman saw the fan-like formation approaching London
the man next to her if they were Germans.

she quickly asked

Glancing up at the apparent

ly low-flying group Mr. MacDonagh, a Times reporter, reassured her that
they were simply a comforting manifestation of London's aerial defense.
A few minutes later, after he got off at his regular stop, MacDonagh
was startled by the sound of anti-aircraft fire and exploding bombs.
He quickly joined the crowd rushing down the Blackfire subway station
stairs.

Flanked by hysterically screaming women, he

2

caught himself

muttering over and over, "The raiders have London at their mercy."

^Noble Frankland, The Bombing Offensive Against Germany (London:
Faber & Faber, 1965), p. 32.
2
Michael MacDonagh, La London During the Great War (London:
and Spottiswood, 1935), pp. 198-200.
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As people cowered on subway platforms bombs tumbled down on Stoke
Newington, Stepney, and Finsbury.

In less than fifteen minutes the

bombers killed fifty-seven people and injured 193.
According to one Times correspondent^" it was a thrilling spectacle.
The bombers were vigorously shelled by anti-aircraft fire and "pluckily
attacked by British aeroplanes at various points.”

The thousands of

Londoners who followed the battle were deeply impressed by the German's
confidence and their "obvious contempt" for the defense.

The Air Board

members who deserted their desks at the Hotel Cecil were perhaps the
most engrossed observers in London as they silently watched the battle
three miles above.

The futile air defense efforts were also witnessed

from the War Office windows.

The War Cabinet, which assembled immedi

ately in special session, remained in shock for several hours.

One

3
observer

later confided to General Haig, "One would have thought that

the world was coming to an end."
The public castigated Air Defence on an unprecedented scale.
Everyone wanted to know how enemy bombers could roam so casually over
daylight London.

The people demanded retaliation raids.

The press re

echoed the conviction of many Londoners that the German Government
would surely halt the raids if it experienced a similar public outcry.

^""Story of the Raid," Times (London), 9 July 1917, p. 9; "Germans
Biggest Air Raid Yet," New York Times, 8 July 1917, p. 1.

2

Andrew Boyle, Trenchard:
p. 223.

Man of Vision (London: Colins, 1962),

3
Sir William Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, vol. II (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), p. 17.
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The War Cabinet now recognized that a serious situation had
arisen.

It realized that repeated raids on this scale could jeopardize

the capital's existence as the political, industrial, and communication
center of the Empire.

Lloyd George took immediate steps to calm public

anger and set into motion forces which were to sharply alter the Bri
tish military structure.

He again recalled a crack fighter squadron

from the Front, informed Trenchard that he would not receive the pro
mised Sopwith Camels and that a nearly completed squadron would be di
verted to Home Defence.^

He also rescinded the veto on public air raid

warnings, and most important of all, asked Lt. General Jan Christian
Smuts to study the situation and offer proposals for a better air organ
ization.
Considering the immense Army/Navy rivalry over air policy and air
craft procurement, Smuts was the ideal choice.

Quite new to the Eng

lish political scene and untainted with party politics, this former
Boer rebel could clearly offer an unbiased opinion.

General David

Henderson, Director-General of Military Aeronautics, not only assisted
Smuts in every way, but also provided him with a memo which set forth
logical arguments for an independent air force.

Although the vivid

memory of the 7 July raid impressed Smuts with the desirability of such
an organization, he nevertheless thoroughly studied the question.

Ac

cordingly, he collected contradictory evidence from many witnesses and
produced two startling memoranda within sixty days.

2

*H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, vol. IV (London:
sity Press, 1934), p. 154.

Oxford Univer

2
Boyle, Trenchard, op. cit., p. 229.
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Before Smuts submitted his first report, he confessed that it
definitely required imagination to grasp the immense change in war
fare.

His first memo described the deplorable state of London’s air

defense and his conviction that fiercer raids would be launched.
Therefore, the cabinet had to appoint a senior officer with air exper
ience to reorganize air defense.

In his second report he foresaw the

day, not far off, when entire industrial and populous centers could
be crippled by aerial bombardment.

He then concluded that the only

answer to a strategic air offensive was an independent air force capable
of mounting a counter-attack.^
Among Smuts’ antagonists none objected more vigorously to his pro
posals than Trenchard.

He vehemently opposed any plan which weakened

the RFC and jeopardized Haig's BEF.

Though he agreed with Smuts that

the airplane was an offensive weapon and that attack was the best de
fense, he could not agree to any debilitation of front-line strength
just to launch a few desultory raids into Germany.

Trenchard contended

that London could best be defended by capturing the Belgian coast and
Gotha airfields.

2

The War Cabinet wasted no time acting on Smuts’ first recommenda
tion.

On 31 July it merged all ground and air units into the London

Air Defence Area (LADA).

It also found in the genial, cheerful, but

^Jones, The War in the Air, V, op. cit., Appendix VI; Frankland,
The Bombing Offensive Against Germany, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

2
Boyle, Trenchard, op. cit., pp. 205, 221. For Trenchard's memo
on air defense see Jones, The War in the Air, V, op. cit., pp. 479-82.
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forceful Major General E. B. Ashmore the ideal commander for the new
organization.

Upon his recall from the Ypres front he^ laughingly,

albeit shrewdly, wrote, "The fact that I was exchanging the comparative
safety of the Front for the probability of being hanged in the streets
of London did not worry me."

Ashmore once again proved the truth of

the oft-quoted Irish proverb that if you want to put life into an
Englishman you have to scare him to death.

Blessed with an agile mind

and the ability to get along well with civilian heads of departments,
he quickly reorganized and refined England's crude air defense system.
In reaction to the Zeppelin threat England's air defense measures
evolved from fifty gun positions and a mobile anti-aircraft unit to a
system of Warning Control Areas— subdivided into districts— and three
cordons of observers situated between London and the coast.

Sound

locators were developed and manned by blind people to locate night
raiders by triangulating engine noise through two megaphones mounted
at right angles on a revolving pole; a stethoscope-like apparatus
2

transmitted sound to the ears and a compass provided the "bearing."
The British also drained St. James' Park lake to prevent its reflec
tion from guiding raiders to Buckingham Palace.

Well-known parks

were camouflaged with dummy lights, emergency airstrips were prepared

^E. B. Ashmore, Air Defence (London: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1929), p. 40.

2
H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, vol. Ill (London: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1931), pp. 128, 172-73; Alfred Rawlinson, The Defence
of London, 1915-1918, 3rd ed. (London: Andrew Melrose, Ltd., 1924),
p. 108.
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in places like Regent's Park, and all important government buildings
were protected with sandbags.^Ashmore effected the coordination of all air defense units through
his LADA Command Post.

From a balcony-like structure he and his staff

overlooked a huge map which subdivided southeast England into an intri
cate grid system of local districts.

With the aid of a color code—

depicting various degrees of danger— and counters moving over the map,
he could follow the progress of every raid and rapidly issue clear,
precise orders.

Telephones soon connected the Command Post to the

police departments, the fire departments, the airbases in Essex, and
the Speaker’s chair in Parliament.

2

Since it still took most inter

ceptors twelve minutes to reach 10,000 feet, the airbases were organ3
ized to "scramble" their pilots at the sound of Klaxon horns.

Ash

more also ordered balloon aprons, massed searchlights, and barrage
fire.

With the exception of radar, the entire system bore a remarkable

resemblence to that of 1940.
Despite Ashmore's success in driving the Germans from Britain's
daylight sky by the end of August, the Germans quickly rebounded in
September with assiduous night raids.

However much the Times preferred

to downplay a growing fear of bombing, the efficacy of protracted raids

■*"L. E. 0. Charlton, War Over England (London:
and Co., 1936), pp. 9-10.

Longmans, Green

2

Ashmore, Air Defence, op. cit., pp. 51, 95.

3
Cecil Lewis, Sagittarius Rising, (London: Peter Davies,.1936;
reprint'-ed., Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1963), p. 202.
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was clearly demonstrated by the surprise attack on the night of 4/5
September.

Around 11:30 P.M. a number of interceptor pilots were en

joying themselves at the crowded Savoy when the entire building shook
suddenly from nearby bomb blasts.

After a moment of absolute shock,

panic-stricken people fled for cover just like the thousands of other
Londoners who rushed into the subway stations in all stages of ap
parel.

"So much for Home Defence," concluded one of the pilots, "The

bombers would always get through."^
The Harvest Moon period (24 September— 1 October) marked the end
of the German summer offensive.

Taking full advantage of the crisp,

clear nights, they launched five ferocious raids in nine days.

The

first raid, during the late evening of 24 September, lasted more than
one hour.
at London.

The Times described it as the most resolute raid yet directed
Star shells were used for the first time to assist search

lights, but the bombers went undetected.

Most important of all, people

throughout London flocked to the subway stations with pillows, blankets,
food baskets, and pets.

2

The following night's raid produced identical

results.
The bombers returned during the nights of 29 and 30 September and
1 October.

At the first "Take Cover" notice Londoners hurriedly

cleared the streets and within minutes many thoroughfares were com3
pletely deserted.

Meanwhile, air defense unleashed an unprecedented

^loc. cit., p. 209; "Path of the Raiders," Times (London), 6
September 1917, pp. 7-8.
2

Fredette, The Sky on Fire, op. cit., p. 143.

3
MacDonagh, In London During the Great War, op. cit., pp. 217, 220.
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hurricane of anti-aircraft fire.

On 29 September Sub-Command West

nearly exhausted its ammunition supply.

The rate of fire on the fol

lowing night was so heavy that guns turned red-hot in spite of the
constant streams of water which were poured over them."*- But the
Giants' first appearance over London negated all these efforts.

Since

their engines could be heard as far as twenty miles away, gun crews
mistook them for nearby Gothas and fired into an empty sky.

Intercep

tor pilots were equally confused by the size of the Giants.

Accus

tomed to firing when the Gotha filled the gun sight, they now opened
fire well out of range.

2

Trenchard inadvertently demonstrated the tense situation in east
ern England on 2 October as he flew in from France at the request of
the War Cabinet.

An alarm sounded and sporadic firing erupted as he
3

crossed the Kent coast.

Both he and his chief of staff

to find London half deserted.

were amazed

That afternoon Trenchard again con

fronted uneasy ministers who virtually demanded retaliatory raids.
When Trenchard reiterated his refusal to rob the Front of aircraft,
the War Cabinet manifested a sense of urgency by agreeing to withdraw
all Yorkshire-based Handley Pages from U-boat patrol.
in turn,

Trenchard,

agreed to send them to Ochey— the proposed bomber base near

Nancy.^

^■Rawlinson, The Defence of London, op. cit., pp. 204, 209.
^Haddow and Grosz, The German Giants, op. cit., p. 28.
3
Boyle, Trenchard, op. cit., p. 235; Maurice Baring, Flying
Corps Headquarters, 1914-1918 (London: Bell and Sons, 1920; reprint
ed., Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., 1968), p. 253.
4
Jones, The War In the Air, V, op. cit., p. 90.
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Unbeknown to Londoners they had survived the worst part of the
air offensive.

German plans for a continuous day and night offensive

never materialized.

Nevertheless, the Harvest Moon Campaign is the

one aspect of the air war most vividly remembered by Londoners long
after the war.

The survivors could never quite erase the memory of

the tension, the overworked nerves, the wearisome nightly warnings,
the long hours in bomb shelters, and the continuous roar of barrage
fire.

By October over 300,000 people fled nightly into subway stations

or the suburbs never knowing if they would return to intact homes.^
Politicians or military men never forgot the tremendous loss of pro
duction during air raid warnings.

For example, during the night of

24/25 September, output at the Woolwich arsenal dropped nearly 75 per
cent because the men ceased working or failed to show up for work; on
the following day normal output was still off by twenty percent.

2

In the remaining months of 1917 the Germans launched five more
raids.

Because of their experimentation with faulty incendiary bombs,

only thirty-two Britons were killed and 133 injured.

At the same time

the Germans lost twenty-two of the fifty-two attacking Gothas; six in
combat and sixteen crashed on landing in Belgium.

However, LADA failed

to bring down a single Giant even though its existence became known
3
sometime between 25 September and 18 December.

^Frank Morrison [pseud.], War on Great Cities: A Study of the
Facts (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1937), p. 139; James M. Spaight,
Air Power and War Rights (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924), pp.
9-10.
2
Jones, The War in the Air, V, op. cit., pp. 86-87, 154.
O

Haddow and Grosz, The German Giants, op. cit., p. 29; "Story of
Giant German Biplane," Times (London), 22 October 1917, p. 7.
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The Gotha raids and the Smuts Report were undeniably instrumental
in passing the Air Force Act on 29 November 1917 and the creation of
the Royal Air Force (RAF) on 1 April 1918.

Largely due to the efforts

of General Henderson the first Air Council came into existence in Jan
uary 1918, and despite the protest of General Haig, Trenchard was re
called from France to serve as the RAF's first Chief of the Air Staff
(CAS).

Even though the Air Council worked energetically for the next

three months to organize the new service, it was plagued from the begin
ning by internal dissension.

The inauspicious appointment of the news

paper magnate, Lord Rothermere, as Air Minister assured an eventual
showdown with Trenchard who was not particularly fond of politicians
or newspaper men.

Besides a difference of temperament, Trenchard took

a much broader view of his responsibilities and assumed that he, the
expert, knew more about air power than the politician under whom he
served.^
The storm finally erupted on 18 March when Trenchard resigned and
only subsided on 25 April with Rothermere’s resignation.

Major General

Frederick Sykes replaced Trenchard on 13 April, and this led immediate
ly to Henderson's resignation on the grounds that he could not work
with the new CAS.

Unable to resume his position in France without de

moting Major General John Salmond, Trenchard considered returning to
the Army.

At this crucial moment the new Air Minister, Sir William

Weir, persuaded Trenchard to accept command of the new Independent
Force which was slated to bomb German towns later in 1918.

^Douglas, Combat and Command, op. cit., pp. 220-21; Jones, The
Origins of Strategic Bombing, op. cit., p. 141.
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The invidious atmosphere within the Air Ministry was further com
pounded by six German raids in the first five months of 1918.

Though

few in number and conducted mostly by Giants, the raids amply illus
trated the efficacy of even sporadic bombing raids.

A still night and

a clear sky automatically sent businessmen home early and thousands of
people into subway stations whether a warning was issued or not.'*'
Moreover, an attack by a single Giant set into motion the entire LADA
system and resulted in the expenditure of a vast amount of ammunition.
The last German bomber raid on England took place on the night of
19/20 May.

In this all-out effort eighteen Gothas and three Giants

dropped more than eleven tons of high explosives on London, Kent, and
Essex.

The forty-nine people killed were all Londoners as were most

of the 177 injured.

If many people had not been out of town for the

Whitsun holiday, the casualties would certainly have been higher.
By the end of the war, 1,414 Britons were killed and 3,416 injured
by Zeppelin, Gotha, and Giant raids.

In their attempts to mitigate

the bomber threat, the British continually reinforced LADA until it
swelled, by June 1918, to 376 interceptors, 469 anti-aircraft guns,
622 searchlights, 258 altitude detectors, and 10 balloon aprons.

2

In

terms of manpower the aircraft tied up 4,614 officers and men; the
Balloon Wing was manned by 3,393 personnel; the remainder tied up a
further 6,136 personnel.

This kept almost 15,000 men from the Front.

^■"London Calm Under Fire," Times (London), 30 January 1918, p. 7;
Ashmore, Air Defence, op. cit., p. 81.
2

Jones, The War in the Air, V, op. cit., p. 153.
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It should not be overlooked that a single raid often consumed 20,000
anti-aircraft shells.^"

Although the lasting psychological impact of

trench warfare cannot be overlooked, these figures— though minute in
comparison— loomed ominously large in the future of a world where
industrialization can quickly refine the simplest machine into a vehicle
of immense destruction.
The question thus arises, what was the impact of these first stra
tegic bombing raids?

General Ashmore casually dismissed the 4,830

casualties as insignificant because more people were accidentally
killed or injured annually in London prior to and after the Great War.
He simply failed to understand that the number of people killed and
injured was not nearly as important as how they became casualties.
Never before were civilians behind the Front subject to the same
combat risks as the fighting men.

Men had always gone to war with the

assurance that their families safety depended upon their courage and
success at the Front.

Now a fighting man had another burden to carry—

the persistent concern for the safety of his loved ones at home.
this in mind it may be appropriate to quote a poem

2

With

which was found in

the purse of a young soldier's fiancee who was killed on her own door
step in the last raid on London:
My girl is dead; that's all I know
I came out here to take my chance
In the uncommon lively show
They're running out in Northern France.

John Laffin, Swifter than Eagles: The Biography of Marshal of
the Royal Air Force, Sir John Maitland Salmond (Edinburgh: William
Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., 1964), pp. 127-28.
^Morrison, War on Great Cities, op. cit., p. 169.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

33

I thought I left her safe behind.
What call had I to feel afraid,
I didn't even call to mind
The chances of a Zeppelin raid.
"Be careful, won't you, Bill?" she said:
And if I tried I couldn't tell
How dear she looked— and now she's dead,
And I'm out here alive and well.
I think they might have took more care
Of her, my girl, and me away,
But mine's the bitter grief to bear,
And mine's, by God, the debt to pay!

Continental Strategic Air Operations

The British^ assert that they inaugurated "strategic bombing" on
22 September and 8 October 1914 when Royal Navy Aircraft raided the
Zeppelin sheds in Dllsseldorf.

However, if we define "strategic bombing"

as the bombing of selected targets— vital to the war effort of a nation
— whose destruction will deprive a nation with the means and will to
continue the war, then these two adventures hardly deserve such a
sobriquet.
The British only inaugurated independent strategic bombing opera
tions in October 1917 after they created the 41st Wing at Ochey.
Aroused by the Gotha raids the War Cabinet allocated No. 55 Squadron
(D.H.4) for day bombing; No. 100 Squadron (F.E.2b) and No. 16 Naval
Squadron (U-boat hunting Handley Pages) were allocated for night oper
ations.

Concentrating most of their efforts on Mannheim, Coblenz,

Thionville, (Diedonhoffen), and Saarbrlicken, this small force launched

"Tor example:
pp. 15, 23.

Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, op. cit.,
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no fewer than fifty-seven raids into Germany between 17 October 1917
and 6 June 1918.^
Trenchard arrived at Ochey to take command of the Independent
Force on 20 May 1918; redesignated VIII Brigade since 1 February 1918
and reinforced by No. 99 Squadron.

Trenchard assumed command with the

assurance that additional squadrons would be forthcoming, and the real
ization of his extremely delicate position in France.

His unit remain

ed outside the jurisdiction of Generalissimo Foch, General Haig, and
RFC Headquarters.

Trenchard answered directly to the Air Ministry

which already contemplated basing the Brigade in England after the
Handley Page V/1500s arrived.
Germany, unlike England, did not possess a population, industrial,
and communication center similar to London.

Therefore, Trenchard de

cided to spread his attacks over as wide an area as possible in order
to demoralize the greatest number of German civilians.

With morale

already dangerously low due to the tight blockade, this scheme stood
an excellent chance of succeeding.

Even so, the great chemical manu

facturing area of Mannheim— Ludwigshaven received exceptional atten
tion.
The British bombing offensive against Germany finally slipped
into high gear in the spring of 1918.

The forty-eight tons of bombs

dropped on Germany in May 1918 exceeded the total tonnage of the previous

^"550 Tons of Bombs: Raids on Germany Described," Times (London),
21 January 1919, pp. 7-8; Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, op.
cit., p. 149.
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six months.1

In June VIII Brigade delivered at least sixty-six tons

and in July it unleashed eighty-one tons on towns like Coblenz, Karls
ruhe, Stuttgart, Offenburg, and Saarbrtlcken.

Reinforced in August by

four additional squadrons (three of them Handley Page O/lOOs) VIII Bri
gade released an unprecedented one hundred tons of bombs on Rhineland
towns.

2

Furthermore, VIII Brigade's first visit to Frankfurt on 12

August resulted in several days of panic and severe criticism of the
„ 3
government.
September marked the climax of VIII Brigade operations over Ger
many; its ten squadrons disgorged 178 tons of bombs on a score of Ger
man towns.

The October operations and the employment of the new Handley

Page 0/400s were severely curtailed by bad weather.

At the time of the

Armistice, the widely dispersed German towns were just beginning to feel
the full effect of an expanding strategic bombing offensive.

Only a

few of the 239 raids over Germany were conducted by more than a dozen
aircraft and approximately 220 of the 543 tons
aimed at German airfields.^

of high explosives were

Nevertheless, 720 Germans were killed and

1,754 were injured.^

lu74 Bombing Raids Into Germany," Times (London), 12 July 1918,
p. 6.
o
"Raids on Germany inSeptember," Times (London),
p. 5; "550 Tons of Bombs," op. cit., pp. 7-8.

12 October 1918,

O

Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, op. cit., p. 193.
^"550 Tons of Bombs," pp. 7-8; Charles Webster and Nobel Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945, vol. I
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961), p. 41.
^"Air Raids on Germany," Times (London), 17 March 1919, p. 10.
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Postwar assessments of operations over Germany reflected fierce
ly divergent conclusions on the future application of strategic airpower.

Many Army and Navy officers discounted the efficacy of long-

range bombing operations because the final results seemed insignificant
to trench warfare veterans; nor did many of them take time to evaluate
the surprisingly rapid process of aircraft refinement in the last year
of the war.

British airmen, on the other hand, underscored the predom

inant accomplishments of these operations.

First, every bomb that

burst on German soil released the pent-up frustration of British civil
ians.

Second, the Germans withdrew a significant proportion of their

frontline aircraft to protect the Reich.

Finally, Trenchard's VIII

Brigade lost only 3.9 percent of all aircraft launched against Germany.
Unlike operations over England and the Rhineland the highly active
and significant air war on the Italian Front remains all but forgotten.
Yet some of the largest air operations of the war took place there.
For example, German and Austro-Hungarian aircraft raided Venice thirtyfour times between 24 Hay 1915 and 23 October 1918.

After the first

few raids most of the city's population was evacuated, but the remain
ing Venetians vividly recalled long after the war the large incendiary
raid of 9/10 August 1916 and the vicious eight-hour long bombardment
on 27/28 February 1918.1

The 27/28 February raid was clearly the most

violent attack on a single Italian town during the war.

Three hundred

bombs destroyed twenty-six houses that night and damaged sixty others

^Hilton P . Goss, Civilian Morale Under Aerial Bombardment, 19141939 (USAF Historical Study No. 14, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Documentary
Research Division, Air University, 1948), pp. 29-30.
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but inflicted few casualties among the people ensconced in bomb shel
ters.'*'

These attacks, like those on England and the Rhineland, left

lingering memories.

Indeed, it appeared to one American correspondent,

2

who survived his first air raid, that he had passed through a hashish
dream which was crowned by a "hell's overture" of frantically probing
searchlights and thunderous anti-aircraft fire.
Treviso, Padua, and Mestre— all situated on the Venetian Plain—
were similarly singled out for exceptional punishment.

Indeed, the

seventy-five tons of bombs dropped on Treviso between April 1916 and
October 1918 nearly matched the total tonnage released on London.

Al

though the raids were labeled as barbaric attacks on the monuments and
pillars of civilization "which were old and ripe when the Huns were
still cannibals," astute observers realized that they were intended to
weaken civilian morale.

In part they succeeded.

Just as Londoners

automatically headed for subway stations, Italians automatically deserted their towns for the open country on moonlight nights.

3

Certainly the Italians didn't hesitate in launching reprisal raids.
Throughout the war the Austrian naval base at Pola endured repeated
raids by the three-engined Caproni bombers.

The nights of 2 and 3

August were quite typical of the raids on Pola; escorted by fighters

■^Perceval Gibbon, "Glories of Venice Are Raiders Mark," New York
Times, 3 March 1918, p. 2.
2
"Biggest Air Raid on Moonlight Venice A Tornado of Noise," New
York Times, 19 September 1917, p. 1.
3
Perceval Gibbon, "Foe Continues Raids on Italian Cities, New
York Times, 6 August 1917, p. 1.
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several flights of thirty to fifty Capronis dropped fifteen tons on
the heavily defended base.^

The Capronis also ranged farther afield.

In 1918 they struck the unfortified towns of Innsbruck, Cles, Messolombardo, and Bozen.

Whereas many of the raids were mostly tactical

in nature, these were specifically directed at Austrian civilians.
Considering the extent of air operations on this front, it should sur
prise no one that Italy produced one of the foremost postwar air theo
reticians.
The establishment of the strategic bomber base at Ochey undeniably
contributed more to the development of postwar air doctrine than any
other factor aside from the German raids on London.

By August 1918

British, American, French, and Italian Airmen operated out of the base
and spent much of their free time discussing the theories of long-range
air bombardment.

2

The Americans were most attentive in these discus

sions and most frustrated by the sudden armistice on 11 November 1918.
Major William (Billy) Mitchell arrived in Paris on 10 April 1917,
only four days after the American declaration of war on Imperial Ger
many, with orders to make preparations for the arrival of a virtually
3
nonexistent air service.

General Arnold

later recalled that the Amer

ican "air force" consisted of fifty-two officers and 1,100 men plus
fifty-five aircraft; fifty-one of them obsolete, four obsolescent.

^Perceval Gibbon, "Foe Continues Raids on Italian Cities," New
York Times, 23 February 1918, p. 2.
2
Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters, op. cit., p. 287.
3
General H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (London:
Co., Ltd., 1951), p. 46.

Hutchinson &
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Nevertheless, imbued with overwhelming optimism and blind faith in
Yankee ingenuity, the Aircraft Production Board appropriated $300 mil
lion for a three-year program which would train 2,500 men the first
year and 5,000 the next.

It also expected to produce 3,700 aircraft

in 1918, 6,000 in 1919 and nearly 10,000 in 1920.^

American airmen

understandably became intoxicated with such a promising future.
It quickly became apparent that men were more readily available
than machines.

Whereas aircraft were eventually supplied by the Al

lies, top echelon personality clashes hampered American efforts for
several months.

The most significant dispute was triggered by the

arrival of Brigadier General Benjamin Foulois and his large, but in
experienced, "civilian" staff.

Actually there was little hope of

avoiding an angry clash between the dynamic "red-tape cutting" Mitchell
and the studious, regulation oriented Foulois.

The issue was only re

solved in May 1918 with the appointment of Major General Mason M.
Patrick as C-in-C of the U. S. Air Service in France.

This allowed

Mitchell to absorb himself in the gigantic St. Mihiel air battle and
the proposed bombing raids deep into Germany.
The unexpected armistice frustrated many airmen's aspirations.
Air power had finally reached the point where it could prove its
worth.

The Germans, for example, were just beginning to develop a

Junkers all-metal, four-engined monoplane strategic bomber capable of

^Benjamin D. Foulois, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts;
The Memoirs of Major General Benjamin D. Foulois (New York: MacGrawHill Book Co., 1968), p. 142.
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carrying a 3,300 pound payload.

Furthermore, in 1919 the Inter-Allied

Control Commission discovered the nearly completed Poll Giant Triplane.
Its report^ concluded that New York City easily fell within this bomb
er's 80-hour cruising range.

Still more ominous was Anthony Fokker's

revelation that the armistice had saved Britain from electronically
controlled pilotless flying bombs.

2

Nor were the Allies any less ambitious.

A perturbed Billy Mitchell

could lament with some justification, "I was sure that if the war last3
ed, air power would decide it."

Trenchard's Independent Force, which

the Americans were to heavily reinforce, was scheduled to bomb, the
Ruhr and especially Berlin with high explosive, incendiary, and gas
bombs.^

The new Handley Page V/1500 giant bombers finally brought Ber

lin within range.

Although smaller than the German version, the four-

engined V/1500 could carry a six-man crew and a 3,000 pound payload up
to 1,200 miles.

It first flew in May 1918 and the first six reached

the 27th Group at the end of October.

Yet despite round-the-clock ef

forts, the Group could not be made operational before the armistice.^

Saddow and Grosz, The German Giants, op. cit., pp. 133, 152.
^"Story of the Fokker Plane," Times (London), 16 September 1919,
p. 10.
O

Isaac Don Levine, Mitchell: Pioneer of Air Power (Cleveland:
Forum Books, 1944), p. 147.
S h i s scheme was often referred to after the war. For example:
"Bombing Berlin," Times, (London)j 2 January 1919, p. 7; "Aviation
Spells Salvation," Times (London), 8 January 1920, p. 11; Joseph M.
Kenworthy, New Wars: New Weapons (London: Elkin Mathews & Marrot,
1930), pp. 110-11.
Saylor, Combat Aircraft of the World, op. cit., pp. 373-74;
"550 Tons of Bombs," op. cit., pp. 7-8.
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Consequently, the airmen entered the postwar period convinced that
they were robbed of their one chance to prove the efficacy of airpower.
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CHAPTER II

THE PRECEPTORS

If there be a domineering, tyrant thought, it is
the conception that the problem of flight may be
solved by man. When once this idea has invaded
the brain it possesses it exclusively. It is
then a haunting thought, a walking nightmare, im
possible to cast off. . . . Let us admit that
the problem has been solved, and let us speculate
upon the effects on society . . . all will have
to be done over again; the fortifications, the
maneuvers, the defenses of the frontiers, strategy,
all is brought to naught. . . .
No more frontiers!
No more insular seclusion! No more fortresses!
Louis P. Mouillard,
L'Empire de l'Air (1881)

At the end of the First World War the leading airmen of all Western
nations felt cheated since the armistice denied them the opportunity to
demonstrate the immense possibilities of air power.

Air power, like

armored warfare, was too revolutionary for many army officers to grasp.
Conventional methods had won the war and inveterate staff officers
still preferred the horse to horsepower.

Colonel J. F. C. Fuller'*' wrote

a few years after the war:
Their ignorance is colossal and is only excelled by
their lack of vision. On Armistice Day, 1918, a typical
adherent, without a smile on his face, said to me: "Thank
God! we can now get back to real soldiering."
Although the traditionalists labeled air power proponents as "theorists,"
they could not prevent air power from dominating postwar thinking.

"^Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, The Reformation of War (London: Hutchin
son & Co., 1923), p. 141.
42
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The airplane demonstrated once again that an idea is occasion
ally ahead of its time because adequate equipment and technological
skills are unavailable.

Consequently, the air power question ignited

in military circles the most vehement controversy since the days when
gunpowder blasted feudalism into oblivion.

As young audacious doc

trinaires clashed with their obdurate superiors, passion often thrust
both to extremes.

More than anything else the airmen needed military

philosophers who could logically persuade the traditionalists to re
evaluate Clausewitz and Mahan with a twentieth century perspective.
In the two decades following the First World War, countless men
and women labored diligently to advance the cause of aviation; but
three men stand far above the rest and a fourth just barely joined
this select circle.

They were General Giulio Douhet of Italy, Briga

dier General William Mitchell of the United States, Air Marshal Hugh
Trenchard of Great Britain, and General Walther Wever of Germany.
They were not necessarily more farsighted or more familiar with aero
nautical developments than their contemporaries.

Nevertheless, they

hold a special position in the annals of aviation because they all
expounded a tenacious conviction in the future of air power while
they occupied influential military positions.

Giulio Douhet

The General Giulio Douhet gained fame in the thirties when his
book, The Command of the Air, began to receive extended attention out
side of Italy.

Born of well-to-do parents in 1869, Douhet decided
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early on a military career.1

Keenly interested in science and endowed

with a lively imagination, Douhet entered the artillery academy and
assured himself of a distinguished future by graduating first in his
class.

Somewhat later his superiors singled Douhet out for his bril

liant performance at the Turin Polytechnic School of Warfare.

While

he attended the school Douhet poured many of his ideas on motorized
transportation into a book which remained a standard text long after
his departure.

This early advocacy for motorization earned Major

Douhet the command of Italy's first motorcycle battalion in 1905.
Douhet first awoke to the importance of air power in early 1909
when Wilbur Wright arrived in Rome to establish an Italian pilot train
ing program.

That he quickly grasped the implications of this new

phenomenon is clearly demonstrated in his 1909 publications.
vinced that air forces were now inevitable, he

2

Con-

warned fellow country

men:
To us who have only armies and navies, it must
seem strange that the sky, too, is about to become
another battlefield no- less important than the battle
fields on land and sea. But from now on we had better
get accustomed to this idea and prepare ourselves. . . .
Few other Italians got as excited over airplanes as Douhet.

Then

again, his publications and preoccupation with aircraft led to his

■Raymond R. Flugel, "United States Air Power Doctrine: A Study of
the Influence of William Mitchell and Giulio Douhet at the Air Corps
Tactical School, 1921-1935" (Unpublished doctor's dissertation, Uni
versity of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1965), pp. 73-79. All biograph
ical material on Douhet comes from this source.
2
Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (New
York: Coward McCann, Inc., 1942), pp. 26-27, 100.
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appointment in 1912 as commander of the air battalion in Turin.
There Douhet encountered his first difficulties with traditional
officers and befriended the Italian aircraft designer Gianni Caproni.
Reassigned in May 1915 as chief of staff of a unit operating in
the mountainous Carnatic zone, he became alarmed over the misuse of
manpower and air power.

Desiring to rectify what he considered a reck

less course toward disaster, Douhet proposed that vital Austrian towns
ought to be bombed by a force of 500 Caproni bombers.

Instead he was

court-martialed and sentenced to one year imprisonment for severely
criticizing the conduct of operations in a 1916 memorandum.

Exonerated

one year later on account of his accurate prediction of the Caporetto
disaster, Douhet assumed command of the Central Aeronautical Bureau in
February 1918.

He retired from this post in 1921 in order to give more

thought to his ideas on total war.

These he finally spelled out in the

authorized 1921 publication of his famous book.
Douhet, like many others, searched for a means of avoiding trench
deadlock in a future war.

Acutely nationalistic and oriented to Ital

ian needs, this thoughtful and deliberately logical preceptor advocated
that air power was the sought-for panacea.

He contended that the dead

lock in France would have crumbled if either foe had lost its base of
supply.

Douhet realized that all major nations possessed sufficiently

developed industrial bases which could keep producing armaments as long
as there were men left to use them.
Douhet first stressed the need for an independent air force.

He

encouraged civil aviation only so long as it could benefit the air force.
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Moreover, he opposed the formation of small ineffective air arms for
the army and the navy.

Since aircraft cost less than battleships,

he urged that all resources be directed towards the creation of a
large bomber force of "battle planes."

In a future war, Douhet con

tended, this force must win command of the air just as navies once
won command of the sea.

But "command of the air," Douhet^ explained,

does "not mean supremacy in the air nor a preponderance of aerial
means, but that state of affairs in which we find ourselves able to
fly in the face of an enemy who is unable to do likewise."

Hence,

the belligerent who achieves this goal will be able to cut the enemy’s
army and navy off from their bases while simultaneously providing immunity to his own forces.

Conversely, he

2

argued, defeat in the air

means defeat in war.
In Douhet's view air power was irresistible.

Therefore, he com

pletely dismissed air defense either in the air or from the ground.
The last war proved to his satisfaction that every resolute bomber at3

tack succeeded despite elaborate defensive measures.

He

further

contended that in an era of total war, or "War of Nations," that the
bomber should not only be directed against "objectives of least
physical resistance, but against those of least morale resistance as
4
well."

Douhet

postulated:

^loc. cit., p. 95.

Douhet's emphasis.

2loc. cit., pp. 23, 125, 256.

^loc. cit., p. 22.

4
loc. cit., pp. 5, 9-10.
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The prevailing forms of social organization have
given war a character of national totality— that is,
the entire population and all the resources of a nation
are sucked into the maw of war. . . .
No longer can
areas exist in which life can be lived in safety and
tranquility, nor can the battlefield any longer be lim
ited only by the boundaries of the nations at war, and
all their citizens will become combatants, since all of
them will be exposed to the aerial offensives of the
enemy.
Douhet^- could not reconcile himself to the fact that people wept when
they heard that a few women and children were killed in an air raid
whereas they remained essentially unmoved by the news that thousands
of soldiers perished in battle.

All human lives were equally impor

tant, and in total war equally subject to risks.
Seeing that the German Army capitulated only after the collapse
of the home front, Douhet concluded that civilian morale was every
nation's Achilles' Heel, and that it could be shattered by swift,
terrifying blows at the very outset of war.

But he stressed that the

destruction and terrorization of heavily populated communication and
industrial centers could only be accomplished by a combination of high
explosive, incendiary, and poison gas bombs.

These were to be released

by bombers operating en masse for the sole purpose of destroying a
target in one violent attack.
Douhet

2

clearly underscored the importance of gas bombs.

Buildings

could be blasted apart and set afire, but the gas would prevent fire
brigades from extinguishing blazing buildings while it simultaneously
3

permeated civilian bomb shelters.

1
loc. cit., p. 195.

"Imagine whst would happen," Douhet

2
loc. cit., pp. 20, 182, 187.

3

loc cit., p. 58.
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wrote, "among the civilian population during a single attack.

First

would come explosions, then fires, then deadly gases . . . then fires
would spread while the poison gas paralyzed all life."

The death of

the first city, he deduced, would panic the surviving cities which,
in turn, could induce the enemy government to sue for peace.

He^

also recognized that aircraft made bacteriological warfare possible
since they could quickly ravage widely dispersed areas.
He did not believe that these methods of warfare could be outlaw
ed.

After all, there is no such thing as a humane war since the pur

pose of war is to inflict the maximum carnage upon the enemy.

History

clearly demonstrates to any observer that whenever men are locked in
a life-and-death struggle, they will consider any means of winning as
legal and justifiable.

Considering that air power offered the means
2

of unimaginable destruction, Douhet

reasoned that "command of the air"

would be the decisive factor in a future war— but not the only factor.
With the full benefit of hindsight, we can easily criticize por
tions of Douhet*s theory as they applied to World War II.

For example,

he saw no value in pursuit planes, he considered the bomber invulner
able, he lacked an aeronautical engineering background, and he did not
take into account possible improvements in air defense.

Neither did

he foresee the development of radar, the eight-gun fighter plane, nor
the combatants' refusal to use gas in World War II.

Still, Douhet had

a tremendous impact on aviation in the thirties— especially in France.

^loc. cit., p. 162.

2loc. cit., pp. 193, 204, 257.
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In the decade following the First World War all western nations
were impressed by the power of the French Air Force.
remained the strongest in the world.
it only from 320 to 126 squadrons.

Numerically it

Postwar reorganization reduced
But sixty-four of these squadrons

were relegated to short-range observation

duty.'*'

Thus, the French

Air Force appeared strong on paper, whereas in reality indifferent
staff officers and politicians allowed it to drift aimlessly into
stagnation.
A few intrepid officers and politicians persisted in their efforts
to establish an independent air force, and in 1920 they were partially
gratified by the expansion program which would increase the air force
to 220 squadrons by 1925.

Otherwise they were thwarted at every turn

by the increasingly conservative High Command which only visualized
limited air reconnaissance and tactical operations at the Front.

The

oretically the only exception to this rule would occur at the outbreak
of war.

During the brief period of mobilization, the French High Com

mand approved strategic air operations against the enemy's staging
areas, depots, and communications.

2

The government, likewise, contrib3

uted to the decline of French air power.

As Krauskopf

pointed out:

The year 1920, therefore, marked the beginning of a
long period of diffused responsibility, in which the War
and Navy Ministries, although retaining tactical control
of their own aviation, establishing programs, choosing
material, and allocating funds, had no authority over

^■Robert W. Kruskopf, "French Air Power Policy, 1919-1939" (Un
published doctor's dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington,
D. C., 1965), p. 7.
2
loc. cit., p. 19.

3

loc. cit., p. 5.
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technical research and development, aircraft procurement,
or aircraft testing, which were lumped with civil aviation
and the meteorological services under a civilian ministry.
Nor did the situation improve much in the twenties.

In 1923 the

proposed expansion program was slashed to 208 squadrons which would
not become operational until 1929.

Moreover, the High Command only

activated observation squadrons during this period.

Ideally the cre

ation of an Air Ministry in 1928 should have marked a step in the
right direction, but the Army and Navy negated this by retaining con
trol of all aircraft except a few outdated bombers.

With their ambi

tions impeded for over a decade, French airmen understandably embraced
Douhet's doctrine.
Douhet's ideas were first presented in France in 1930, and two
years later Jean Romeyer released the first translation of his book.
It immediately unleashed a controversy as airmen attacked or defended
his conclusions.

For example, the editor^ of L 'Aeronautique contended

that Douhet's ideas were impossible to implement within existing con
ditions.

Insofar as existing conditions in France were concerned, he

may well have been right.

Colonel P. Vauthier, on the other hand,

wrote that, "The study of Douhet is an inexhaustible source for re
flection. . . . Let us take care not to treat lightly, as a Utopian
dreamer, a man who may later be regarded as a Prophet."

2

In fact,

Vauthier's book, La Doctrine de auerre du General Douhet (Paris, 1935)

1loc. cit., pp. 63, 72.

2
Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military
Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1943), p. 496.
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is still the best study published on Douhet.

In any event, Vauthier

and his comrades fully enlightened the French to the bomber menace.

Billy Mitchell

In the United States Brigadier General William Mitchell became
the second of the famous preceptors.

Although Mitchell attempted to

emulate Trenchard, he was nonetheless— as one American^" pointed out—
an originator, impatient of obstacles however genuine, and more keenly
aware of aeronautical strides than Douhet.
cognized these same traits.

Trenchard apparently re

While discussing the flamboyant American

with his chief of staff, Trenchard remarked, "He's a man after my own
heart.

If only he can break his habit of trying to convert opponents
2

by killing them, he'll go far."
Billy Mitchell displayed his impetuous and rebellious nature early
in life.

He was born on 29 December 1879 to upper-class parents who

were residing in Nice, France, at the time.

Mitchell returned with

them three years later to Wisconsin where his father became engrossed
in state and national politics.

In his early life Mitchell received

a broad liberal education but still found ample time to satiate his
passion for sports.

Then in 1898 he defied his father by dropping out

of college to enlist for the Spanish-American War.

Nevertheless, he

expediently took advantage of his father's political influence to

^loc. cit., p. 500.
2
Boyle, Trenchard, op. cit., p. 299.
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secure a commission for himself and to remain in Cuba after the war.^
In the following years he served in the Philippine insurrection, he
helped chase Pancho Villa into Mexico, and— at thirty-two— he became
the youngest officer on the General Staff.
Upon his arrival in France in April 1917, Mitchell plunged into
an extensive study of aeronautical theory and practice.

He first

toured French air bases and then visited the Front for ten days during
the Nivelle Offensive.

This appalling blood bath not only broke the

French Army, but also shattered any illusions Mitchell may still have
had on warfare.

Mitchell's

2

diary notations clearly reveal that his

experience at the Front converted him to air power:
A very significant thing to me was that we could
cross the lines of these contending armies in a few min
utes in our airplane, whereas the armies have been locked
in the struggle, immovable, powerless to advance for three
years. . . .
Although Mitchell liked the French, he was much more impressed by
the methodical and practical British; and so he set off for RFC Head
quarters in May 1917 determined to capitalize on their experience.
arrived unannounced and demanded to see Trenchard.

He

Trying to rid him

self of the American, Trenchard growled that he had no time to chaperon
him or to answer questions.

But Mitchell penetrated Trenchard's re

serve with a boyish grin and the profession that he was quite sure
3
that the well organized RFC could do without Trenchard for awhile.

York:

1Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power (New
Franklin Watts, Inc., 1964), p. 2.

2

Quoted in Levine, Mitchell, op. cit., p. 92.

3
Boyle, Trenchard, op. cit., 298-299.
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In the following three days Mitchell developed a deep respect for
Trenchard and a lifelong friendship.

At the same time, Trenchard

introduced Mitchell to the concept of strategic air operations.
Trenchard, in all probability, had the greatest influence on
developing Mitchell's incipient views on air power.

The gruff British

general impressed him with the importance of an all-out air offensive
and the possibilities of expanding air operations over the length and
breadth of Germany.

Not long after his departure from RFC Headquarters,

Mitchell noted, "The bombardment people are sure that if they are given
enough planes and explosives, there would be nothing left of Germany
in a short w h i l e . T h e idea of bombing the industrial Ruhr and even
tually Berlin itself excited his imagination.

Even so, he adroitly

stayed within bounds at American Expeditionary Force Headquarters
which frowned on the idea of long-range bombing.

But all of Mitchell's

ideas and expectations came to an abrupt halt in November 1918.
Before Mitchell returned to the United States in February 1919,
he stopped off in London to see Trenchard and to study all facets of
the independent RAF.

This convinced him that the United States needed

its own independent air force.

2

Once back in America, Mitchell was

disappointed not to receive command of the U. S. Army Air Service,
which went, instead, to Major General Charles C. Menoher— a non-flying
officer.

Nevertheless, Mitchell retained a remarkable degree of in

fluence within the air service.

^Levine, Mitchell, op. cit., p. 91; Arnold, Global Mission, op.
cit., p. 46.
^Hurley, Billy Mitchell, op. cit., p. 38.
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In order to prevent the rapid demobilization from emasculating
American air power, Mitchell decided to capture the public imagina
tion with his ideas and with spectacular aerial feats.
spoke on air power at every opportunity.

He wrote and

As one writer^- noted,

he could be shocking, satirical, or irreverent; and he was definitely
the "gadfly" of the General Staff.

In short, Mitchell was polemical,

impetuous, and flamboyant— but not yet insubordinate.
Mitchell

9

flung himself into the national arena in order to alert

politicians and citizens that the world stood on the threshold of an
aeronautical era in which air power would be the most powerful weapon
in the world.

Since air power had come to stay, he insisted that Amer

icans must discard isolation and accept the new conditions that existed
3

in the world.

His most recent biographer

explained:

Mitchell [was] one of the few Americans who under
stood that the "Great War" had not solved the basic prob
lems affecting world peace. Also, he was the first American
to warn his countrymen so resoundingly of the impact avia
tion would have on future conflicts or to show them how
wide-spread was the idea of strategic bombardment among
the airmen of the western world.
Above all, Billy Mitchell stressed the importance of air power
4
and its equality with the older services.

According to Mitchell,

the

Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air
Arm, 1917-1941 (USAF Historical Study No. 89, Maxwell AFB, Alabama:
Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955), p. 17.
^William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibili
ties of Modern Air Power— Economic and Military (New York: G. P. Put
nam's Sons, 1925), pp. 3-4; William Mitchell, "Aeronautical Era," Satur
day Evening Post, CXVIIC (20 December 1924), p. 3.
"^Hurley, Billy Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 116-17.

4

William Mitchell, Our Air Force: The Keystone of National De
fense (New York: G. P. Dutton & Co., 1921), pp. xix, 13-14, 199.
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next war would begin in the air; and the results of this contest
would probably determine the outcome of the war since ground and
naval forces could not operate under an enemy controlled sky.

"Con

sequently," wrote Mitchell,^ "the only defense against an air force
is another air force."

He contended that this required the establish

ment of a Department of Aeronautics which must be equal to the War and
Navy Departments within a Department of Defense.

Since he made no

distinction between land and sea based aircraft, except their landing
fields, he also advocated placing all military aviation under this new
department.

2
3

Unlike his Italian counterpart, Mitchell

called for a balanced

air force of 600 aircraft— sixty percent pursuit, twenty percent at
tack, and twenty percent bombardment.

Whereas Mitchell relegated At

tack Aviation to close support and interdiction operation, he under
scored the need for Pursuit (fighter) Aviation.

He reasoned that

nothing could resist properly handled Pursuit Aviation.

Not even in

his most zealous moments did he ever recommend unescorted bombing at4
tacks.

"A large lumbering airplane," wrote Mitchell

in 1921, "or a

collection of airplanes, no matter how well armed, cannot resist the
surrounding attack of Pursuit Aviation;" and he^ reiterated in 1924

1
loc. cit., p. 14.

2
loc. cit., pp. 162, 199.

3
"Air Service Plea Fails to Get Funds," New York Times, 29 January
1921, p. 1; Mitchell, Our Air Force, op. cit., p. 37.
4
Mitchell, loc. cit., p. 46.
5
Flugel, United States Air Power Doctrine, op. cit., p. 148.
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that against fighters, "the bombardment planes haven't any chance."
But he clearly asserted that with command of the air and with full
fighter escort, the bombers would always reach their targets.
Keenly aware of American sentiments, Mitchell elucidated the
bomber's offensive role in carefully phrased terms of "defense."
Mitchell predicted that immediately after a declaration of war that
"the enemy" would strike at industrial, communication, and population
centers with h igh explosives and gas.

He^ anticipated that such at

tacks would compel the evacuation of major cities and cause the ces
sation of industrial output.

He even inferred that bombers may not

have to hazard a city's defense.

Instead, they could "stand off for
2

many miles and hit a target" with "aerial torpedoes."

As the years

sped by, Mitchell became increasingly outspoken on the bomber menace
until he^ finally postulated in 1931:
When nations look with apprehension at each other,
it is not the hostile navy or the hostile army they
think of first, but the hostile airplane bomber. The
airplane bomber has enough offensive strength to destroy
the largest city . . . .
Bombers need not actually fly
over a city to hit it, but can launch winged projectiles
loaded with gas or explosives miles away, at five or six
miles altitude. Nothing on earth . . . can stop them.

Mitchell, Winged Defense, op. cit., pp. xvii, 5, 126. Facing p.
208 is a picture of an airplane spreading a smoke blanket over New York
the caption reads, "Whole areas can be inundated with gas in this manner*
2loc. cit., pp. 204-205.
^"Mitchell Scores Army Air Program," New York Times, 23 May 1931,
p. 3. Emphasis added.
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Even today people are amazed by Mitchell's numerous accurate
predictions.

It should be pointed out, though, that Mitchell kept

track of the latest technical advances, and during his tour of duty in
Washington, D. C., he was known to dine often with foreign air attaches.
Beside.® this, he secured copies of all reports sent to military intel
ligence in Washington by attaches abroad, he received personal letters
from leading air-oriented people in Europe, and he counted Trenchard,
Paul de Lavergne, Colonel A. Guidoni, Caproni, and L. E. 0. Charlton
among his friends.'*'
ian,

2

Most interesting of all, according to one histor-

Mitchell met Douhet early in 1922 and had a number of lengthy

discussions with him.

Hugh Trenchard

None of the preceptors were able to shape their nation's air
policy like Great Britain's Hugh Trenchard.

Few British airmen read

Douhet's book prior to World War II, but his ideas were too universal
not to take root elsewhere.

Indeed, Trenchard1s ideas were much

closer to Douhet's than to Mitchell's.

In the ten years that he

served as CAS, Trenchard's name clearly became synonymous with the
concept of strategic bombing.

^Hurley, Billy Mitchell, p. 54.

2
loc. cit., p. 75. Hurley pointed out that it took Mitchell ten
years to admit that he met Douhet on his trip to Europe. It is also
possible that he became familiar with Douhet's book at this time. Fur
thermore, after again visiting Trenchard, it must have dawned on him
how widespread the bomber doctrine was among airmen. Flugel, on the
other hand, infers that Mitchell kept this meeting secret because he
"lifted" the Italians' ideas for his own use; see Flugel, United States
Air Power Doctrine, op. cit., 115-16.
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Air Marshal Sir Hugh M. Trenchard was born on a stormy February
day in 1873.

No one in the orderly Victorian home dreamed that this

boy would someday embark on an equally stormy career.

His father,

a former infantry captain, decided early on a military career for
him.

Despite private tutoring, Trenchard proved to be as poor a stu

dent as he was an outstanding sportsman and athlete.'*'
ly, he failed the army entrance examinations.

Not surprising

Undaunted, his father

placed him in a "crammer school" where Trenchard displayed a deeprooted stubbornness and an inclination to bend rules.
Trenchard finally secured a commission in the Royal Scots Fusi
liers.

He first served a tour of duty in India but somehow always

missed the rotation for the limited campaigns on the northern frontier.
Because his ambitions for combat were continually frustrated in India,
Trenchard volunteered for the Boer War; ironically he was severely
wounded in his first engagement.

After two years convalescence and a

brief tour of garrison duty, Trenchard served five adventurous years
in the jungle of Nigeria.

He returned to England in 1910 but soon be

came disenchanted with the insipid garrison life.

In a desperate

search for excitement, Trenchard volunteered for the RFC in August
1912.

After a number of successful "crash landings" he received his

flying certificate and accepted a position at the Central Flying
School.

After that his career accelerated at a remarkable pace.

November 1914 he took command of the First Wing and in August 1915
he replaced Henderson as commander of the RFC in France.

^Boyle, Trenchard, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

In

59

In light of Trenchard’s energetic opposition to the creation of
a strategic air force, many observers were surprised that he accepted
command of Britain's first independent bombing force in 1918.
ally Trenchard never really changed his mind.

Actu

As early as June 1916

he asked for "a certain number of machines" for the Front and for
raids into Germany.

But he always considered the latter a luxury

as long as the Front lacked sufficient aircraft.^

Since production

fell short of expectation and training plunged to deplorable depths,
Trenchard refused to take Henderson’s proposals for an independent
force seriously.

Nevertheless, he

admitted years later that, "Hen

derson had twice the insight and understanding that I had . . . .

and

it is doubtful whether the R.A.F. or Britain realizes its debt to him,
which is at least as great as its debt to Smuts."
Trenchard never authored a book and wrote very little, but his
3
ideas were firmly laid down for his successors.

Douglas

recalled

that, "Trenchard was inarticulate, and, at times, bumbling in his
ways; but he was a fearsome man in an argument."

Trenchard excelled

in his well-rehearsed arguments with representatives of the other
services before various governmental committees.

In these sessions,

as well as in discussions with subordinates, Trenchard expounded his
unfolding air doctrine.

"We had to feel our way towards a doctrine

^Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters, op. cit., p. 281; Boyle,
Trenchard, op. cit., p. 219.
2

Boyle, loc. cit., p. 233.

3
Douglas, Combat and Command, op. cit., pp. 220-21.
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of air warfare," recalled Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,^ "and under
Trenchard*s inspiration there evolved the theory of air warfare,
based on the supremacy of the offensive."
The air offensive was all important to Trenchard.

Ever since

the Battles of Verdun and the Somme he asserted that the airplane was
the most offensive weapon that had ever been invented, and that the
only feasible defense was a vigorous offense.

Time and time again

Trenchard reiterated that the RAF could not stand on the defensive.
Success in an air war depended on maintaining the offensive whatever
the odds or the cost.

It was simply a choice of destroying or being

destroyed on the ground.

2

Consequently, he considered the bomber

offensive the heart and soul of British air defense.
Trenchard maintained that intense air fighting would commence at
the outbreak of the next war.

This aerial duel would not necessarily

take the form of a series of air battles but would more than likely
develop into a series of reciprocal bomber offensives through which
3

the weaker belligerent would be thrown on the defensive.

Once the

RAF achieved this "command of the air," its bombers would strike at
any target that contributed to the enemy's means and will to continue
the war.

Hence, the enemy's industrial, communication, and transpor4

tation centers would be paralyzed at the outset of war.

^John Slessor, The Central Blue (New York:
1957), p. 41.
2
Boyle, Trenchard, op. cit., p. 156.

3

Frederick A. Praeger,

loc. cit., p. 576.

4

Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive
Against Germany, 1939-1945, vol. IV (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1961), pp. 72-74. Memo by the CAS for the Chiefs of Staff
Sub-Committee on the War Objective of an air force, 2 May 1928.
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Moreover, a study of the German raids on London led Trenchard to
deduce that the morale effect of a bomber attack outweighed by far any
material destruction that could be achieved.^

In short, Trenchard

believed that an extension of the horrors of the battlefield to civil
ian communities would result in the morale collapse of industrial and
public service workers, and that the ensuing chaos would probably
compel the enemy government to sue for peace.
Trenchard apparently did not see anything immoral in the extension
of "frightfulness" to civilians.

First of all, he recognized no dif

ference between aerial and artillery bombardment of a town.

Second,

it seemed more logical to destroy a tank or airplane factory than to
destroy their end products piecemeal at the Front.

Finally, Trenchard

was convinced that in a future war the enemy would attack British
towns; therefore, it was best to strike first.

2

Obviously, Trenchard

completely agreed with Douhet and Mitchell that it was unnecessary for
an air force to defeat the enemy's military forces in order to defeat
the enemy nation.
However much Trenchard's detractors may criticize the "Trenchard
Legacy," he was undeniably admired by many who came to know him per
sonally.

Billy Mitchell wrote that he had never known a man he more
3

greatly respected or in whose judgement he had more confidence.

^Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, I, op. cit.,
p. 63.

2
Boyle, Trenchard, op. cit., p. 577.
O

Flugel, United States Air Power Doctrine, op. cit., p. 33.
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Slessor^ recalled that Trenchard was not a great soldier, airman, or
statesman; but he was a great man:

self-confident without a trace of

arrogance; possessed of a contemptuous yet not intolerant disregard
for anything mean or petty; and was endowed with the capacity to
shuffle aside the nonessentials and put an unerring finger on the
real core of a problem or the true quality of a man.
ner, Douglas

In a like man-

wrote, "I have never had anything but the warmest ad

miration for our first great Air Commander.
great man. . . .

He was unquestionably a

he made a great and lasting impression upon me."

Walther Wever

After the First World War the Germans found themselves in a
unique but unhappy position.

The Treaty of Versailles limited their

armed forces to 100,000 men and prohibited them from acquiring either
tanks or military aircraft.

Although the treaty clipped Germany of

her wings, it could not remove the will to fly; and so the Germans
employed various covert methods in order to keep pace with techno
logical developments in the West.

By the time Adolf Hitler became

Chancellor, they were able to combine excellent officers with a welldeveloped aircraft industry.
air force in half a decade.

This allowed them to construct a m o d e m
Moreover, the Germans were fortunate to

find the ideal man to organize their new Luftwaffe (air force).

^Slessor, The Central Blue, op. cit., p. 45.

2
Douglas, Combat and Command, op. cit., p. 143.
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General Walther Wever was one of forty General Staff Officers
arbitrarily switched to the Luftwaffe after the creation of the Reich
Air Ministry on 10 May 1933.

Wever was born in 1887 of middle-class

parents in the province of Posen.

He distinguished himself in the

First World War, and in 1917 he joined Ludendorff's hand-picked staff
where he played a key role in foiling Nivelle's Offensive.^"

During

the twenties his organizational talents impressed both General von
Seeckt and General von Blomberg.
Originally the choice of the first Luftwaffe Chief of Staff lay
between two of the most outstanding Colonels in the German Army—
Manstein and Wever.

But Manstein was considered a bit old-fashioned

and Wever was highly recommended by Colonel Hans-Jtirgen Stumpff who
had known him since the first World War.

2

Erhard Milch (State Secre

tary of Aviation), who was never easily impressed by staff officers,
quickly recognized Wever's talents and asked the army to release him.
Although Blomberg approved Wever’s transfer, he nonetheless muttered
that the Luftwaffe had stolen his best officer and a future commanderin-chief of the Army.

3

It is very doubtful if any other officer except Wever could have
created a strategical and tactical air force in a Third Reich permeated

■^Richard Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership in the German Air
Force (USAF Historical Study No. 174, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Aerospace
Studies Institute, Air University, 1969; reprint ed., New York: Arno
Press, 1970), pp. 1-2.
2

loc. cit., pp. 2-3.

General Andreas Nielsen, The German Air Force General Staff (USAF
Historical Study No. 173, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Research Studies In
stitute, Air University, 1959; reprint~ed77~New York: Arno Press, 1968),
p. 28.
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with plots, jealousies, rivalries, and general mistrust in the upper
military and political echelons.

He was one of the very few staff

officers who impressed Hitler and won his full confidence.

Milch

admired his professional zeal, organizational abilities, and never
hindered Wever in any way.

In fact, Milch told Suchenwirth^ nine

years after World War II that Wever "was the only General Staff Chief
since the end of World War I who came close to Moltke."

Finally, and

equally as important, GBring considered Wever indispensable and simply
"tremendous."

2

Likewise, Wever had no difficulty in infecting his officers and
men with his own enthusiasm and in converting them to his way of think
ing.

Wever was a fatherly supervisor who often tested his men's capa

bilities without ever injuring their pride or personal feelings.

He

was never petty and often encouraged his men to express their ideas
freely.

He came to know his people personally through frequent field

inspection trips and often turned a serious moment into a lively and
3

humorous one with his renowned smile.

Indeed he had one of those rare

dynamic personalities which inspired trust and confidence in all quar
ters.
Once Wever assumed his new post he had little difficulty in de
termining what kind of an air force he desired.
army background supplied the answer.

Two books and his

By thumbing through Hitler's

^Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership in the GAF, op. cit., p. 4.
^Nielsen, The German Air Force General Staff, op. cit., p. 138.
Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership in the GAF, op. cit., p. 9.
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Mein Kampf, Wever deduced that a war with Russia was virtually inevit
able.

Not only was Communist ideology diametrically opposed to Nazism,

but Russia offered Germany its only avenue for expansion.^"

Douhet's

book offered the one effective way of dealing with the Soviets even
beyond the Ural Mountains.

When Colonel Wimmer introduced Wever to

the designs of the four-engined Junkers Ju-89 and the Dornier Do-19,
he immediately recognized that the standard bomber of the future would
have to be a long-range machine— a true "Ural Bomber."

2

But he also

vividly recalled the plight of World War I infantrymen and that of the
undefended Rhineland towns.

Hence, he decided to depart from Douhet's

doctrine by developing a strategical, tactical, and Home Defense air
force.
Unfortunately, Wever remains an enigma to this day since his ef
forts are overlooked in most postwar accounts of the Luftwaffe.
enough information exists to sketch his basic doctrine.

Yet

According to

3

General Nielsen

he wished to create an air force capable of meeting

Douhet's requirements and therefore, deliberately emphasized long-range,
four-engined bombers.

He clearly emphasized his ideas before the Air
4

Warfare Academy on 1 November 1935.

"Never forget," Wever

stressed,

"that the bomber is the decisive factor in aerial warfare," and that

■^loc. cit., p. 5.
2

Nielsen, The German Air Force General Staff, op. cit., pp. 155,

172.
3ibid.
4
Eugene M. Emme, ed., The Impact of Air Power: National Security
and World Politics (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1959), p.
184.
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"the object of any war is to destroy the morale of the enemy."

Ac

cording to his timetable the first of the 1,000 four-engined Do-19s
and Ju-89s were to become operational by 1939.
Few nations were as fortunate as Germany in the early thirties.
It not only possessed the services of an exceptional officer, but also
recognized him for what he was.

For that reason, the Luftwaffe suf

fered a severe blow when he accidentally died on 3 June 1936.

Wever

was quickly succeeded by Generals Kesselring, Stumpff, and Jeschonnek.
The first two were unable to cope with Milch*s and GOring*s insidious
ways.

Furthermore, they lacked Wever's urge to create a long-range

bomber force.

Nor did they possess his dynamic personality.

General

Jeschonnek once again restored Hitler's faith in the Luftwaffe but
failed to mitigate Hitler's basic mistrust of General Staff Officers.'*'
Even more damaging, in the long run, was Jeschonnek's faith in Ernst
Udet's dive bomber and his complete trust in the two-engined Ju-88.
By 1938 the four-engined bomber was only a memory.
General Nielsen

2

Consequently,

contended many years after the war:

With the loss of its first Chief of Staff, the
Luftwaffe lost the first, and perhaps most decisive,
battle of World War II.

^Nielsen, The German Air Force General Staff, op. cit., p. 184.
2

loc. cit., p. 29.
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CHAPTER III

THE WARRIORS

We are in face of a new force of almost limitless
potentialities. Properly trained and directed, it
is capable of transforming the whole face of war
almost beyond recognition . . . .
The revolution
has begun. The day of the contentions of great
armies, those huge mastodons of m o d e m war, those
saurians of human combat, is passing away before
our eyes.
James M. Spaight,
Air Power and War Rights (1924)

As it became increasingly evident that there could be no agree
ment between the visionaries and the blind, a handful of air oriented
men rallied to support the preceptors' air power crusade.

Like the

preceptors, these men understood that the bomber denoted ominous im
plications for the future of civilization.

They became dedicated war

riors— albeit some were indeed reluctant warriors— who continually
sought to enlighten their fellow countrymen to the bomber menace.
Since most of them believed that

the bomber threatened their very

existence, they sought public support

for the development and mainten

ance of strong air forces.

The remainder were devoted pacifists who

called attention to the bomber menace in hopes of mitigating it.
Nevertheless, militarist and pacifist alike agreed with Major Karl
Bratt^ of Sweden, who contended that the bombing of civilians in World

^“Karl Axel Bratt, That Next War?,trans.
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), p. 53.

Ernst Classen
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War I was the most important development of the war for it introduced
a new epoch in war and the science of warfare.
All the warriors emphasized the rapid aeronautical strides in
the First World War and what this augered for the future.

They were

prolific writers, and often lectured before political organizations
and university gatherings.

They were generally well informed, intel

ligent, and commanded various degrees of influence.

Above all, though,

they wanted to influence their governments by arousing the political
power of the common citizen.

Therefore, in the following presentation

of their principal themes it will be advantageous to keep in mind the
salient features of the preceptors' theories.

The Bolt from the Blue

The warriors encountered little difficulty in determining how the
next war would begin.

They simply combined the capability and poten

tiality of m o d e m technology with the well established characteristics
of man.

If it came down to a struggle for existence, the warriors

concluded, all combatants would attempt to gain the upper hand by any
means available.

With this in mind, they emphasized that a modern air

force offered aggressors an opportunity to launch a pre-emptive aerial
strike at the heart of the enemy nation on a scale so devastating that
it would shock pre-World War I adherents of "Copenhagening.

^In the Napoleonic Wars Lord Nelson sailed his fleet into Copen
hagen harbor and sank the Danish fleet without the benefit of a declar
ation of war. Thereafter, the term "Copenhagening" signified a crip
pling surprise attack at or before the outset of war.
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All air power proponents assumed that the next war would begin
in the air.

In fact, many'*' believed that it would be an all air war

in which armies and navies would only play a secondary role at best.
This conviction led Bratt to conclude that air supremacy would decide
the next European war.

He read both Douhet's and Mitchell's publica

tions and completely agreed with them that the development of air
power must be studied with the future in mind and not the past.

Hence,

Bratt postulated that mobilization in the future would no longer be a
question of days but rather one of hours or minutes.
he

o

It would be, as

said, a "push button" war in which responsible military officers

would argue that a single hour's delay could lose the war.
Informed people on both sides of the Atlantic accepted the fact
that the next war would begin with highly destructive aerial attacks.
3

In the United States, for instance, Gulick

expressed a grave concern

that major American manufacturing, communication, and transportation
centers could be terrorized, paralyzed, and destroyed by bomber at
tacks.

General Patrick^ echoed these same fears but added that aircraft

carrier launched bombers would not necessarily be limited to coastal

*"For example: L. E. 0. Charlton, War from the Air: Past, Present,
Future (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1935), p. 37: Bratt,
That Next War?, op. cit., p. 54.; Lord Fisher, "Marr'd," Times (London),
10 November 1919, p. 10.
2
Bratt, That Next War?, op. cit., pp. 46, 48.
^Sidney L. Gulick, "The Aerial War Games," New York Times, 23 May
1931, p. 16.
^Mason M. Patrick, The United States in the Air (Garden City, N. Y.:
Doubleday, Doran, & Co., 1928), p. 168.
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cities but could also carry death and destruction far inland.

Joerg

Joergensen, a Danish professor, voiced virtually the same sentiments.
He wrote and lectured that war psychosis would spur the belligerents
to immediately unleash the most barbaric aerial attacks upon each
other.

"All moral principles," he added, "all education and disci

pline will be forgotten."^

But of all nationalities, the British

were probably most sensitive to the "Bolt from the Blue."

During the

inter-war period the British often expressed their fear of surprise
attack.

For example, Morrison

2

wrote:

It is the generally accepted view of competent
observers in all countries that one of the first acts
of a belligerent Power will be an attempt to strike
a paralyzing blow at the most vulnerable point of the
opposing war machine— the administrative heart of the
enemy.
3

Nor did Liddell Hart

refrain from joining this foreboding chorus:

In wars of the future the initial hostile attacks
will be directed against the great nerve and communica
tion centers of the enemy's territory, against it's
large cities . . . . against every life artery of the
country . . . .
Entire regions inhabited by peaceful
populations will be continually threatened with extinction.
P. R. C. Groves was undoubtedly Great Britain's most prolific
and influential writer.

It is now impossible to say if this former

*Goss, Civilian Morale Under Aerial Bombardment, op. cit., p. 58.
^Morrison, War On Great Cities, op. cit., p. 8 . Similarly, an
other account warned, "A nation with a strong air force can with prac
tically no warning strike at the heart of the enemy country and bombard
its inhabitants irrespective of age or sex." See H. Montgomery Hyde
and George R. F. Nuttall, Air Defence and the Civil Population, rev.
ed. (London: Crescent Press, 1938), p. 1.
3
B, H. Liddell Hart, Paris or the Future of War (London: Kegan
Paul & Co., 1925; reprint ed., New York: Garland Publishers, 1972),
p. 41.
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RAF Brigadier General inaugurated or simply echoed public awareness
of the bomber menace.

At any rate, he authored a number of serious

articles and books which noted the increased range and carrying capac
ity of aircraft.

This, he^ asserted, altered the character of war

from one of "fronts" to one of "areas."

Groves

2

also assured the

reading public that huge fleets of enemy bombers would strike immedi
ately at Britain’s nerve centers with high explosives and gas bombs.
Nor were the French and Germans immune to this effusion of fore
boding.

Captain Rene Fonck, the foremost surviving French air ace of

World War I, predicted that quick mobilization of air power would be
the vital factor in the next war.

It would then require only two or
3

three weeks to annihilate a city the size of Paris.

Another French

man asserted in Les Ailes (Wings) that massive sneak air attacks
would surely precede a declaration of war because the enemy would wish
to attain all the advantages of such a tactic.

"This," he concluded,

"is the menace which, despite what one says or pretends, hangs c>;cr
France."^

Furthermore, the enemy who would presumably launch this

^P. R. C. Groves, "Our Future in the Air," Times (London), 21
March 1922, p. 13.
^P. R. C. Groves, Behind the Smoke Screen (London: Faber and
Faber, Ltd., 1934), p. 32; P. R. C. Groves, "For France to Answer,"
Atlantic Monthly, CXXXIII (February 1924), p. 145.
3
"Sees Planes Deciding Issue In Future Wars," New York Times,
16 December 1923, p. 2.
^"How 400 Planes Could Demolish Paris," Literary Digest, LXXXVII
(7 November 1925), p. 72.
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attack gave no indication that such methods would not be employed.
General von Metzsch asserted that, "No legal consideration will stand
when the vital interests of a nation are at stake.

War will immediate

ly be carried into the enemy country by means of massed aerial raids.
Bratt

obviously spoke for all the warriors when he presumed that fear

of the bomber would be the decisive factor in launching unimaginably
destructive pre-emptive aerial strikes at the outset of the next war.

The Age of Ruin?

The first chapter clearly illustrated that once cities were bombed
the people were at first confused, then dismayed, and finally out
raged at becoming part of the "front."

After the war the public re

alized that cities would probably again be bombed in the next war.

And

by the time of the Spanish Civil War, in the late thirties, people
automatically expected to be bombarded from the air.

This change was

primarily due to sensational journalism as well as the sober accounts
of the warriors.
Americans and Europeans were already being bombarded with dire
predictions of destruction from the air just one year after "The War
to End War."

Not only would the bombers be launched at the outset of

war, but they would be directed primarily at the enemy cities.

Realizing

^"The War to End Civilization," New Republic, LXXVII (22 November
1933), p. 52.
2

Bratt, That Next War?, op. cit., p. 68.
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this, one member of Parliament^" wrote, "the threat from the air
is the greatest danger this country has ever had to face since it be
came an independent nation."
ton

2

Elaborating on this theme, another Bri-

argued that there would be no place of safety.

All would per

ish: the old with the young, the pacifist with the militarist, even
kings and presidents.
Fuller devoted considerable space in his 1923 publication to the
menace from the air.

He revived the reader's memory of World War I

bombing operations and pointed out the remarkable strides in aviation.
He then described in graphic detail how the next war would be won in
forty-eight hours.

Fuller

3

also assumed that the civilians would be

the first to suffer:
Whatever the civilian may desire or squeak for,
to put it vulgarly, in the next great war he is going
to be "in the soup," and what kind of soup will it be?
A pretty hot one!
On the whole Liddell Hart agreed with Fuller.

He, too, foresaw

enemy bombers winging unhindered over the fleet towards Britain's
governmental and industrial centers.

If the bombers struck swiftly

4
and powerfully, Liddell Hart

saw no reason why the war would last more

than a few hours— at the most a few days.

Moreover, he was convinced

that such a war could very well destroy civilization.

^"Joseph M. Kenworthy, New Wars: New Weapons (London:
Mathews & Marrot, 1930), p. 75. Kenworthy's emphasis.

Elkin

2
J. R. Kennedy, "London's Air Defences," Nineteenth Century,
CXVI (September 1934), p. 258.
o
Fuller, Reformation of War, op. cit., pp. 149-50.
^Liddell Hart, Paris or the Future of War, op. cit., pp. 4, 40.
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During a visit to the United States Squadron Leader Walser aided
Mitchell's crusade by warning Americans that New York could soon be
destroyed by an air armada flying at the unbelievable altitude of
30,000 feet.^

In spite of such periodic foreign portents of doom,

the United States had its own, albeit small, army of warriors.
Mingos,

2

Howard

for one, asserted that the bomber was rapidly becoming the

dominant factor in world affairs.

He assumed, like his British cousins,

that in a future war American and European civilians would find them3
selves in the front line.

One New York editor

not only concurred with

these views, but went on to paint an even grimmer picture:

he postulated

that further increases in speed and range would make it comparatively
easy for bombers to annihilate entire cities even before adequate
alarms could be sounded.
Most informed observers were obviously convinced that a future war
would be brief and devastating.

But for some reason, post-World War

II accounts of this period completely overlook the one indispensable
factor which compelled many people to accept the preceptors' and .war
riors' conclusions.

Quite simply, the statesmen of the inter-war period

confronted a triad of horrible weaponry much like that confronting us

■^"Menace of Attack by Air," New York Times, 11 September 1923, p.
14.
^Howard Mingos, "The Menace of Aircraft," Forum, LXXII (July
1924), p. 67.
3

"The New Agencies of War,” New York Times, 8 November 1921, p.
18. General Fechet likewise declared that leading American cities
could be leveled within twenty-four hours by invading bombers; "Special
to the New York Times," New York Times, 21 January 1932, p. 12.
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today.

Whereas we expect to be bombarded by nuclear, bacteriological,

and chemical warheads, they likewise expected a rain of high explosive,
incendiary, and poison gas bombs.

Indeed, the persistent fear of gas

bombs in the twenties and thirties cannot be overstated.
This contemporary disregard for the fear of gas during those years
is even more astonishing in light of some of the similarities between
the two postwar periods.

Both gas and nuclear weapons first caught

the attention of the world after they were employed in war.

Both

emerged from war as crude weapons which were progressively refined
along with their delivery systems in the postwar period.

Moreover,

all segments of the population became aware of the danger these wea
pons posed to the survival of their nation.

Furthermore, it soon

became obvious that every significant nation could acquire these wea
pons and this fostered the dual dilemma of proliferation and arms
limitation.
Many informed people were convinced that the Armistice had saved
Europe from the horror of aerial gas attacks.

This was especially true

of the British who had planned to deluge Berlin with gas bombs late in
1918.

Since the British crossed the gas bomb threshold themselves,

they apparently assumed that other nations would also resort to this
type of gas warfare.

Frankly, it is amazing how often this theme ap

peared in print prior to the Second World War.

Unfortunately, only a

few examples can be cited.
Groves^ asserted that millions of people could be gassed by

^P. R. C. Groves, "Air Power and Disarmament," Times (London),
18 September 1922, p. 11.
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bombers in a single night, and that the subsequent obliteration of
governmental centers could imperil civilization itself.

Kenworthy al

so believed that in a future war poison gas and even bacteriological
agents would be dropped from aircraft on defenseless cities.

"In the

process," he^ vowed, "such devastation, terror and agony will be ex
perienced by men, women and children that the whole social fabric of
what we call civilization will crumble and dissolve."
Commander Burney foresaw the slaughter progressing in a logical
sequence.

First, high explosive bombs would burst open thousands of

buildings.

Then, thermite bombs would set them afire.

civil population would be gassed.

Finally, the

He feared that so much of civiliza

tion would be destroyed in the process that society would probably return to something resembling the "Dark Ages."

2

Meanwhile, Morrison

3

highlighted another critical problem:
It is a fairly safe prediction that, in the event
of London being suddenly subject to a gas war, not more
than 10 percent of the population will be found voluntarily
to have equipped themselves with the necessary apparatus.
The remaining 90 percent will be potential casualties.
Moreover, concerned observers across the channel fully shared
these fears.

In Germany General von Deimling echoed the universal

"kj. M. Kenworthy, "Air Navies:
12 January 1930, sec. V, pp. 1-2.

The Great Menace," New York Times,

2
"Airplanes, and General Slaughter, in the Next War," Literary
Digest, LXXIX (17 November 1923), p. 60. For a similar appraisal see,
Hyde and Nuttall, Air Defence and the Civil Population, op. cit., p. 78.
3
Morrison, War On Great Cities, op. cit., p. 204.
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dread that gas would be used in the next war on a scale unknown In
World War I.

He emphasized that it required no imagination to depict

what would happen in such a war; quite simply gas, fire, and high ex
plosives would reduce European culture and civilization to ruin.^
Dr. Woker, a Swiss scientist, concurred completely with this
analysis because he believed that war mania knew but one aim— the complete and unscrupulous destruction of the enemy.

2

In France General

3
Debeney

predicted that poison gas, liquid fire, and a hurricane of

explosives would revive for many the horrors of Sodom and Gomorrah.
In fact, the only defense he foresaw against the bomber was the limita
tion of its fuel tanks and fully stocked underground shelters from
which new life could blossom.
Furthermore, the warriors encountered little difficulty in imag
ining what would transpire in major metropolitan centers during and
after a bomb and gas attack.
centers are inhabited . . .

As Bratt^ pointed out, "The industrial
by that part of the population which is

psychologically most sensitive— the working class."

Groves^ simply

stated that it would be impossible to estimate the casualties of a

^""Airplanes, and General Slaughter," op. cit., p. 64.
2
Goss, Civilian Morale Under Aerial Bombardment, op. cit., p. 61.
3
General Eugene Debeney, "The War of Tomorrow," New York Times,
25 September 1921, sec. VII, p. 1.

4

Bratt, That Next War?, op. cit., p. 69.

^Groves, Behind the Smoke Screen, op. cit., p. 151.
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concentrated twenty-four hour bomber attack.

As a matter of fact,

the fear of gas plagued Groves ever since 1922 when he first learned
that the Germans possessed a new horrible gas which penetrated the
most modern masks.

This led him'*' to conclude that there could be no

escape from death since the gas would filter into basements and subway
stations.
Liddell Hart

2

envisioned simultaneous attacks on a dozen cities

like London, Manchester, and Birmingham.

With industry, Fleet Street,

and Whitehall in ruins, he deduced that the working class would be
3
driven to madness and marauding.

Charlton,

too, asserted that un

disciplined flight from London and the disintegration of public facil
ities would throw the population into a state of lawlessness and semi
starvation; and that nothing could prevent this from occurring because
"One cannot fly from flying."
Nor did the warriors fail to inform their fellow citizens on the
4
ultimate aim of this mass slaughter.

Professor Reeves,

of the Univer

sity of Michigan, testified:
One of the most important factors in war is morale.
One of the most effective ways of breaking morale is by the
use of airplanes. I£ Germany failed in the last war to
break morale by bombing London and shelling Paris, it was
because she didn’t do enough of it.

^P. R. C. Groves, Our Future in the Air (London:
Co., 1922), p. 78.

Hutchinson &

^Liddell Hart, Paris or the Future of War, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
3
Charlton, War From the Air, op. cit., pp. 172-73.
^"Stress Need of Air Defence," New York Times, 25 August 1923,
p. 3. Emphasis added.
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Fuller^- amply illustrated that such negligence would not reoccur in
the next war:
Picture, if you can, what the result will be:
London for several days will be one vast raving Bedlam,
the hospitals will be stormed, traffic will cease, the
homeless will shriek for help, the city will be in pan
demonium. What of the government at Westminster? It
will be swept away by an avalanche of terror. Then will
the enemy dictate his terms, which will be grasped at like
a straw by a drowning man.
Nor should Marshal Foch's

o

oft quoted statement be overlooked:

The potentialities of aircraft attack on a large
scale are incalculable, but it is clear that such attack,
owing to its crushing morale effect on a nation may im
press public opinion to the point of disarming the Govern
ment and thus become decisive.
In the end Spaight
the war.

3

simply stated, "The attacks on the towns will be

Their success will mean victory."

The Survival Margin

All of the warrior's prognostications were obviously based on two
fundamental assumptions.

It was taken for granted that the bombers

would always reach their targets and that they would wreak destruction
4
and havoc on a scale unimagined in World War I.

Charlton

asserted

that the Gotha raids were but a foretaste, the merest nibble of what
Britons could expect in the future.

The American Assistant Secretary

^"Fuller, The Reformation of War, op. cit., p. 150.
^P. R. C. Groves, "Our Future in the Air:
Times (London), 22 March 1922, p. 13.

The Danger From Germany,"

3
Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, op. cit., p. 12.

4

Charlton, War Over England, op. cit., p. 125.
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of the Navy for Aviation^ advised, "The late European war offered but
a foretaste of what may come when things that were the imaginings of
fictionists a decade and a half ago are realized in grim truth . . . "
The editor

o

of the Times cautioned Londoners not to expect a repetition

of the Gotha's sporadic attacks which were just strong enough to stimu
late the inventiveness of British air defense.
In fact, the immense British air defense effort in World War I
did much to establish the idea of an irresistable bomber offensive.
3

Charlton,

for example, expounded that on the whole the Gothas encoun

tered little resistance, and that their success was out of all propor
tion to their losses.

He further maintained that on those rare occa

sions when the Germans lost a Gotha, it was usually a straggler.

There

fore, he asked, what chance would air defense have against the overwhelming fire power of a tight modern bomber formation?
of the Times, among others, echoed this same theme.

The editor

4

After reminding

the readers that the intricate LADA system had failed to stop a mere

Edward P. Warner, "Aerial Armament and Disarmament," Foreign
Affairs, IV (July 1926), p. 624; "Aerial Armament and Disarmament,"
The American Review of Reviews, LXXIV (August 1926), p. 204. In a
like manner General Patrick attested that twelve bombers operating
from aircraft carriers could drop as many bombs on New York City as
the Germans dropped on London throughout the war; "Sees City At Mercy
of Enemy from Air," New York Times, 8 January 1928, p. 2.
^"The Menace of Aircraft," Times (London), 25 September 1920,
p. 11.
3
Charlton, War From the Air, op. cit., pp. 143-44.
^"British Air Policy," Times (London), 21 March 1925, p. 13.
Pacifists in the United States also exposed LADA's apparent failure in
their attempts to arouse Americans to the bomber menace; see Elvira K.
Fradkin, The Air Menace and the Answer, (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1934), p. 49-50.
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handful of bombers, he asked them to consider what the effects of a
modern raid would be.
After the warriors accepted the idea that bombers could not be
stopped once they were launched, they logically championed a tactic
we often consider unique to the nuclear age.
the bomber as a two-edged weapon.

In short, they viewed

Reflecting one of Trenchard's

salient themes, both Kenworthy and Groves^- insisted that an all bomber
war could only be forestalled by the threat of retaliation.
The threat of such a dreadful exchange of bomber offensives led
many to believe that total war could perhaps be averted.

Colonel

Lockwood wrote in the Manchester Guardian that a war of bomber offen
sives would deteriorate into a battle of national attrition by bombs,
fire, and gas; and that virtually every soul would perish in the bel2
ligerent's major cities.

In other words, it would be Falkenhayn’s

and Haig's tactics at Verdun and the Somme graduated to a national
scale.
3

On the other hand, Bratt

argued that civilized people could not

long resist continuous attacks from the air.

Therefore, professor

Mayer asserted in France that the people had to decide whether they
would unleash this madness upon themselves and thereby, commit

^Kenworthy, New Wars: New Weapons, op. cit., p. 116. P. R. C.
Groves, "Our Future In the Air: England Without a Defence," Times
(London), 24 April 1922, p. 8. Among others who advocated this theme
are: Morrison, War on Great Cities, op. cit., p. 181; Hyde and Nuttall,
Air Defence and the Civil Population, op. cit., p. 1
^Quoted in "The Terror of the Air," Literary Digest, LXXXV (6 June
1925), p. 23.
3
Bratt, The Next War?, op. cit., p. 68.
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suicide.

1

According to Mingos,

2

it was simply a question of survival
3

or mutual extermination.

Similarly, Lord Allenby

conceded that "the

next war will mean the complete end of civilization as we know it."
4
After taking all this into consideration, Spaight
that war had been "sadly vulgarized."

finally lamented

Nevertheless, this very vulgar

ization of war offered mankind his one sliver of hope.

After studying

the question of bomber attacks, General Frederick Maurice^ wrote in
1925:
Such an attack if not immediately and completely suc
cessful would bring retaliation and expose the civil popula
tion of the assailant to the same dangers. It is unlikely,
therefore, to be adopted deliberately unless there seems to
be a good prospect of ending the war at once by this means
or unless it is employed as a last desperate measure when
all else has failed, or seems likely to fail.

^Goss, Civilian Morale Under Aerial Bombardment, op. cit., p. 58.
^Mingos, "The Menace of Aircraft," pp. 68, 75.
O
"Allenby, at 70, Warns Next War Means End of Civilization," New
York Times, 24 April 1931, p. 1; "Lord Allenby*s Tribute to Territor
ials," Times (London), 24 April 1931, p. 11.
^Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, op. cit., p. 103.
^Quoted in George H. Quester, ed., Deterrence Before Hiroshima:
The Air Power Background of Modern Strategy (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 63.
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CHAPTER IV

THE LOTUS YEARS

One does not throw away an umbrella just because
it isn’t raining.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home

The ten-year period that followed the First World War has been
called "The Golden Age of Aviation."

During those years men and women

flew continuously higher, farther, and faster.

The British established

commercial air routes throughout their empire and two Britons astounded
the world by winging their way across the Atlantic.

The world was

further captivated by the daring aerial explorers who unlocked the
mysteries of the north and south poles.

Meanwhile, a group of intrepid

American military aviators successfully circumvented the earth while
another group of Americans established unprecedented endurance records
by first employing in-air refueling.

Perhaps even more astounding,

insofar as it caught the public's imagination, was Lindberg's memorable
exploit in the "Spirit of St. Louis."
But much to the airmen's chagrin, military aviation did not enjoy
a similar golden age.

The airmen were fortified with theories but not

with governmental appropriations.

Their enthusiasm for air power as

well as their hopes and fears of the future were frustrated time and
time again by budget oriented politicians who desperately wanted to
believe that they had indeed fought the war to end war.

The airmen

were further hobbled by intransigent Army and Navy traditionalists who
83
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fought tenaciously for every penny of the limited appropriations.
They ostensibly justified this on the ground that the next war would
be, like the last, won on the high seas and in the mud— certainly not
in the air.
The postwar years in Britain and in the United States were clear
ly a period of mental and physical retrenchment.

The air services

still needed time to mature and to consolidate their gains.

The air

men were only consoled by the knowledge that the tide would surely and
slowly flow in their favor.

Even so, the airmen of these two excep

tionally air oriented nations had to wage fierce battles for survival.

The Gods Hate Britain

The necessities of war compelled the Cabinet to merge the RFC with
the Royal Naval Air Service into an independent air force.

But the

RAF faced its fiercest battle after the exigencies of war had passed.
Shortly after the Armistice the Government had to find answers to
three key questions:
inal components?

Should the RAF be split up again into its orig

Should the Air Ministry itself continue to exist?

What should the relationship be between civil and military aviation?
But Lloyd George's first decision— the Ten-Year Rule— actually
impaired the process of resolving these questions.

The Ten-Year Rule

firmly stated that the British Government would base its foreign and
domestic policies on the assumption that there would not be another
major European war during the next decade.

However meritorious or

credible this decision may have been, there is no questioning the fact
it left a legacy of procrastination and illusion.
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After the Armistice the RAF needed, above all, strong, resolute
leadership and esprit' de corps.

Unfortunately, Sykes (CAS) lacked

the resilence and force of character to save the RAF.

There is no

disputing his administrative abilities, but he was clearly out of
touch with the political situation.
for this oversight.

In a way the man cannot be blamed

Sykes was a dedicated airman who only sought to

create a British Imperial Air Force second to none in the world.
However, the unbelievably rapid demobilization of British air
power stunned Sykes as well as most other airmen.

The aggregate

strength of the RAF at the end of the war included 291,175 officers
and men, 22,171 aircraft, and approximately 700 airfields.^- But by
8 March 1920 the Government had demobilized 261,445 officers and men
and over 10,000 aircraft.

Furthermore, the remaining squadrons en

countered difficulties in securing acceptable machines and sufficient
„ 2
spare parts.
The first phase of this emasculation of British air power struck
Sykes to the quick.

It doomed his ambitious scheme of replacing

British sea power with a world-wide network of strategic air bases.
Altogether he envisioned 117 British squadrons as well as thirty-seven
Australian, Canadian, and South African squadrons.

He further planned

to standardize equipment within this Strike Force and to maintain it

"'‘Sir Frederick Sykes, From Many Angles (London: George G. Harrap
& Co., Ltd., 1942), p. 244; Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters, op.
cit., p. 313.
Baffin, Swifter than Eagles, op. cit., p. 150.
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on a war readiness basis.

He^ estimated the force would cost approx

imately L 21,000,000 annually.
But the British Government, confronted with a wide array of
problems, expressed no intention of endorsing such an elaborate scheme.
Terror flared up again in Ireland, trouble seethed in India and the
Middle East, and British troops were still participating in the Rus
sian intervention.

In fact, there were still 420,000 British troops

in France and the Rhineland, 96,000 in Egypt and Palestine, 21,000 in
Mesopotamia, and nearly 45,000 in Russia.

2

After almost five years of

war, the people cried for peace, but there was no peace.

Because of

the promised "return to normalcy" the Government found it necessary
to slash the military budget and even considered eliminating the RAF.
Air Minister Weir, who saw the storm clouds gathering in White
hall, encouraged his successor— Winston Churchill— to replace Sykes
with Trenchard since "he can make do with little and won't have to be
3
carried."

Churchill accepted Weir's advice and arranged a meeting

with Trenchard in January 1919.

The meeting quickly deteriorated into

a verbal donnybrook when both of these bullheaded men vented their
opinions; but the exchange cleared the air of any possible misunder
standings, and the two men departed in an atmosphere of mutual respect
and trust.^

A week later Trenchard again became CAS and held the post

until December 1929.

^Sykes, From Many Angles, op. cit., p. 154.
^"Size of British Forces Abroad," Times (London) 11 July 1919, p. 12.
^Boyle, Trenchard, op. cit., p. 328.

^loc. cit., pp. 329-30.
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Two days after Trenchard took command of the RAF he informed
Major General Salmond that the Government would only tolerate small
wars in the near future.^- He had, in effect, prepared himself for
Lloyd George's Ten-Year Rule.

It now remained Trenchard's task to

devise the smallest feasible budget which would maintain the largest
possible force.

He intended to accomplish this by building the RAF

from the ground up; that is, he sought to develop an "air force" spir
it by creating excellent schools and facilities.

In fact, he allo

cated so much of the budget for bricks and mortar that some newspapers
dubbed the RAF the "Royal Ground Force."

2

Although Trenchard agreed out of political necessity to limit
the RAF to twenty-five and one-half squadrons (nineteen of which were
stationed overseas), he did not merit the vindictive attacks that
Groves unleashed in 1934 when it was again in vogue to seek out scape3
goats.

Groves

asserted that Trenchard had displayed no conception of

future warfare or what air power really meant.

Indeed, he went so far

as to state that it was entirely Trenchard's fault that the RAF had
plunged from the world's strongest air force in 1918 to the fifth
strongest by 1930.

At the same time, though, Groves conveniently for-

got his own defense of RAF eleven years earlier when he

^loc. cit., p. 333.

4

wrote:

2loc. cit., p. 352.

Groves, Behind the Smoke Screen, op, cit., pp. 92, 257.
S . R. C. Groves, "War in the Air," Times (London), 23 July 1923.
p. 8 .
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. . . [since] financial considerations dominate the
entire issue, we are obliged to cut our cost according
to our cloth, and it is therefore imperative . . . that
we can make the most of such air forces as we may be
able to raise.
Trenchard harbored no doubts that the RAF had to justify its
existence in economic terms.

Deeds, more than words, were needed to

convert the politicians and the public to the value of air power.
Above all, only visible accomplishments could keep the RAF in the
public's mind.

Therefore, the frontier wars between 1919 and 1925

provided the RAF with the means to justify its existence.
The first opportunity came in May-June 1919 during the Third
Afghan War.

Although the army bore the brunt of the fighting, the

RAF did provide effective ground support operations on a number of
occasions.

Moreover, the bombing of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and

the city of Jalalabad seemed to have a significant effect on the
Afghan zest for war.^

The operation convinced Salmond that against

primitives the RAF possessed advantages over the army in economy,
speed, and fewer casualties.

2

This the RAF proved again in the spring of 1919 when the Somali
bandit, "Mad Mullah," began to terrorize the Somaliland colony.

It

was estimated that it would require two army divisions, the construc
tion of a railroad, a prohibitive drain on the Treasury, and at least
one year to apprehend him.

But Trenchard assured the Colonial Office

that the RAF could do it alone.

The financially desperate Colonial

^Elmer B. Scovill, "The Royal Air Force, the Middle East, and
Disarmament, 1919-1934," (Unpublished doctor’s dissertation, Michigan
State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1972), pp. 118-19.
^Laffin, Swifter than Eagles, op. cit., p. 153.
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Office took him at his word and gave the RAF its chance.

According

ly, a bomber squadron left Cairo in January 1920, bombed the bandit’s
forts, pursued them across country, and forced them to surrender to a
Camel Corps.

Britain's cheapest war in history took only three weeks

and cost a mere £77,000.^
Lloyd George's budget oriented government did not overlook this
inexpensive way of dealing with frontier wars.

Moreover, the Somali

Campaign was directly responsible for the convening of the Cairo Con
ference in March 1920 where Churchill assigned the RAF the primary task
of dealing with frontier disturbances— especially in Iraq.
It can be said that the French invasion of the Ruhr triggered off
the most serious crisis in postwar Iraq.

This French initiative not

only strained already poor Anglo-French relations, but it also encour
aged the Turks to make new demands for the Mosul region.

Although

the British had recently survived the Chanak Crisis, the Turks appar
ently did not misinterpret British sentiments.

For example, Bonar Law
2

vowed, "We cannot act alone as the policeman of the world."
At any rate, when the Lausanne talks broke down, Bonar Law
clearly expressed his intention not to fight for Mosul.

At this

point, Salmond— on his own initiative— attacked the Turks in the

^Boyle, Trenchard, op. cit., 366-67.
^Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (New York: Plume
Books, 1966), p. 92. He made this statement on 7 October 1922 during
the behind the scene moves to oust Lloyd George; on 23 October Bonar
Law succeeded him as Prime Minister.
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Kurdistan redoubt of Rowanduz Gorge.

Only Trenchard*s vigorous sup

port prevented a shocked Cabinet from immediately recalling Salmond.
Meanwhile, many people in London watched and waited.

This was espe

cially true of the two committees (one studying Iraq and the Salis
bury Committee studying the future of the RAF) which could not con
clude their investigations until Salmond either succeeded or failed.
As one writer^ noted, "Everybody in London was intent, apprehensive,
or both."
When Salmond took command of the four RAF squadrons and the 10,000
man native levy in Iraq, he sensed the prevailing restlessness in the
country.

He also immediately recognized that if the Turks could hold

the Rowanduz Gorge bottleneck, that Mosul would slip into their hands.
Nor did he doubt, after an aerial inspection, the truth of an old Arab
proverb that said:

"When Allah had made Hell he found it was not bad

enough, so he made Iraq— and added flies."

2

Without doubt this wild,

rugged, and mountainous region of stark and lonely gorges was an in
fantryman's nightmare.
everything:
ation.

Hence, Salmond used aircraft for virtually

bombing, close support, re-supply, and medical air evacu

His campaign was so successful that the Turks renounced Mosul
3

and signed the Lausanne Treaty on 6 August 1923.
In the opinion of C. J. Edmonds, a British official in Mosul,

^Laffin, Swifter than Eagles, op. cit., pp. 175, 179.
2
loc. cit., p. 168.

3

loc. cit., p. 186.
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Salmond's appointment came just in time to save Iraq.^

The British

Commissioner in Iraq agreed completely with this assessment.

He

wrote a friend that only aircraft had saved the British position in
Baghdad.

Yet despite this praise and the immediate impact Salmond's

air and ground campaign had on Salisbury's Committee, the campaign
also illustrated how difficult it was to bury old prejudices.

When

one author of British military campaigns was asked why he hardly men
tioned the Iraq campaign, he replied, "An RAF man was in command.

It

3

doesn’t qualify as a military campaign."

Whereas the Iraq Campaign

enabled the RAF to prove its worth in combat, the Ruhr Crisis once
again revived British fears of bomber attacks on London.

As tension

heightened observers on both sides of the Atlantic were keenly aware
of French air supremacy.

It was bluntly pointed out in Aviation that

the French Air Force was larger than the combined strength of the
4
United States, Great Britain, and Italy.

And on a one-to-one basis,

the French were four times as strong as the British.
Indeed, it is often overlooked today how seriously the world
viewed the Ruhr Crisis.

For instance, the Milwaukee Sentinel wondered

if the situation would parallel Anglo-German relations in the fifteen

^Scovill, "The RAF, the Middle East, and Disarmament," p. 144.

2

loc. cit., p. 137.

3
Laffin, Swifter than Eagles, op. cit., p. 192.
^"French Sky Hornets Worry Britain," Literary Digest, LXXVIII
(14 July 1923), p. 12.
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years prior to World War 1.^

Meanwhile, the Brooklyn Eagle empha

sized the tense climate by noting that there were half a million more
men under arms in 1923 than in 1913 despite the compulsory disarmament
of Germany.

2

But since Germany was disarmed the Philadelphia Record

asked why France maintained the largest air force in the world and
3
against whom would it be used.
The crisis not only triggered a wave of outrage in Britain but
it also offered the RAF a golden opportunity to expand during a per
iod of economic difficulties.

Liddell Hart^ recorded, as only an

Englishman could, that Britons "felt a strong sense of personal dis
comfort" when they realized that most of the French Air Force was as
sembled within reach of London.

While the Air Staff reached the con

clusion that casualties affected the French more than the British and
that the French would "squeal" long before the British could be struck
a mortal blow,^ the Air Minister— Sir Samuel Hoare— reassured Britons
over the BBC that there was no need for panic, even though a hostile
power could drop more bombs on London in one day than the Germans had
dropped during the entire war.^
Meanwhile, Time^ reported that the British public— fully aware

1

2
loc. cit., p. 13.

loc. cit., p. 12.

3

loc. cit., p. 13.

4
B. H. Liddell Hart, Europe in Arms (London: Faber and Faber),
p. 69.
^Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, IV, op. cit.,
p. 66.
^"Air Defence of London," Times (London), 16 May 1923, p. 16.
^"Franco-British Rivalry," Time, I (9 July 1923), p. 24.
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that a rapid and overwhelming air attack could decide the next war—
supported Prime Minister Baldwin's plan to expand the RAF by thirtyfour squadrons.

This would give British Home Defence fifty-two squad

rons (seventeen fighter and thirty-five bomber).

The Temps responded

to this announcement by asking against whom the British expected to
use this air force and ended by advocating negotiations rather than
confrontation.^

Ironically, the financial burden of the Ruhr occupa

tion sounded the Swan Song of French air power, whereas the political
crisis was instrumental in rejuvenating the RAF.
Actually, the fears of a military clash between these former al
lies were virtually unfounded.
Groves,

2

to arms.

"It seems highly improbable," wrote

"that either Britain or France would actually have resorted
What was decisive was the knowledge common to both that we

were powerless to do so."

Hoare completely concurred with this view
2

in his evaluation of the twenties.

He

argued that the British gov

ernment could not hope to achieve its goals when other governments be
gan to question Britain's influence in the world.

But in this episode

the question of war or peace was not nearly as important as the re
kindled fear of the strategic bomber.
Although the frontier wars and the Ruhr Crisis did much for the
RAF's public image, it still had to fight bitter political battles in

"*""An Air Entente Suggested," Times (London), 28 June 1923, p. 14.
2
Groves, Behind the Smoke Screen, op. cit., p . 21.
3
Sir Samuel J. Q. Hoare [Lord Templewood], Nine Troubled Years
(London: Collins, 1954), p. 110.
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the inner sanctums of Whitehall in order to maintain its independence.
The contest demanded of Trenchard all the energy, determination, and
lucid arguments he could muster.

Even so, Sir Eric Geddes* economic

committee frightened Trenchard as the Navy never could.

He feared

that the "Geddes axe," which audited all phases of government between
December 1921 and March 1922, could destroy everything he had accom
plished since 1919.

Trenchard, therefore, ordered that every penny

spent by the RAF since the Armistice must be accounted for, and that
nothing must be kept from Geddes.

He also considered it necessary

to tactfully "educate" Geddes on the importance of air power.^
Needless to say, Geddes was completely surprised by this spirit
of cooperation.

Thus, when the Army suggested that the Air Ministry

could well afford the largest budget cuts, Geddes welcomed Trenchard*s
rebuttal that the Army open all of its books as the RAF had dene.

2

Even though L5,000,000 were slashed from the RAF budget, the committee
was persuaded to rescind its suggestion to scrap eight squadrons and
it compromised more often than anyone had expected.
But in his long struggle with the Navy, Trenchard met an equally
stubborn and determined opponent.

The First Sea Lord, Admiral David

Beatty, logically wanted both administrative and operational control
of all naval aircraft.

To the RAF, however, this augered a dangerous

precedent; for if it gave in to the Navy, then the Army might claim
control of all tactical aircraft.

Trenchard superbly fended off every

^Boyle, Trenchard, op. cit., pp. 402-03.
2ibid.
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attack until the final showdown in 1923 when Bonar Law ordered Lord
Salisbury’s Committee for Imperial Defence to finally determine if
an independent and equal air force should indeed exist.
Throughout the spring of 1923 Beatty used numerous Parliamentary
lobbying tricks to sway the Committee, but Salisbury guaranteed Trench
ard a fair hearing.

In Trenchard*s view it was plainly a life-and-

death struggle for the RAF.

In the ensuing battle both resorted to

political backstabbing, innuendo, shouting barrages, and before it
ended, both Beatty and Trenchard threatened to resign.

In the end

Trenchard*s forceful interpretation of the issue won the day.
First of all, none of the financially oriented politicians ques
tioned the RAF's efficacy in frontier wars.

Moreover, Trenchard suc

cinctly refuted Beatty's charge that he was merely a dreamer by empha
sizing, "An air force can't be built on dreams, but it can't live
without them either, and mine will be realized sooner than you think.
Trenchard also predicted that governments may yet hold cabinet meetings
in bomb shelters and added that in the entire course of World War I,
the Germans dropped only 242 tons of bombs on Britain; but, by 1925,
France could drop 325 tons in one day, whereas Britain would be lucky
to return 67 tons.

2

Such arguments, plus the Ruhr Crisis, persuaded

the committee to vote in favor of an independent RAF.
The RAF also received energetic support from the warriors and the
Press during its long struggle for independence.

1
loc. cit., p. 368.

As early as 1919 the

2
loc. cit., p. 469.
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flamboyant Admiral Lord Fisher asserted that future wars would be
fought in the air and under the sea.
salvation.
ity, he

1

He argued that aviation spelled

Since the battleship admirals were out of touch with real-

simply suggested, "Sack the lot."

The Times

2

periodically

carried the theme that Britain needed an air defense that could cripple
the enemy before he strikes London.

And Groves’ articles in the Times

spurred most other British newspapers to support air power.
cluded:

These in

the Pall Mall Gazette, "Our Lost Air Defence," (9 June 1922);

the Evening News, "Wake Up to Flying," (17 June 1922); and the Daily
3
Express, "Our Lost Air Supremacy," (12 June 1922).
It cannot be over emphasized how much Englishmen dreaded the pos
sibility of air attacks from the Continent.

This was especially true

in the case of Samuel Hoare who secured a copy of Paris or the Future
4
of War shortly after he became Secretary for Air in Baldwin's Cabinet.
This book and subsequent meetings with Liddell Hart only reinforced
Hoare's conviction that the next war would be fought over Britain's
great cities.

At various gatherings like the Guildhall Banquet, Hoare

reiterated the theme that civilians would be the primary victims of

^"Lord Fisher, "A Swarm of Aircraft," Times (London), 6 November
1919, p. 8 ; Lord Fisher, "Aviation Spells Salvation," Times (London),
8 January 1920, p. 11.
^"Home Defence By Air," Times (London), 4 August 1922, p. 8 .
3
Groves, Our Future in the Air, op. cit., pp. 81-84.
^Liddell Hart, Memoirs, I, op. cit., p. 99.
^"National Air Defence," Times (London), 17 October 1925, p. 7.
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gas and bomb warfare.

Hoare^ later recalled:

The need as I saw it was to prevent the light
ning defeat of a peaceful country by a sudden and
overwhelming attack from the air. . . .
To eliminate
or at least to lessen the risk, therefore, the first
and most urgent step . . . was the reduction in the
number and size of bombers [through international
agreement].
The renowned pacifist, Lord Cecil, agreed that threatened retaliation
might save London; but, he too, warned that civilization was probably
2
doomed without arms limitations and a strong Leagur of Nations.
Unfortunately, the RAF's final victory over the Navy came at a
most inopportune time.

Six long years after the Treaty of Versailles,

Europe finally frolicked in the euphoria of peace.
continent was free of war.

At last the entire

German, British, and French representa

tives met at the Swiss resort town of Locarno in 1924 and apparently
settled the west European frontier question.
and France never seemed more secure.

Germany joined the League

But the French remained conscious

of Germany's capacity to rearm, and most statesmen realized that Ger
many would never reconcile itself to its eastern frontier.

Yet despite

these nagging doubts, most Europeans took the Locarno euphoria quite
seriously.
The British were probably the happiest victims of this illusion
of perpetual peace since Locarno allowed them to relax their preoccu
pation with Europe.

To Baldwin— who founded his second government on

^Hoare, Nine Troubled Years, op. cit., p. 117.
2

"Europe in Arms," Times (London), 23 February 1924, p. 7.
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the theme of peace, stability, and isolation— this illusion proved
especially useful in 1926— the year of the General Strike.

This

strike marked the watershed in the relations between the Government
and the trade unions.

Moreover, its effects lingered into 1927 when

falling unemployment and a surplus budget once again ushered in a
period of stability.

Meanwhile, with no enemy in sight the military

services were allowed to stagnate, and even Churchill chose to jump
aboard the bandwagon by annually extending the Ten-Year Rule.

In

fact, only half of the thirty-four squadrons that Baldwin had author
ized in 1923 were actually activated by 1927.

But only a few people

really protested this apathy towards national defense.
Yet it is surprising how many political figures did not forget
the bomber menace during these halcyon days.

Between 1926 and 1930

the Times printed one or more articles nearly every month on the de
plorable condition of air defense or the horrors of fire and gas that
people must expect in the next war.

Lloyd George, for example, argued

that bombers must first be limited by international agreement and that
air warfare must finally be outlawed if civilization hoped to survive.'
Lord Halsbury likewise asserted, during his numerous visits to the
semi-religious gatherings of the pacifistic League of Nations Union,
that any attempt to annihilate London with gas would result in the
subsequent obliteration of the aggressor's cities.

Only such a

^■"London's 'Doom' in the Air," Literary Digest, VIIIC (8 Septem
ber 1928), p. 9.
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threat, he averred, could protect civilization from an all-out bomber
war.

1
Lord Thomson (Secretary for Air, 1929-1930) was even more out-

spoken.

In a number of publications, he

2

reminded people that air

warfare required no mobilization period, and that bombers could appear
over London— loaded with gas, incendiaries, and high explosive bombs—
even before a declaration of war.

Thus, in a few short moments a

once prosperous city would become a smoking charnel house and the war
would surely be decided in a matter of days.

He

3

also pointed out,

"that if the heart of the Empire were to stop beating, the limbs would
soon decay."
Thomson

4

Because the bomber was a shield as well as a sword,

pessimistically concluded:

It will be a life-and-death struggle, directed on both
sides by men who, however humane they may be personally,
will be out to win. And the way to win will be by the ruth
less bombing of localities, which in many cases will be dense
ly populated- For every combatant killed in action, ten
civilians will quite probably be slaughtered in their work
shops or their homes.
Thomson, moreover, was a close friend of Prime Minister J. Ramsey
MacDonald.

The Prime Minister's own weakness in military matters often

"Says 42 Tons of Gas Would End All London," New York Times, 7
December 1928, p. 2; "The Conference on Armaments," Times (London), 7
December 1928, p. 10.
2
Lord [Christopher B.] Thomson, Air Facts and
John Murray, 1927), pp. 153-54; Lord Thomson, "Air
Age, CCCXXXI (March 1926), p. 503; "War in the Air
American Review of Reviews, LXXI (March 1925), pp.

Problems (London:
and Empire," Living
and Disarmament,"
308-09.

3
Thomson, Air Facts and Problems, op. cit., p. 152.
S-oc. cit., p. 25.
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made him turn to Thomson for advice.^- Therefore, it is not surprising
that MacDonald

2

concluded:

The next war will be worse than ever . . . .
There will be air raids, with poison gasses, which
will simply devastate whole towns and countrysides.
Unfortunately, with Arthur Henderson firmly situated in the Foreign
Office and a Cabinet generally opposed to military expenditure, Mac3

Donald could not rescind the Ten-Year Rule.
And who will ever forget former Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin

4

declaring in Parliament that the man in the street must realize that
no power on earth could protect him from being bombed; and that:
The only defence is in offense, which means that you
have got to kill more women and children more quickly than
the enemy if you want to save yourselves. I mention that
so that people may realize what is waiting for them when
the next war comes.
Moreover, his phrase, "the bomber will always get through," appeared
in nearly every English speaking newspaper.
The RAF's struggle with the Navy and the long air power debates
of the twenties undeniably made successive governments aware of the

^"Liddell Hart, Memoirs, op. cit., p. 148.
o

Arlington B. Conway, "Death from the Sky," American Mercury, XXV
(February 1932), p. 167.
3
Hoare, Nine Troubled Years, op. cit., p. 113. This is somewhat
surprising since Henderson remarked, "the next war will not be like the
last . . . in the last war we were killing by retail but next time we
shall do it wholesale . . . [since it will be fought] by aircraft using
poison gas;" see "Disarmament Policy," Times (London), 10 February 1931,
p. 16.
^"Mr. Baldwin On Aerial Warfare," Times (London), 11 November 1932,
p. 8; "Baldwin Warns of Air Raids," New York Times, 11 November 1932,
p. 4.
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bomber menance.

But not even Trenchard*s fierce arguments could unlock

the Exchequer's purse.

The RAF's procurement budget could not keep

pace with such developments as all-metal construction, retractable
landing gear, variable pitch propellers, and the necessary expansion
of facilities to handle the newer aircraft.

Without proper aircraft,

Slessor^ recalled, the RAF's belief in the bomber was intuitive— a
matter of faith.

The RAF had its strategic principles and tactical

doctrine, but it lacked the means to put them into effect.
less, Slessor

2

Neverthe-

was convinced that without Trenchard the RAF would have

suffered the fate of the British tank corps which entered World War II
with only 146 battle tanks.

The World's Last Citadel

The Postwar situation in the United States was remarkably similar
to that of Great Britain.

But two significant differences produced

somewhat diverse problems for each nation's air arm.

Britain emerged

from the war with an independent air force and with the realization
that the Channel would not protect it from bomber attacks.

On the

other hand, the American air arm did not achieve independence and
Americans felt quite safe behind their two ocean moats.
It must be recalled that the United States Army Air Service
(USAAS) began well-nigh from the ground up in 1917 It lacked equip
ment, experience, and personnel.

Moreover, by the time of the Armistice

^Slessor, The Central Blue, op. cit., p. 204.
2

loc. cit., p. 46.
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American airmen had only sensed the potential of air power.

American

airmen were generally youthful, enthusiastic, and thoroughly dedicated
to the air power doctrine.
colorful group of heroes.

They returned from the war as the most
But in the view of traditional officers,

they were the most undisciplined mob of young men that had ever donned
an American uniform.

Above all, though, returning American airmen

were truly dismayed to find only a handful of men who actually under
stood air power.
The members of the Bolling Mission were among the few Americans
who really grasped the air power doctrine.

Late in 1917 General

Squier instructed Captain Raynal Bolling, Lt. Colonel Edgar Gorrell,
Colonel S. D. Waldon, and Captain Fiorello La Guardia to study aero
nautical developments in Europe, and to make suggestions on how the
United States could meet its aerial obligations at the Front.

Since

the group would be more than 3,000 miles from home, the general order
ed Bolling to anticipate developments so that American aircraft would
not be obsolete when they reached the Front.^
Bolling's group first met the same people in France and Britain
that had influenced Mitchell.
from its Italian sojourn.

But the group undoubtedly profited most

While in Italy the Americans met Caproni,

and he obviously impressed them even though he clearly wanted to
negotiate a deal for his bombers.

During frequent dinners and long

'S’oulois, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, op. cit.,
pp. 148-49.
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discussions, he introduced the group to Douhet’s ideas.^

Furthermore,

Caproni just happened to have an English translation of a book entitled
Let Us Kill War, which was alledgedly written by a friend of his.

The

book emphasized the destruction of the enemy’s vital centers by stra
tegic bombing.

The Bolling Mission— inspired by Caproni, the book,

and Italian air operations— enthusiastically embraced the idea of
strategic bombing.

Gorrell, in fact, asked for another dozen copies

of the book which he planned to spread among his friends in Washington.'
The Crowell Mission became the second significant group to in
spect European aeronautical developments and its final report exposed
the crux of the American air power debate.

Secretary of War, Newton

D. Baker, ordered his assistant, Benedict C. Crowell, to organize a
group for the purpose of investigating Allied aeronautical principles
and to decide if any of them could prove useful to the United States.
In approximately ten weeks the Crowell Mission toured England, France,
and Italy.

The Americans interviewed aircraft industry executives,

governmental officials, and ranking air officers.

But its final report

3

on 19 July 1919 shocked Baker.

It recommended the establishment of

an independent air force and endorsed the idea of long-range bombing.

^■J. L. Boon Atkinson, "Italian Influence On the Origins of the
American Concept of Strategic Bombardment," Air Power Historian, IV
(July 1957), p. 145.
o

loc. cit., p. 146. This explains where Gorrell got the ideas
for his Air Corps Tactical School manual which stressed the importance
of strategic bombing; see Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine, op.
cit., p. 11.
3

loc. cit., p. 21.
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But the idea of bombing civilians nauseated Baker.

He truly

wished that the clock could be turned back to the nineteenth century.
Therefore, he suppressed the report and created a second investigative
group composed entirely of non-flying officers and wholeheartedly
endorsed its conclusion not to create an independent air force.^

The

Crowell report only surfaced in December 1919 when Congressman La
Guardia's Sub-Committee on Aviation called Crowell as its first witness.

2
American airmen quickly realized that the war had not altered

the General Staff's doctrine that the ultimate objective of all mil
itary operations was the destruction of the enemy's armed forces.

The

3
Times' correspondent

in Washington, who sensed the Army's mood and

the gist of Crowell's report, concluded that the Army would probably
eliminate the USAAS.

After watching the air service dwindle from

20,000 officers and men on 11 November 1918 to barely 200 by December
1919,

4

Mitchell and his most zealous disciples— especially Milling,

Brereton, and Hartney— reached the same conclusion.

But Mitchell did

not launch into his air power crusade until he was sure that Represen
tative Curry's efforts to win Congressional support for an independent
air force had also failed.

1ibid.
2

Levine, Mitchell, op. cit., p. 178.

"^"Future of Aviation In the United States," Times (London),
15 August 1919, p. 9.
^Hurley, Billy Mitchell, op. cit., p. 41.
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From the time of the spectacular sinking of the Ostfriesland
until his famous court-martial, it certainly seemed that Billy Mit
chell was a "one man show" for air power.

In order to capture the

public’s imagination, he increasingly overstepped traditional mili
tary bounds and often defied the "old-fashioned" generals.

Yet there

is no denying that he made Americans air conscious.
General Arnold^ recalled that he noticed a distinct change in
Mitchell when they again met in 1919.

He appeared sharper, more

alert than ever, and he displayed an angry impatience with— what he
considered— the well-organized enemies of air power.

He primarily

blamed entrenched Admirals, like Benson, who could not conceive any
possible use for aircraft, and who stated flatly:
need aeroplanes."

Mitchell promised Arnold

2

"the Navy doesn't

that he would show every

one the value of aircraft by conducting transcontinental flights,
flights to Alaska, and "above all, to sink those damned battleships!"
3

When Arnold

suggested that the Navy might not cooperate, Mit

chell adamantly responded, "We're going to get them and we're going
to sink them."

Not only did Mitchell get his ships, but he stunned

the Navy with a weries of preliminary tests.
captured German U-boat.

His pilots first sank a

Then, on 13 July 1921, they sank the German

destroyer G-102 with alarming ease and, just as easily, sank the
FranVfurt in eleven minutes on 18 July.

This quickly led to the famous

■'"Arnold, Global Mission, op. cit., p. 79.
2ibid.

3ibid.
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demonstration on 22 July 1921.

Determined to sink the Ostfriesland

in as spectacular a fashion as possible, Mitchell disregarded test
guidelines and ordered his pilots to attack with 2,000 pound bombs.^
Nearby military and civilian observers first saw six bombs explode
around "unsinkable" Ostfriesland; they were then shocked to see the
ship sink in twenty-one minutes.
Charlton

2

believed that the eye-witnesses would never forget

that dramatically intense moment; and he certainly never forgot the
expression of blank incredulity on the faces of senior American naval
officers.

While foreign air attaches wired the sensational news to

Europe, Senator Poindexter remarked that the test demonstrated the
need for more American aircraft and that the Congress might revise
its decision not to build aircraft carriers.

3

Needless to say, the

tough, resolute, but soft-spoken Admiral William A. Moffett welcomed
this news.
"Billy" Moffett, often called the Father of Naval Aviation, ap
preciated the benefits Naval fliers reaped from Mitchell's exploits,
but he vigorously denounced Mitchell's plan to unite all air arms into
one air force.

He rightly believed that Army airmen could not compre

hend the intricacies of carrier operations on the high seas.

Admiral

Sims, the first American all-big-gun ship advocate, completely supported
Moffett's view.

He declared that the Ostfriesland sinking demonstrated

^"Hurley, Billy Mitchell, op. cit., p. 67.

2
Charlton, War From the Air, op. cit., p. 77
O
"2,000-Pound Bombs From Army Planes Sink Ostfriesland," New York
Times, 22 July 1921, p. 2.
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the obsolescence of battleships.^

Much like Lord Fisher, Sims vowed:

"It is the airplane, the submarine and the use of gasses which will
2

play the leading parts in the warfare of the future."
Nevertheless, the results of the test only accentuated, rather
than ended, the controversy between air and naval experts.

Once the

Navy recovered from its initial shock it dismissed the test on the
ground that it was not a realistic one.

Naval officers argued that

the demonstration was conducted in ideal weather, that the ship was
motionless, and that it was unmanned.
True to his word, Mitchell now sketched a repertoire of spectacu
lar aerial feats.

He contemplated cross-country flights, round-the-

world flights, and night flying demonstrations.

In his efforts to

make Americans believe that anything could be done in the air, he
called for bigger aircraft, larger payloads, and longer flights.

But

he did not reckon on General Patrick replacing the easily manipulated
Menoher as Chief of the Air Staff.

Since Patrick understood Mitchell'

idiosyncrasies, he immediately ordered the flamboyant officer to pre
sent himself and unequivocally informed him as to who would command
3

the air service.
choices:

When Mitchell protested, Patrick

gave him but three

he could continue as Patrick's principal assistant, he

could transfer, or he could resign.

^"Sims on Battleship," New York Times, 3 March 1922, p. 13.
9
"Sims Praises Conference," New York Times, 7 December 1921, p. 4
O

Patrick, The United States in the Air, op. cit., p. 86.
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According to one historian^- Patrick symbolized the progressive
spirit of the USAAS.

He was General Pershing's classmate at West

Point, and he was specifically chosen by Pershing to restore order
in the air service in France.

To better understand the problems of

his pilots, Patrick learned to fly at sixty years of age, and he also
quickly absorbed the airman's outlook.

Moreover, his moderation,

judgement, and honesty won him the respect of his military and politi
cal opponents.
practicality.

Unlike Mitchell, Patrick possessed both vision and
But like Mitchell, he appeared before numerous Congres

sional committees and developed a strong dislike for the self-appointed
"experts" on fact finding committees.
Patrick was one of the Americans who remained in Europe after the
war to participate in the drafting of the military clauses at Versailles.

He

2

came to appreciate the potential of aircraft during the long

questioning and debating sessions, and he also came to realize that
"in the near future” the United States could come within range of
3

European aircraft.

Hence, Patrick

desired an independent air force

within a Department of National Defense in order to coordinate Amer
ican defense against such an eventuality.
Patrick began his quiet six-year battle for aviation before the
Lassiter Board.

He testified that the air service was practically

^Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine, op. cit., p. 25.
Patrick, The United States in the Air, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
^loc. cit., p. 190.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

109

demobilized and urged the adoption of a ten-year expansion program.
He further suggested that air units should be more centralized and
capable of operating more or less independently.^"

Although the

Board agreed with him in principle, President Coolidge's rigid
economic program prevented it from being implemented.
Furthermore, Patrick never tired in his attempts to enlighten
fellow Army officers on the importance of air power.

For example, he

2

asserted that the 1921 and 1923 bombing experiments against battle
ships "proved conclusively that sea craft were in great danger from
an air attack," but added "the conclusions by some of the air enthu
siasts that surface naval vessels could no longer be employed may be
somewhat overdrawn."
But he saved his best performance for an Army War College audience
on 9 November 1925.

He first held up a copy of Lidell Hart’s "little

book," Paris or the Future of War, and declared that he accepted its
underlying assumptions regarding the aim of war.

He then asked his

audience of ranking officers to imagine what would happen in an enemy
industrial town after it was bombed and gassed.

He concluded by asking

how long Germany could have fought in the last war if strategic bombers
3
had destroyed the Krupp works?

Moreover, he tacitly based his entire

address on the idea that only an air force can defeat another air force.

^"Foulois, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, op. cit.,
p. 199.
^Patrick, The United States in the Air, op. cit., p. 176.
3
Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
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General Patrick’s last significant effort to win more indepen
dence for the USAAS came before the hostile Morrow Board.

Patrick

advocated establishing an air department within the Army similar in
status to that of the Marine Corps.^

All but one Second Lieutenant

among the fifty to sixty airmen who testified supported Patrick in
advocating a separate military air service.

2

In the end, the Morrow

Board concluded that the United States was too secure behind its oceans
to justify the cost of another service or to further complicate the
military establishment.

However, the Board did agree to transform

the air service into the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC).

In

the following year the Congress passed the Air Corps Act which also
authorized an expanded budget for aircraft procurement.
Needless to say, Patrick's moderation and diplomatic ways depres
sed Billy Mitchell.

Despite the successful round-the-world flight in

1924, which focused attention on military aviation as no other event
since the Ostfriesland episode; and despite all his writing, flying,
and audacious speeches, Mitchell still saw no progress for air power.
He became increasingly zealous and irritated Patrick by stepping out
of bounds once too often.

As a result, Patrick fired Mitchell and

transferred him to San Antonio, Texas.

3

For some inexplicable reason two events apparently spurred
Mitchell on to his court-martial.

First, on 1 September 1925,

^"Army Leaders Divided on Air Defense," New York Times, 22 Sep
tember 1924, p. 1.
2

"Army Air Officers Want Fliers Placed in Separate Corps," New
York Times, 29 September 1925, p. 1
3
Arnold, Global Mission, op. cit., p. 93.
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Commander Rodgers and his crew of four vanished on their flight from
San Francisco to Honolulu.

Then, on September, the airship Shenandoah

exploded accidentally and killed nearly everyone aboard.

Finally, on

5 September, Mitchell released to the Press a 6,000 word memo charging
the War and Navy Departments with imcompetency, criminal negligence,
and almost treasonable administration of the National Defense.^- When
the inevitable court-martial was about to convene, one editor

2

sympa

thetically, but realistically, noted:
Like Ajax he has defied the lighting; he has asked
for trouble, and presumably he will get it. . . . There
is more than an even chance that Colonel Mitchell will
overplay his part and lose his audience. The public
sympathizes with a victim of official tyranny, but it
quickly tires of the individual who keeps on shouting
that he alone is right and that everyone else is wrong.
Throughout the court-martial, Mitchell's fellow officers almost
unanimously supported his goals.

Whereas they often disagreed with

him on details, and often confessed that he tended to exaggerate; they,
nevertheless, conceded that his audaciousness and exaggerations were
necessary to awaken the American people.

Mitchell’s fellow airmen

were truly trapped between Scylla and Charybdis.

They could sympa

thize with Mitchell's course of action and perhaps even endorse it,
but they did not dare to throw off their own mantle of military dis
cipline.

In the end, too, Mitchell and his supporters' enthusiasm

could not overcome their opponents' rank.

1ibid.
^"Aviation and Colonel Mitchell," Independent, CXV (19 September
1924), p. 314.
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The Morrow Board and Mitchell's court-martial clearly mark the
end of one period in American military aviation.

During this period

the air power debate was mainly confined to military circles.
primarily a "family affair."

It was

Only occasionally, due to Mitchell's

efforts, did the Press or Congress become involved.

Unlike the Bri

tish, few Americans harbored fears of a "knock out blow."

They pre

supposed that the Atlantic and Pacific ramparts would always shelter
their North American island citadel.
Therefore, the eight-year period following 1925 still stands out
as one of the most interesting phases in the annals of American mili
tary aviation.

Whereas aircraft design and performance remained vir

tually static prior to 1925, both obviously responded to the air staff's
demands in the late twenties and early thirties.

This was primarily

due to the Air Corps Act of 1926 which also authorized a five-year
expansion program.

This, in turn, led to the development of the speedy

twin-engined B-9 and B-10 bombers.

Since they easily outpaced all

existing interceptors, they inadvertently revolutionized United States
air doctrine.

Moreover, such obvious technological innovations slowly

awoke an increasing number of Americans to the bomber menace.
It is necessary, during this period, to distinguish between
authorized doctrine and the airmen's own views.

Although the Air

Corps Tactical School manual of 1926 parroted the General Staff's
doctrine, that the enemy's army must remain the main objective, it,
nevertheless, added that bomber forces might aid the infantry by de
stroying communication and military industrial centers beyond the range
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of artillery.^- In other words, the Air Staff had tacitly separated
tactical from strategical operations.

Only with the advent of the

B-9 and B-10 in the early thirties— and later the B-17— did the Air
Staff openly advocate a policy of offensive air doctrine.

2

Differences of opinion flourished only briefly at the Tactical
School.

Bomber advocates soon ostracized "renegades” like General

Chennault who insisted that the development of fighter planes must
keep pace with that of the bombers.

3

General Foulois

4

recalled that

Mitchell's, Douhet's, and Trenchard's ideas were studied at great
length at the Tactical School and, within a few short years, the
"bomber men" declared that nothing could stop a high-flying, tightly
formed bomber formation.

But once the Air Corps accepted the idea of

high-flying, self-defending bomber formations, it quickly discarded
the doctrine of a balanced air force, escort fighters, and air super
iority as prerequisites for effective bombing operations.
Meanwhile, some Americans began to voice their fears of the fu
ture.

For diametrically opposite reasons, militarists and pacifists

pointed out with equal vigor the horrors of the next war.

For ex

ample, General Fechet resigned as CAS in 1932 for the expressed purpose

■'’Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
2
loc. cit., p. 55.

3
loc. cit., p. 58.

^Foulois, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, op. cit.,
p. 225.
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of "awakening" Americans from their "fools paradise."^
man,

2

Major Sher-

one of Mitchell’s cortege, had already asserted:

The bomber now stands forth as the supreme air
arm of destruction, with vastly enhanced power. When
nations of today look with apprehension on the air
policy of a neighbor, it is the bomber they dread.
3

One dedicated pacifist

not only agreed with this but added that

the bomber and poison gas had come to stay.

Moreover, Senator Wads

worth, Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, warned Amer
icans that international treaties would probably not prevent the use
of gas in war.

"I wonder," he asked, "whether a nation, if backed to

the wall, would not tear up its treaties and grasp any weapons avail
able."^

Admittedly the ranks of concerned Americans remained small in

the early thirties, but they slowly and continually swelled as another
world war loomed on the horizon.

This was particularly true of the

pacifists who painted perhaps even more horrible pictures of the "next
war" than the militarists.

■^"General Fechet Quits Air Corps to Wage Fight to Strengthen the
Nations Aerial Defense," New York Times, 2 January 1932, p. 1.
^M. W. Royse, Aerial Bombardment: And the International Regula
tion of Warfare (New York: Harold Vinal, Ltd., 1928), p. 236.
Fradkin, The Air Menace and the Answer, op. cit., pp. 3-4; "Sees
War By Gases Decimating Nations," New York Times, 11 March 1929, p. 11.
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CHAPTER V

REHEARSAL FOR DOOMSDAY

There is at least one good thing to be said
about the next war: it will not keep us
long on edge. The whole business will be
over in a couple of hours.
Stuart Chase,
"The Two-Hour War" (1929)

Between 1928 and 1933 six of the world's major powers conducted
unprecedented aerial war games above their own major cities.

These

spectacular simulated aerial battles between "aggressor" and "defense"
forces undeniably stand out as the most remarkable, if not unique,
aspect of this period.

War games, in one form or another, date back

to the origins of standing armies.

They were usually designed to test

new weapons, new tactical theories, or to simply maintain combat effi
ciency.

But never before, nor since, have such eye-catching aerial

demonstrations abounded over so many metropolitan centers.
These aerial war games lasted anywhere from one or two days to a
week.

They often involved between one hundred to seven hundred air

craft, and they ranged between amazingly realistic demonstrations of
air power to colorful aerial parades.
war games for two obvious reasons:

The air staffs conducted these

they wanted to test the bombers'

ability to penetrate their air defense systems, and, through these
demonstrations, to secure larger appropriations.
But the reasons for conducting these aerial games were not as
important as the demonstrations themselves.

Time and time again they
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called attention to the bomber menace.

People in cities like New York,

London, Rome, and Leningrad witnessed these mock battles overhead.
Governments followed them with an apprehensive eye and the Press faith
fully reported their progress and the foreboding conclusions.

In each

major nation the games visually reinforced all that had been written
and said about the strategic bomber in the past decade.

Therefore, it

is surprising that historians have completely overlooked these spec
tacular war games and their overall effect on governments, military
men, and concerned observers.

Death Is No Dream

The air oriented Soviet Union apparently inaugurated the era of
mock air raids in June 1928.

Soviet air exercises were not as elabo

rate or as large as those in the West, but they were extremely real
istic.

In fact, the dictatorial governments seemed to have a penchant

for realism.

The Russians clearly demonstrated this on 2 June when

an "interventionist" force approached Leningrad.

Sirens and horns

wailed, people headed for cellars, and interceptors rose to destroy
the bombers.

Nevertheless, the bombers got through and dropped quite

a few harmless, though distinctly odorous, gas bombs.^

That following

September Kiev experienced a similar mock gas attack during Red Army
maneuvers.

At the approach of the "enemy" the city was entirely black

ed out and only men wearing gas masks were allowed to dash through the

‘'‘"Sham Air Attack On Leningrad:
(London), 11 June 1928, p. 14.

Gas Masks and Bombs," Times
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streets once dummy bombs began bursting on impact.^The elaborate British war games in August 1928 surprised much
of the world despite the lack of realistic detail.

These simulated

air raids, larger than any Gotha raid in World War I, began on 13
August when seven tight bomber formations crisscrossed London within
an hour.

Thousands of Londoners were amazed to see flight after flight

of interceptors winging towards the bombers.
aerial battles filled the sky.

Within minutes tenacious

Even though the RAF did not simulate

actual bombing, it did its best to mimic real war conditions.

By the

end of the first day, the umpires concluded that 151 bombers and 139
interceptors had been destroyed, and that twenty-three tons of bombs
had hit the capital.

2

The mock attacks continued around-the-clock for the next seventytwo hours, and resorting to a bit of realism, the night raiders flash
ed bright lamps in lieu of dropping bombs.

The first shock came on

the night of 14 August when fourteen separate bomber attacks eluded
the defense and hypothetically destroyed the Air Ministry and several
O
other government centers.

The second shock came on the following

night when an entire group of Fairy Foxes reached London, "bombed" the
city and escaped unnoticed by the defense.^

^"Red Army Manoeuvres,"

In their final analysis

Times (London), 17 September 1928,

p. 11.

^"Air Raids on London," Times (London), 14 August 1928, p. 10;
"London is 'Raided' By Seventy Planes," New York Times, 14 August 1928,
p. 5.
^"London Air Raids," Times (London), 15 August 1928, p. 12.
^"Air Attacks Renewed,"

Times (London), 16 August 1928, p. 10.
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of the four-day exercise, the umpires claimed that fifty percent of
the bombers had been intercepted and destroyed.

However, the Press‘d

quickly deduced that the remaining bombers must have reached their
targets and released their cargoes of bombs and gas.

Had it been a

real war, therefore, few observers doubted that London would have suf
fered severe casualties.
About a month later the French also staged aerial war games as
part of the French Array’s fall maneuvers.

One reporter

2

described

the 14-15 September games as the most elaborate aerial demonstration
ever carried out on the Continent.

Since nearly 400 aircraft "attack

ed" Paris for several hours, "destroyed" the entire Defense Staff, and
jeopardized the safety of visiting dignitaries sucu as Samuel Hoare,
the reporter was probably correct.

French planes also used bright

lights to simulate the dropping of bombs and special reporters at the
"Front" kept Parisians well informed on the progress of the "war."
Meanwhile, civil defense units and fire brigades performed their duties
with admirable realism.

When the show finally ended few people ques

tioned the fact that the bombers repeatedly penetrated the defense and
hypothetically inflicted great damage on the city.

3

Even though London's veterans of the Gotha raids enjoyed the

^"Air 'Raids' Bring Disarmament Plea," New York Times, 18 August
1928. p. 5.
2
'"Enemy' Drops Bombs On French Capital," New York Times, 15
^"Mock Air War 'Kills' Hundreds in Paris," New York Times, 16
September 1928, sec. II, p. 1.
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splendid aerial games, they hardly considered them a demonstration of
war.

After all, no real bombs fell on the city and the umpires had to

guess at the amount of destruction.

But skeptics were quickly silenced

by a number of grim appraisals of the exercise.

The aeronautical cor

respondent^- for the Times contended that the air games proved that not
even the most modern defensive measures could save London’s ten million
inhabitants from a bomb and gas attack.

Lloyd George simply stated

that the aerial games illustrated that the next war will completely
devastate the belligerent's nations; consequently, if the nations do
not disarm in the air, "It is bound to end, sooner or later, in a
smash.
A surprising number of Americans were even more concerned with
the significance of these aerial games despite the fact that they had
3

never been bombed.

For instance, the editor

of a small mid—western

town wrote, "We can remember what the last war was like.

All indica

tions are that the next war . . . will be inestimably more horrible
4

in every way."

Another concerned American

■^''London's Peril:
August 1928, p. 10.

wrote:

Lesson of the Air Battle," Times (London), 18

^"Air 'Raids' Bring Disarmament Plea," New York Times, 18 August
1928, p. 5; "Air Armament Cut Most Urgent Says Lloyd George," Chris
tian Science Moniter, 17 August 1928, p. 2.
o
"The Lesson From London," Kalamazoo (Mich.) Gazette, 20 August
1928, p. 6 .
^"Aerial Navies," World's Work, LVII (December 1928), p. 120.
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Both the British and the French air forces have
recently been conducting manoeuvres to determine how
easy it would be to defend their capitals from an as
sault by hostile airplanes. In each instance it was
demonstrated . . . that the enemy could break through
and inflict enormous damage. Much of London was the
oretically bombed and gassed.
Moreover, American pacifists could not agree on how to interpret the
war games.

Some denounced the demonstrations as warlike and contrary

to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but others^" argued that the games had
actually demonstrated the need for peace because they "brought home
to everybody that if there is another European war on a grand scale,
European civilization is doomed."
Meanwhile, other writers contemplated the grim implications of
these rehearsals for doomsday.

Chase,

2

for one, believed that Liver

pool, Manchester, and Birmingham would also have been gassed and bombed
if it had been a real war instead of a mimic attack.

In that event,

he added, not even a rat or a roach would have survived.

After wit-

3

nessing the games another American

contemplated that in a future war

a ten-year-old girl— choking to death on gas— might possibly gasp in
a hospital, "Tell father I helped to defend London."

He caustically

Sisley Huddleston, "Air Maneuvers Seen As Aid to Cause of Peace,"
Christian Science Monitor, 18 September 1928. p. 3; corresponding
closely to this view, A. Corbett-Smith wrote, "if anything were still
needed to drive into the minds of people the utter futility of war, the
Royal Air Force of Great Britain has given it to the world," "London
Helpless Against Air War," New York Times, 2 September 1928, sec. VIII,
p. 12.
^Stuart Chase, "The Two-Hour War," New Republic, LVIII (8 May 1929),
p. 326.
^Lee Simonson, "Bombing London," Nation, CXXVII (3 October 1928),
p. 318.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

121

concluded, "It's too bad we can’t have a sample war just to be certain
of what it would be like instead of having to rely on the umpires. . .
The United States had its own small but audacious aerial demon
stration in 1929 when General Foulois ordered one twin-engined Keystone
bomber to "attack" New York City.

With the aid of two in-air refuel-

ings^" Foulois expected the bomber to fly the 800 miles from Fairfield,
Ohio, to New York andback without landing.

But a large storm front

over New York and Pennsylvania foiled this part of the plan.

Never

theless, the pilot decided to trust his instruments and to continue his
mission by flying "blind."

The bomber finally arrived around 9:30 P.M.

on 21 May 1929 and the crew released an aerial flare over Governor's
Island.

When the flare exploded in mid-air, it illuminated the entire

bay area and hundreds of people called thePress for an explanation.
The pilot of the bomber and the Press
swers.

The jubilant pilot

3

2

quickly supplied the an-

announced:

We have demonstrated that with proper equipment,
trained personnel, and adequate navigation and radio
facilities, raiding bombardment squadrons can go any
where, at anytime, under any weather conditions.

The first in-air refueling took place on 9 November 1923 over
Long Island, see "Planes Prove Theory of Refueling in Air," New York
Times, 9 March 1923, p. 1. "The Army's nursing bottle of the air"
again demonstrated this technological feat for the people of New York
on the day after this demonstration; "Big Bomber Refuels In Air Above
City While Crowds Gasp," New York Times, 23 May 1929, p. 1.
^"Army Plane 'Bombs' Ft. Jay In Night Raid On New York," New York
Times, 22 May 1929, p. 1.
\ t . Odas Moon, "Airman Describes His 'Bombing' of City," New York
Times, 24 May 1929, p. 1.
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Although variovis interpretations of the demonstration were expressed,
most agreed that it symbolized the horrors of future war.

After all,

everyone knew when the bomber was supposed to arrive over New York,
and the city's defense still failed to locate it.

Consequently, a

New York editor^ asked his readers to consider what could have tran
spired if ten enemy bombers had reached the city that night.
Americans on the East and West Coasts witnessed much larger
demonstrations of air power in 1930.

These, by and large, took the

form of aerial reviews over San Francisco and New York.

In the first

phase 195 aircraft winged westward from bases in Virginia, Michigan,
and Texas for the purpose of repelling an "invasion."

After the Air

Corps "destroyed" Crissy Field near San Francisco and the military
facilities at San Jose, it concluded the two weeks maneuver with an
astounding bombing demonstration above San Francisco's financial distnct.

2

Then, in May, Army and Navy fliers excited people from Boston to
Washington with massed aerial fly-bys and mock bomb and gas attacks on
mid-town New York.

This demonstration stopped traffic for miles and
3

drew thousands of people on to rooftops and to windows.

Although

Admiral Moffett emphasized the value of the American aircraft carriers

1"War In the Air," New York Times, 23 May 1929, p. 28.
^"Lay San Francisco In Sham War Ruins," New York Times, 19 April
1930, p. 3; "Air War," Time, XV (14 April 1930), p. 15.
^"City Again 'Bombed* In Navy Air Raid," New York Times, 10 May
1930, p. 1; "Air Raid, In Quotes," Outlook, CLV (21 May 1930), p. 97.
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which launched the "attack" on New York, he also tacitly conceded
that an enemy force could do the same thing.
Later that summer the French and Russians again conducted remark
ably realistic air warfare exercises.

The people of Lyons were given

a loud and well prepared demonstration in July.

When the bombers

finally reached the blacked-out city, they were met with an incessant
barrage of blank anti-aircraft fire.

A few minutes later fire depart

ments fought simulated fires and the police practiced mob control.^
The authorities only complained that too many people remained outside
in order to watch the exercise.
But when Moscow's air raid sirens screamed their horrible warning
on 21 August 1930, the obedient citizens donned their gas masks as they
dashed for shelter.

This time the Soviets actually detonated explo

sives on the ground where bombs would have fallen.

Meanwhile, anti

aircraft guns let loose a long, fierce barrage and fire engines dashed
through thick clouds of smoke that represented poison gas.

2

In the year before the great disarmament conference at Geneva,
the world witnessed the most significant, elaborate, and thoughtprovoking aerial war games.

Moreover, they indisputably affected the

public, the Press, and governmental authorities.

Besides accentuating

the world's desire for peace, the war games also cast additional empha
sis on the uneasy international situation.

^"Sham Air Raid On Lyons," Times (London), 31 July 1930, p. 13.
^"Moscow Is Enlivened By Vivid Sham Air Raid," New York Times,
22 August 1930, p. 5.
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Appropriately enough the most expensive and elaborate aerial
demonstration took place in the United States.

But even as the 672

green-bodied and yellow-winged bombers and fighters assembled at air
fields around New York, pacifists in Connecticut, New York, and Phila
delphia protested to the President that the war games were "a menace
to peace," a desecration of the Sabbath, and an outrage to Christian
People.'*'

Notwithstanding this grumbling the aerial games began on

23 May 1931 in a heady atmosphere.
General Foulois* ambitious demonstration began at 5:45 P.M. when
the vanguard of bombers roared over Yonkers on its way to mid-town New
York.

Millions of amazed New Yorkers watched the exhibition from ten

ement house rooftops, the upper levels of skyscrapers, and countless
other vantage points.

2

In fact, more than 50,000 people stormed Gov

ernor's Island in order to witness the twenty mile long line of air3
craft which passed overhead for nearly half an hour.

Meanwhile, a

radio announcer graphically described the "greatest mimic air battle
in history" to the listeners of more than 150 stations around the
country.

4

"Quakers Protest To Hoover," New York Times, 16 May 1931, p. 2;
"To Protest Air 'War' and Cost By Parade," New York Times, 23 May 1931,
p. 3.
^"Great Air Armada Thrills Millions," New York Times, 24 May 1931,
p. 1.
"*"50,000 At Battery, View Air Apectacle," New York Times, 24 May
1931, p. 1; "U. S. Air Armada," Times (London), 25 May 1931, p. 10.
^"Nation Hears Story Of Flight Over City," New York Times, 24 May
1931, p. 26.
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The next day the "air armada" winged up the coast to Boston where
several hundred thousand people awaited its arrival.

Much like the

New Yorkers, the people of Boston were amazed at the number of air
craft they saw overhead and the lively mock air battle that the Air
Corps staged.^- On the following day, the "air armada" returned to New
York via Vermont, New Hampshire, Albany, and the Hudson Valley.

This

time Foulois gave New Yorkers a lively eight minute mock air battle
and once again millions of people were left speechless by what they
saw.

2
In the wake of this second "attack" on New York the Air Corps

turned south, fought off hypothetical bombers— that were launched from
aircraft carriers— over New Jersey, and then winged en masse over Phil
adelphia, Baltimore, and Annapolis.

The USAAC staged its finale over
3

Washington, D. C., on Memorial Day with "hair raising dives and climbs."
Altogether the "air armada" flew over 2,000,000 air miles withou mishap
and impressed millions of Americans in the process.
Two months later, while the representatives of seven European na
tions met in London to discuss peace in Europe, the RAF attempted to

"^"Boston, Chins Up, Views Great Air Show Over City," Christian
Science Monitor, 25 May 1931, p. 1.
^"Plane Fleet Sweeps Back From Air 'War' To Thrill City Again,"
New York Times, pp. 1, 3.
^"Air Fleet’s Tribute Ends Manoeuvres," New York Times, 31 May
1931, p. 23.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

126

surpass its 1928 aerial demonstration.
hampered the first day of "war."

Unfortunately, bad weather

As one reporter^" observed, the ten

bomber squadrons could not find their targets and the interceptors
could not locate the bombers.
the first round.

Britain's famous weather obviously won

But the situation changed quickly on the second day.

Over 300 RAF aircraft battled over London on 21 July and all umpires
agreed that at least fifty percent of the bombers succeeded in reaching
their targets.
headquarters.

2

In fact, one group managed to destroy the Duke of York's
Nor did the pattern change during the next seventy-two

hours of round-the-clock attacks.
but reassuring.

Once again the results were anything

The umpires estimated that the "aggressor" dumped

fifty-four tons of bombs and gas on London despite a more efficient
air defense effort.

3

The French also resumed their aerial exercises that summer, but
on a much smaller scale.

Moreover, it seems that the nearer the French

air games came to the German border, the more seriously they were view
ed by the local population.

For example, the 27 August air maneuvers

over Nancy were quite realistic.

Alarms sounded, guns roared, the town

was blacked-out and civilian "casualties" were rushed to fully staffed

"''"Air Raid On London's Docks," Daily Herald (London), 21 July 1931,
p. 1.
^"Air Raid On London," Times (London), 22 July 1931, p. 12; "Air
Raids Show London Can Be Blown To Bits," New York Times, 22 July 1931,
p. 4.
■^"London Razed In Three Days," Daily Herald (London), 24 July 1931,
p. 2; "Air Exercises Ended," Times (London), 24 July 1931, p. 11.
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aid stations.*- But the "attack" on a port city in the Gulf of Lions
on 30 April caused little excitement even though the umpires agreed
that the facilities were probably destroyed.

2

The Italians, on the other hand, actually seemed to be rehears
ing for war.

They not only employed a record number of aircraft, but

also resorted to psychological tactics.

In fact, the Air Staff used

over 890 aircraft for the specific purpose of testing Douhet's theory
3
of massed aerial attack.

The Italian Air Force launched its mock war

with a vigorous attack on Spezia during the early morning hours of 27
August.

Even though the defense knew exactly where and when the "ag

gressor" would strike, the bombers nevertheless crushed all resistance
by eight o'clock.

At this point they roamed at will over the town

and released thousands of leaflets

4

which announced:

Italians: In case of war enemy aircraft will not
drop coloured paper on your towns and homes but powerful
explosives and incendiary bombs. The enemy airmen will
fire real bullets, and will drench the streets of towns,
not with the vapour of the air manoeuvers, but with a
deadly rain of poison.
On the following day Caproni bombers attacked Genoa and Florence.
On this occasion Italian fliers released large quantities of fire
crackers in lieu of bombs which released a pungent sulphurous odor

■^"French 'Air Raid' On Nancy," Times (London), 28 August 1931,
p. 9.
o
"French Air and Naval Exercises," Times (London), 4 May 1931,
p. 13.
"*"894 Italian Planes Start Sham Fight," New York Times, 29 Aug
ust 1931, p. 6.
^"Leaflets Dropped From The Air," Times (London), 28 August 1931,
p. 9.
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when they exploded.^"

The third day opened with a ninety minute "bom

bardment" of Milan and Bologna and more than 300 bombers returned that
afternoon for the coup de grace.

But this time the anti-aircraft bat

teries were surprised by the simultaneous appearance of dive bombers
who simulated a gas attack by smothering the towns with a dense cloud
2
of smoke.

Since most of Italy's northern cities were "destroyed"

and declared uninhabitable, the defense acknowledged defeat and asked
for an "armistice" on 31 August.
The 1931 aerial demonstrations also generated familiar portends.
3
One mid-western editor

wrote, "the present aerial games should have

a deep significance for anyone who is equipped with normal powers of
imagination."

Gesner,^ who apparently believed that American isola

tionists lacked imagination, insisted in his grim account of a future
war that, "there is no defense against an air attack by a power wil
ling to pay the price in airplane carriers, planes, and men."

Mean

while, a British reporter"* assured Londoners that the RAF had conclu
sively proved that nothing can stop the bomber.
Although aerial war games were staged in 1932, they never again
matched those of the previous year.

Nevertheless, the French and

^"Genoa Bombed," Times (London), 29 August 1931, p. 9.
^"Italian Air War," Times (London), 31 August 1931, p. 10.
^"War Birds," Kalamazoo (Mich.) Gazette, 28 May 1931, p. 6 .
^Paul D. Gesner, "The Morning After," Forum, LXXXVI (October 1931),
p. 246.
^"London 'In Ruins' After Bombing," Daily Herald (London), 23 July
i931, p. 1.
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Italians compensated for this lack of quantity with realistic quality.
In pursuit of such realism the entire eastern section of France, from
Rheims to Metz, briefly relived wartime memories as three separate
bomber groups swept across the Ardennes, the Marne, and the Moselle
districts.

Towns were blacked-out, train schedules were retarded, and

most of the people participated in one form or another.^But the Italians placed even more emphasis on realism.

In May

1932 they constructed a large mock city and then destroyed it with real
bombs and gas.

2

Then, in September, Rome received a foretaste of war.

When the first of several bomber waves approached Rome, the sirens
wailed, the searchlights probed for the invisible invaders, and anti
aircraft guns let loose a barrage of blank shells.

Within five minutes

all of Rome, including the Vatican, was blacked-out and all thorough
fares were deserted.

The latter point was especially important since
3

the bombers released small smoke-filled bombs.

This particularly

realistic aerial demonstration provoked a great deal of thought in Italy
and— taking into consideration the wide press coverage— it could not
have been overlooked by the Geneva Disarmament Conference.
The five years of war games clearly accentuated the widespread
fear of aero-chemical warfare.

Many nurses in France began to receive

special training in the treatment of chemical warfare victims and an

^"Sham Air Raid Made On Eastern France," New York Times, 26 August
1932, p. 3.
^"Huge Dummy City Razed In Italian Air Show," New York Times,
28 May 1932, p. 6 .
^"Planes 'Bomb* Rome In A Realistic Test," New York Times, 29
September 1932, p. 4; "Pope In Hail Of Bombs," Daily Herald (London),
29 September 1932, p. 9.
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increasing number of citizens were encouraged by their governments to
take precautions on their own.

In response to such encouragements gas

masks were sold as Christmas presents in the eastern provinces of
France.

"Buy a gas mask," one advertisement^ announced, "It will prove

the best investment you ever have made.
late."

Do not wait until it is too

Furthermore, the Danish Government manifested the prevailing

mood in Europe when it made arrangements to distribute gas masks to
the public since it would be "criminal negligence not to prepare for

2
the possibility of chemical warfare."
However, underground shelters were considered even more efficient
than gas masks and apparently no one surpassed the Russians in this
area.

The bomber menace obviously influenced Soviet architecture since

Moscow^s new communal dwellings included spacious and well-equipped
underground shelters.

3

But the Swiss were not far behind the Russians.

According to one Swiss professor

4

only deep underground shelters equip

ped with electricity, air filters, and ample reserves of food and water
c ' protect mankind in the next war.

He added that some Swiss towns

had already begun to build such special bomb shelters.

Eventually even

the British Home Office released a special Air Raid Precaution pamphlet

^"Gas Masks Are Urged As Christmas Gifts," New York Times, 13 De
cember 1931, sec. Ill, p. 3.
o

"Denmark To Distribute Gas Masks To Civilians," New York Times,
28 September 1933, p. 6 .
O

"Gas Attack Shelters For Moscow Houses," New York Times, 25 Feb
ruary 1930, p. 5.
^Quoted in Bratt, That Next War?, op. cit., p. 81.
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that explained how an average basement could be made gas-proof.^

In

any event, all the aforementioned factors encouraged many Americans
and Europeans to pursue the vision of international disarmam ent with
even more enthusiasm.

So Bright The Vision

Assuming that entire nations would become a battlefield in a
future war and haunted with the belief that the bomber stood supreme
among the available weapon systems, many governments attempted to
limit or abolish air power.

It is often overlooked today that these

and later attempts to limit arms are but a chapter in a long sequence
of attempts to limit new weapons.

Indeed, as early as 1139 A.D. the

Lateran Council attempted to outlaw the crossbow after it began to
take a heavy toll of the armored nobility.

This effort met with no

more success than the attempt to outlaw the musket.

Wellington, like

wise, failed in his attempts to ban the breechloading rifle even
though it threatened to transform the infantry into long-range assas
sins.
Moreover, the 1868 St. Petersburg Agreement demonstrated once and
for all that useful weapons will not be banned.

At that time, the

seven major European powers banned incendiary and explosive bullets
because they foresaw no use for them.

But when it became clear in

1915 that Zeppelins were especially vulnerable to incendiary bullets,
the British quickly disregarded the St. Petersburg Agreement. .Finally,

"hlyde and Nuttall, Air Defence and the Civil Population, op. cit.,
p. 112.
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in 1923, this highly advantageous ammunition was again legalized.^"
Because of military utility, the 1907 Hague Conference failed to
renew the five-year prohibition on the use of balloons.

The French

and Germans simply refused to surrender their potentially useful
airships.
The period between the world wars once again demonstrated that
however much nations may desire peace and disarmament, they will not
agree to abolish potentially useful weapons.

This quickly manifested

itself during the 1922 Washington Naval Conference.

Although the five

major powers agreed to limit the rather expensive battleships which—
by the way— Mitchell had already sunk, a special sub-committee found
itself unable to reach an agreement on the limitation of bombers.
did this escape the attention of the Press.
Journal

2

Nor

The Louisville Courier-

noted that the conference "did nothing regarding the limita

tion of air forces, even tho the world was convinced that the next
3
war would be fought in the air."

The editor

of the New York Times

said much the same thing:
The conference, after restricting capital ship
strength, forbidding submarine warfare upon merchant
vessels and placing poison gasses on the blacklist, admits
its helplessness to curtail the sinister energies of the
most dangerous and destructive instrument of modern war,
the bombing airplane.

^Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, op. cit., pp. 168, 178.

2
Quoted in "French Sky Hornets Worry Britain," p. 12.
^"No Limitation For Aircraft," New York Times, 11 January 1922,
p. 20.
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In fact, this initial failure established an agonizing pattern
of hope and frustration.

After the grim experience of the First World

War, the world desperately searched for peace, but not even the most
pacifistic diplomat could resolve the bomber question.

After a few

futile attempts the diplomats realized that bombers, unlike battle
ships, could not be limited by tonnage, numbers, or characteristics
because it was impossible for them to distinguish between military and
commercial aircraft.

Quite simply, the first ultimate weapon— the

bomber and the gas bomb— offered the world numerous peaceful benefits
as well as the promise of horrible destruction in war.

Furthermore,

since both aircraft and gas were manufactured for commercial and mili
tary uses, both could easily be secretly produced.
Nor were subsequent attempts to limit or abolish the bomber men
ace in the twenties any more successful.

Both the Hague Conference

of 1923 and the committee of air experts, which assembled at Brussels
in 1927, found it impossible to define or limit military air power.
Even though the World hailed the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, and one
writer^- even went so far as to call it "One of the greatest events
since the birth of Christ," Bratt

2

observed that this attempt to out

law war could not be "expected to function at the very moment it was
designed to function— on the eve of the outbreak of war and under the
pressure of war-psychosis."

Obviously, the weapons themselves had to

be outlawed; and, therefore, the representatives of sixty nations

^"The Pact of Paris," Literary Digest, VIIIC (8 September 1928),
p. 5.
2
Bratt, That Next War?, op. cit., p. 199.
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assembled at Geneva on 2 February 1932 in one last effort to limit
offensive weapons— especially the strategic bomber.
The Geneva Disarmament Conference opened with neither pomp nor
ceremony in, what Hoare^ called, one of the most "dismal buildings in
Europe."

It lacked proper ventilation and acoustics.

Moreover, the

representatives were continually scrutinized from the gallery by "an
army of savage looking women" who represented various American pacifist
groups.

Nevertheless, as Henry L. Stimson noted, the disarmament con

ference was "the result of some twelve years of development and it
[carried] with it in a very large measure the hopes of the peace-loving
2

peoples of the entire world."
By the time the first few months had passed, it became clear that
national interest still outweighed the longing for disarmament.

The

French called for an international police force and for the interna
tionalization of civil aviation.

The United States and Great Britain

disagreed with this plan and called instead for the elimination of
aerochemical, bacteriological, and submarine warfare.

Italy and Japan

added capital ships and aircraft carriers to the list.
Soviets wanted to abolish bombers, tanks, and artillery.

Meanwhile, the
In other

words, the French wanted to keep the Germans disarmed and they wanted
to neutralize German civil aviation; the Americans and the British
sought to redeem their isolation; the Italians hoped to neutralize

^Hoare, Nine Troubled Years, op. cit., p. 124.
o
"Stimson Will Back 'Energetic Steps' For Disarmament," New York
Times, 7 January 1932, p. 1.
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French power; the Japanese wanted security from the Americans and the
British; and the Russians wanted to diminish the mechanization of land
warfare.

Nevertheless, each nation expressed its fear of the bomber.

Appropriately enough, the British fired the first volley at the
strategic bomber.

Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, denounced

the promiscuous character of destruction which m o d e m war threatened
and then called for the abolition of the most m o d e m methods of war
fare; that is, those which threatened the existence of civilians.*
The American representative was more explicit.

He announced, "All

bombing 'planes should be abolished'," and added that all forms of
aerial bombardment must be outlawed.

2

Yet, despite these pleas, the

delegates made little progress by the time they adjourned for the
summer recess.

They had only agreed in principle that the bombing of

civilians should be outlawed, that all aerial bombardment should be
abolished, and that civilian aircraft should be limited by size and
weight.^
This is not to suggest, however, that the delegates were not
plagued with other problems.

Indeed, they sought to reach an agree

ment on the size of standing armies, reserves, and stockpiles.
thermore, tanks and artillery received their share of attention.

Fur
The

*Hyde and Nuttall, Air Defence and the Civil Population, op. cit.,
p. 41.
2
"Disarmament:
23 June 1932, p. 11

United States Proposals In Full," Times (London),

^"Arms Resolution Offered At Geneva," New York Times, 21 July 1932,
p. 4.
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delegates were also deadlocked on the vital question of disarmament
supervision and subsequent inspection procedures.

But Simon exposed

the most outstanding problem confronting the disarmament conference
in his^" address to the returning delegates:
There is no aspect of international disarmament
more vitally urgent than adoption without delay of the
most effective measures to preserve the civilian popu
lation from the fearful horrors of bombardment from the
air.
The British finally announced their willingness to go to any
lengths to disarm in the air.

They suggested that all disarm to Bri

tain's level— fifth in the world— and that they agree to accept the
lowest possible unladen weight for civilian aircraft.

This, as it

turned out, became the most fearsome stumbling block.

Almost everyone

believed that passenger and cargo aircraft could readily be converted
into bombers.

Therefore, if bombers must be outlawed, then large civil

ian aircraft must likewise be abolished.

As it was, the delegates spent

weeks, running into months, trying to define the specifications of a
bomber.

They focused in on three key characteristics; namely, weight,

engine horsepower, and the ratio of horsepower to wing area.

But the

delegates could not agree on even one of these points.
In order to circumvent this hurdle, the French— who readily confessed their fear of sudden aerial attack and chemical warfare—

2

^"Text of Simon Plan To Cut Armaments," New York Times, 18 Novem
ber 1932, p. 4.
2
"Initiative Seized By France," Times (London), 8 February 1932,
p. 12.
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proposed on several occasions that all civilian aircraft must be
placed under the control of the League of Nations.

The Italians,

who possessed some of the world's largest bombers, displayed little
interest in the French plan or in the weight-limitation scheme.

The

Italians finally announced that they would only consent to a weightlimitation scheme if all nations agreed to set the minimum weight for
aircraft at 1,430 pounds.^- Anything less, they reasoned, would elim
inate Italy's strike force but not the other nations lighter bomber
forces.
Yet both these ideas would have curtailed or doomed the develop
ment of commercial aviation.

In the end the United States killed both

plans when it announced that American commercial aviation must be ex
empt from any control because of America's "special geographical and
meteorological conditions."

2

Moreover, the British demand that the

RAF must maintain and, if necessary, use bombers against "primitives"
in frontier areas all but eliminated any chance of outlawing the bomber
or aerial bombardment.
Luckily for all concerned the Germans walked out of the disarma
ment negotiations on 14 October 1933.

The Germans, it should be re

called, had demanded Gleichberechtigung (equality of rights) from the
beginning.
armament.

Officially they were willing to agree to any level of dis
After all, they were already disarmed under the clauses of

^"Italy For Plane Limit To End Bombardment," New York Times, 22
August 1932, p. 7.
2
"Disarmament In the Air," Times (London), 17 February 1933,
p. 12.
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the Versailles Treaty.

But at Geneva the Germans demanded the right

to increase their forces to whatever level the others disarmed to.

Al

though the British could understand this reasoning, the French could
not.

The French argued that the disarmament conference could not al

low Germany to rearm.

On the other hand, Germany would no longer ac

cept the position of a second-class power.

Thus, while everyone

blamed Germany for the failure of the disarmament conference, Churchill'
shrewdly pointed out:
The nations had been nagging each other to disarm,
while all the time their hatreds, jealousies, and dangers
had been quite unrelieved. Of course they would not dis
arm. Not one of them was thinking of doing so, except,
perhaps Great Britain. On the contrary, during the last
seven or eight years those nations have increased their
armaments, especially the United States, whence came the
most beautiful speeches of all.
Actually the Geneva Disarmament Conference never had a chance of
succeeding.

Not only were military men unwilling to part with the

bomber, the aircraft carrier, or the tank, but the antics of restless
dictators compelled other governments to examine their defenses instead
of the question of disarmament.

A quick glance at the political scene

amply illustrates this.
After the economic crash of 1929, the world seemed restless and
filled with portents of momentous changes.

In Europe a sense of fore

boding replaced the "Spirit of Locarno" and most of the major powers
confronted serious social and economical problems.

In the Middle East

"Germany's Neighbors," Times (London), 15 November 1933, p. 16.
According to various official sources Churchill was quite correct. In
1932 the U. S. appropriated $109,066,000 on aviation, the British spent
$98,500,000, and the French spent $83,600,000; Fradkin, The Air Menace
and the Answer, op. cit., p. 138.
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both Syria and Palestine seethed with unrest while the Orient stirred
with signs of a coining storm.

Africa had not found solutions for its

numerous political and economic problems and South America was unable
to cope with its economic unrest or the bloody war on the Chaco pla
teau.

Hence, Fuller'1' ruefully observed:

"Never in the whole course

of modern history . . . has peace been more desirable than today; and
yet never during this tremendous period has the word 'War' been so
constantly upon our lips.

Wherever we turn we hear the whisper of war."

As it was the Japanese did not even bother to whisper in China.
When the Mukden Incident exploded into open warfare in October 1931,
the Japanese not only bombed Chinchow,

2

but they also circumvented the

Kellogg-Briand Pact by not declaring war.
watched its first "brush fire" war.

In fact, a shocked world

Every claim was contested in the

League and every statement of fact was denied.

Collective security

and world opinion had not deterred an aggressor— the League had clear
ly failed.

Moreover, the League's staunchest defenders rebuked such

criticism with the surprisingly familiar argument, " . . .

could anyone

tell how much worse things would have been in Manchuria if it had not
3

been for the restraining influence of the League?"

This, of course,

^J. F. C. Fuller, "War and Western Civilization," Nineteenth
Century, CXV (April 1934), p. 394.
2

"Japanese Bombard Chinchow From Air," New York Times, 9 October
1931, p. 1; "War," Time, XVIII (19 October 1931), p. 18.
3
"The Manchurian Dispute," Times (London), 12 November 1937,
p. 7.
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side-stepped the fact that the war existed and people were being
bombed despite the Covenant.
And then, a mere four days before the opening session of the
disarmament conference, the Japanese attacked Shanghai.

For the next

two months the New York Times carried daily front page accounts of
the war in China while the disarmament conference often slipped from
the front page.

Americans and Europeans read of the bombing of Chapei

and how thousands perished in the ensuing conflagration.-^" Even though
2
the Japanese Ambassador

assured the League that "notwithstanding the

unfortunate situation in the Far East," Japan was still eager to disarm,
the war in China dragged on into 1933.

Moreover, during this last

phase the Japanese used gas bombs against China's military and civilian
3

personnel.

The warnings of the past decade were apparently all coming

true in the Orient.
Meanwhile, the League alternately pleaded with Bolivia and Paraguay
to cease their war in the Chaco wilderness and threatened them with
various consequences if they did not.

Nevertheless, these two insig

nificant nations defied the League as easily as Japan.

By the time
4

the war ended in 1935, it had claimed about 250,000 casualties.

But

1mJapanese Planes Again Bomb Shanghai,” New York Times, 3 February
1932, p. 1; "Chinese Casualties at Chapei," Times (London), 5 February
1932, p. 12.
^"Matsudaira Pledges To Aid Arms Cut," New York Times, 11 February
1932, p. 15.
O
Fradkin, The Air Menace and the Answer, op. cit., p. 77; "Disaster
Preparedness Training-Lesson Plan For Hazard Survey Forces," (22nd Bom
bardment Wing, March AFB, Calif.: March Form 57, 1968), pp. 1, 20.
4
Goss, Civilian Morale Under Aerial Bombardment, op. cit., p. 77.
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it cannot be determined how many of them were victims of the brutal,
though limited, air operations.

Nevertheless, the Chaco War, the

conflict in China, the continued fighting on India's northwest
frontier, and the strife in Kurdistan all contributed additional signs
and portents of things that awaited the civilized world should it again
embark on a major war.
By 1933 a great many government officials, military men, and in
fluential citizens were unmistakably concerned with the bomber menace.
Whenever war was mentioned, these men immediately visualized a sky
blackened by bombers.

Moreover, they were unable to devise a feasible

method of mitigating this threat to civilization.

Accordingly,

one

American^ spoke for millions of people when he sadly commented:
To the man-in-the-street the shadow of the bomber
is the sharp expression of what another war must mean.
Its shadow falls across his home, across the office and
factory and field where he works, across his schools
threatening his liberty and his existence.

^W. O'D. Pierce, Air War: Its Psychological, Technical, and
Social Implications (New York: Modern Age Books, 1939), p. 7.
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RUMINATION

If there is to be another war, we know only
one thing about it— that is, how it will be
begun. No one can tell what will happen
after it gets started, nor how much of civ
ilization will be left at the close, but the
one sure fact is that it will begin in the air.
James T. Shotwell (1934)

The question that most urgently needs answering is why has vir
tually every historical study since World War II overlooked this fear
of the strategic bomber?

Why do historians like Higham^ declare that

singular bloody incidents during the bombing of London "were used in
the following years by statistically unsophisticated air force planners
to create a horrible spectre of the power of the bomb," and that their
fears of the future were "largely out of touch with reality?"
would a student

2

And why

of World War I bombing operations write as late as

1973 that the preceptor's and warrior's forecasts were merely "exag
gerated claims" for air power?
Interestingly enough Maitland provided the answer some 150 years
ago when he observed that it is too easily forgotten that the past was
once the future.

Obviously, this general disregard of the bomber men

ace is based on the knowledge that the major powers did not use gas
bombs against each other in World War II.

^Robin Higham, Air Power;
Martin's Press, 1972), p. 52.

Since gas was considered

A Concise History (New York;

St.

2
Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, op. cit., p. 208.
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an indispensable part of the bomber's repertoire of weaponry, it is
ludicrous to assume that inter-war fears of strategic bombing were
groundless just because they failed to materialize in the last war.
Despite all the accounts of how well Europeans endured the heavy
bombing in World War II, it is always interesting to ask the survivors
how long they would have remained in their basements if they had learn
ed that gas bombs were mixed in with the high explosives and incendi
aries .
It goes without saying that today we possess an ultimate weapon
for more deadly than the strategic bomber of pre-World War II days.
But this is simply stating that the ultimate weapon has been refined
to more destructive levels.
power of the atom.

Few people in the thirties foresaw the

Nevertheless, they could picture as clearly as we

can today the potentiality of their ultimate weapon.

The bomber was

just as real to them as today's ICBM is to us, and they had to face
the bomber just as we must confront the nuclear missile.
Above all, it cannot be over emphasized that air power received
the Lion's share of attention whenever war was discussed during the
inter-war period, and that aerochemical
to

civilization.

warfare was considereda threat

Liddell Hart^ clearly pointed this out inhis1937

publication:
To anyone who analyses the comparatively slight
material results of air raids in 1914-1918, it is re
markable to find what a profound psychological impres
sion they made, and have left. . . . The effects have
not disappeared with the cessation of the cause.

^Liddell Hart, Europe In Arms, op.

cit., p. 12.
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Even the official British history^ of World War II bombing oper
ations pointed out that the Gotha raids were "often recalled in later
years" and "the fact that two squadrons of fighters had to be with
drawn from France at a critical moment was never forgotten.

After a

decade of speeches and writing, many people were inoculated with the
idea that the "Front" no longer existed and that civilians were doomed
to perish in their own homes or workshops.

Although some people prob

ably viewed the preceptors and warriors as fanatics, many other people
listened to them and conjured up pictures of a gassed and dying world.
However, it is also true that the bomber menace was a matter of
speculation and academic discussion.

But this was part of the out

growth of the many attempts to cope with the ultimate weapon.
observers only disagreed on the severity of the next war.

Informed

Otherwise

most agreed that the bomber could destroy cities with high explosives,
incendiary, and gas bombs.

It was also accepted that this could destroy

civilization itself since society could not survive without governmental
authority, public services, and industry.
problems for air staff planners.

This, in turn, created

For example, should the bulk of the

bombers be launched at the cities or at enemy military installations.
After all, every bomber squadron that was aimed at a civilian center
would not only leave enemy bases intact, but also their "second strike
capability.”

This finally led most observers to conclude that only

the threat of retaliation and mutual destruction could deter a major

Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, op. cit.,
pp. 44-45.
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war.

Consequently, each side had to guess the others' intention and

the hesitancy this created manifested itself in 1939 and 1940.

But

Jonathan Griffin,^ among others, astutely observed in 1936 the insta
bility of a situation where enemy bombers continually confronted each
other:
It would be a balance of terrors— for that is
what the balance of power, loaded with bombs, should
truly be called. In the end one group must strike.
Nevertheless, the publications, speeches, speculations, and the
aerial war games all clearly illustrated how well aware the world was
of the bomber menace.

Furthermore, it required little imagination to

combine a decade of progress with the effects of such limited engage
ments as the China episode, the Chaco War, and later the Ethiopian War
o
and the Spanish Civil War.

Charlton

probably had all this in mind

when he lamented:
How tragic that the brain-child, b o m in the early
years of this century, should have become a Frankenstein
in its early thirties.

^Quoted in Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima, op. cit., p. 89.
2
Charlton, War From the Air, op. cit., p. 7.
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